Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Edward A. Hewett

Kim Woodard

Peter Grothe

Vladimir Socor

Antoni M. Kapcia

John K. Cooley

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1980



EAST EUROPEAN DISSENT — Walter D. Connor

Soviet Jews — Zvi Gitelman

Nonaligned Movement — William M. LeoGrande

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Problems of Communism

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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1980 VOL XXIX

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IN THE JANUARY-FEBRUARY ISSUE OF

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Articles

Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?
Walter D. Connor

With the possible exception of post-1976 Poland, there is little evidence as yet of workers and intellectuals' bridging the gap between their respective interests to form coalitions in opposition to the East European Communist regimes. Expanded working classes, faced with declining mobility opportunities, may develop increased "class consciousness," but they are more likely to be concerned with "bread and butter" issues than with the more abstract goals of the dissenting intelligentsia.

Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways
Zvi Gitelman

In the last decade, a variety of official Soviet policies—including a sharp increase in anti-Zionism—have interacted with latent popular feelings to generate a new surge of antisemitism in the USSR. The decision to allow some Jews to emigrate, far from easing matters, has increased tensions, as Moscow has evidently come to view Soviet Jews as a virtual fifth column to be denied advanced education and responsible jobs. Such developments have convinced even many highly acculturated persons of Jewish descent that their future does not lie in the Soviet Union.

Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement
William M. LeoGrande

Since its inception, the nonaligned movement has experienced not only a major expansion of its ranks but also a radicalization of its outlook. In its first decade, its politics were shaped by the cold war conflict between East and West; in its second decade, they have been defined largely by the members' grievances against the West alone. As the movement enters its third decade, however, its politics, especially in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, will probably be determined by an interaction with both of the world's power blocs that is more complex than that which characterized either of the two previous decades.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Soviet Energy: Supply vs. Demand
Edward A. Hewett

Soviet and East European energy needs have major ramifications both for world energy supplies and for political relations within the Soviet orbit. In the 1980's, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance should become a net importer of petroleum. The key question is whether the Soviet Union will continue to subsidize the oil imports of its Comecon allies or force them to make hard-currency purchases on their own.

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China's Energy Prospects
Kim Woodard

Prospects that China will become a major energy exporter over the next several decades are dim. While the People's Republic has considerable energy resources, its own enormous developmental needs can be expected to absorb the bulk of its increased output of commercial energy commodities; indeed, one might even predict, on the basis of comparative analysis with other major economies, that China will itself become a net importer of energy toward the end of this century.

Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe
Peter Grothe

Communist leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe have long considered broadcasting to their countries by Western radio stations one of the most potent threats to their rule. Western broadcasts force Communist authorities to address topics they might otherwise seek to avoid and to adjust domestic broadcasts to compete with the foreign stations. To the extent that Western broadcasts break regime monopolies on information, this perceived challenge is likely to grow in the 1980's as advancing technology makes not only Western radio but also Western television accessible to the masses in Communist states.

Sourcebooks on European Communist States
Vladimir Socor

Sourcebooks on Soviet and East European affairs tend to fall into three broad categories: surveys of current events, bibliographies of published work, and resource guides for those interested in primary research possibilities. Among a recent sampling of such sourcebooks, the resource guides appear most likely to promote progress in Soviet-East European area studies, whereas the surveys and bibliographies are more useful for reference and orientation.

The Cuban Enigma
Antoni M. Kapcia

The Cuban Revolution has now lasted for more than 20 years and appears to have become an established fact of international life. Over these years, Cuba has evolved an "alternative" revolutionary model to that of the USSR. This may be described as nationalist "mobilization politics," with adapted elements of socialist models and an agrarian, export-led distribution economy. Moreover, Cuba seems to be slowly, if tentatively, reducing some aspects of the dependence on the Soviet Union that marked the Revolution's early years.

Conflict Within the Iraqi Left
John K. Cooley

Since the overthrow of the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in 1958, various groups in Iraq, all claiming to speak with a leftist voice, have competed to lead Iraq toward what they perceive as its rightful place in the world. Of these, the most important have been the Baath and the Iraqi Communist Party. While a rapprochement between these two rivals took place in the wake of the establishment of the present Baathist regime in 1968 and of a subsequent warming of Soviet-Iraqi relations, the recent discord between Baghdad and Moscow has produced a renewal of the conflict.

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Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?

By Walter D. Connor

Judged by the ultimate test of success applicable to states—survival—the East European Communist regimes have succeeded. All past the age of 30, they have now achieved a measure of security after an early period marked both by severely compromised legitimacy and identity as Soviet-sponsored and -controlled regimes (as all save Albania and Yugoslavia have been) and by the threat of "rollback" by a West then preponderant in the international power balance. Still dominated in many matters by the USSR, each regime nonetheless strikes, in characteristic ways, a balance between persistent elements of national identity and the effects of 30 years of Soviet-initiated change.

None, however, has escaped internal protest and criticism, dissent and opposition. The sources of this opposition have been diverse. Segments of the intelligentsia seem to be in a state of permanent dissent, finding as much to despise in the current regimes as their forebears did in the interwar regimes of elitist Poland and Hungary, "bourgeois" Czechoslovakia, and the unstable Balkan states. Workers, too, have registered discontent, but the potential impact of their larger numbers has been reduced by the episodic quality of their activity. For the most part, the new working classes have remained quiet—their outbursts leaving only memories of riots, marches, and crudely lettered banners, but no literature, no organizational heritage, however loose.

Mr. Connor is director of Soviet and East European studies at the US Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. He is the author of Deviance in Soviet Society, *1972, and* Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR, *1979, as well as coauthor of* Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems, *1977.*

Regimes have prospered from this situation, wherein generally only the intelligentsia seemed to require constant collective political surveillance. But things would grow less favorable were the future to produce a more politicized working class, and if linkages of an enduring sort were to be established between workers and the more articulate intellectuals. This article shall examine—in the light of past events and current politics in Eastern Europe—the possibilities of the development of such linkages.

Workers and the Workers' State

Though East European Communist parties assumed power in the 1940's in the name of the "workers," the dependence of these parties—as organizational entities—on this social base was minimal. Highly disciplined, centralized organizations, the Communist parties found their raison d'être in the acquisition and retention of absolute power, not in the direct representation of worker aspirations. What Richard Lowenthal has said of the Soviet party is equally true of its later imitators:

> *. . . the Russian Bolsheviks' pretense of being a working-class party had never been true either, even when industrial workers constituted the majority of their membership–because their form of organization made them independent of the actual support of the bulk of the working class and enabled them to change their "social basis" as occasion required . . . .*[1]

Liberated as they were from any mass social base,

[1] Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 109.

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Workers on the production line at a modern pharmaceutical plant on the outskirts of Warsaw.

—P.A. Interpress Photos.

the East European regimes, backed by Soviet power, were able to a large degree to insulate themselves from popular demands, to suppress their very expression. The reality was party domination of all classes, including the workers, and preemption by the party of all organizational "space" between workers and the polity through dominance of the trade-union organizations, "production conferences," and other organs at the factory and higher levels. Add to this formidable array of party control instrumentalities the police apparatus, especially at its high-Stalinist peak, and the quietude of the workers is not difficult to explain.

Yet, all these were not the only factors contributing to the relative absence of worker militancy and dissent during the "gray years" of Stalinism. As I have argued elsewhere,[2] the impact of rapid economic modernization and industrialization on the working class also contributed greatly to its political "neutralization." True, the "takeoff" into "planned" industrialization in the late 1940's, with its high reinvestment rates, depressed the living standards and real incomes of most social groups—including many elements of the working class—to a point lower than that of the last years before World War II and lower than the level achieved in the first few years of reconstruction after World War II, but the result was not that destabilizing with respect to the working class. This was because the "working class" itself was undergoing rapid change. It grew in size as a consequence of the recruitment of peasants (which in turn eased the traditional problems of rural overpopulation and underemployment.) "Hereditary" proletarians became a minority in workers' ranks. Moreover, the demand for present and future managers and professionals of presumably "healthy" social origin generated a flow out of the ranks of the working class, especially by working-class children, into the new socialist intelligentsia, the new political and economic bureaucracies. Despite the regimes' continued rhetoric extolling proletarian virtue, the participants in this movement out of the working class experienced it as upward mobility.

The working class, thus, was open at both ends. At the top, the ambitious, intelligent, and even opportunistic—from whom working-class leaders have always tended to come—were co-opted into the new privileged groups. At the bottom, peasants and their offspring, unused to city life and industrial discipline but eager to escape the harsh rural life, entered in increased numbers. It made little difference that the new socialist intelligentsia of, say, 1952 did not live as well as its interwar predecessor, or that skilled workers in the Warsaw or Budapest of the same year worked longer for less than their counterparts in 1938. The frame of reference of the members of the new intelligentsia was that of the working class from which they had risen; that of the new workers, the peasant world they had left. For both, their new status yielded satisfactions, psychological and material, which gave them a "stake" in the system, a reason to feel that what had befallen them could not have come under the old regime.

This state of affairs profoundly affected the psychology of the working class and the probabilities of its developing "class consciousness" in the classic sense. For the peasant, mobility into the working class—into the urban environment, to a job with bounded hours, steady work, and regular pay—represented an *individual* solution. For working-class offspring not content to settle for their father's status, the expansion of educational opportunities and the demand for professional cadres held out the prospect, once again, of *individual* advancement. These high mobility prospects militated against a readiness to

[2] What follows summarizes points made in the author's "Social Change and Stability in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1977. See also Walter D. Connor, *Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

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seek *collective* solutions to problems—a readiness more likely to arise when individuals are convinced that their membership in a particular class is a "life sentence."

However, the prospects of mobility have been diminished in recent years. The intelligentsia is not expanding at the rate it did during the "heroic" years, and the rate of growth of the working class has slowed with a decline in fertility and the drying-up of the peasant labor pool. Although the offspring of today's intelligentsia possess inherited advantages in their quest to reproduce their parents' status, working-class youths face diminished prospects for advancement, for their numbers and educational aspirations have grown faster than university vacancies. Working-class youths of today also must view their social status differently than their fathers did theirs, i.e., from the more critical perspective of the working class itself rather than as ex-peasants. The chances are increasing that these youths will be forced to remain, against their will, in their class of origin.

Thus, there have appeared to be better prospects for the emergence of a proletarian "class consciousness." Some saw such a development foreshadowed in the Polish events of 1970 and 1976, the Romanian strikes of 1977, and other protests. But the question of whether the "new" activism means anything more fundamental than the spontaneous and ad hoc disorders of 1953–56 is a complex one, and even Marxist dissidents have expressed doubts. For example, the Hungarian András Hegedüs has voiced concern that in the Polish protests of 1970 and 1976, "it was not the demands of the workers as producers . . . but as consumers which came to the front,"[3] and he has argued that the experience of the past has turned work-

[3] András Hegedüs, "The Main Characteristic of the Social Structure of East European Societies, and the Alternatives of Democratic Development of their Power Structure," paper presented to the 1978 Annual Meeting of the National Association for Soviet and East European Studies, Cambridge University, Cambridge, mimeo., p. 8.

A photo of noncollectivized Romanian peasants in the village of Dobresti outside Bucharest in 1953. Industrialization has since brought many such individuals into urban, industrial jobs.

—Wide World.

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ers toward the maximization of wages and the minimization of work to the exclusion of other concerns.[4] Ernest Mandel has called Marxist dissidents to the task of helping the working mass become "politically active and conscious," but has noted that the "higher level of job security and much lower work rhythm" which workers enjoy in socialist economies vs. their counterparts in capitalist economies will make this difficult.[5] It is, indeed, difficult to deny that workers' demands have been "economistic."[6]

Whether these demands and those who express them should therefore be written off as of little potential significance for political change is another question. True, in the past, there has been little inclination on the part of workers to merge their particular demands with broader demands voiced by intellectual dissidents for liberalization of economic and political life in Eastern Europe. But is this still the case? To answer that question, one must first examine the record in an attempt to understand better how and why the activities of these two groups have diverged.

Different Worlds, Different Concerns

The dynamics of Communist politics over the last three decades have unquestionably shown that a wide gap still separates intelligentsia from workers. At most critical junctures, cooperation between them has been the exception rather than the rule.

Poland provides much to ponder in this regard. In 1956, each group contributed to the upheaval of the Polish October, but in different and uncoordinated ways. A rebel intelligentsia and studentry made its impact felt in the pages of *Po prostu* and other journals, as well as through a "revisionist" element in the upper councils of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) itself, paving the way for the return of Wladyslaw Gomułka. Although little contact existed between this intelligentsia and Poland's workers, expressions of dissent by the latter—the riots in Poznan and elsewhere and the rapid growth of workers' councils in the factories—were perhaps even more critical than actions of the intelligentsia in convincing the regime hierarchs that substantial accommodations would be



The Szczecin building in which Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek met with striking workers in January 1971. The signs read: "The Central Trade Union Council [CRZZ]—with the Workers and Not with the Party"; "Punish Those Guilty of the Bloodshed"; and "Citizens' Militia: Do Not Shoot at Workers."

—A private photo by a Polish citizen now in the West.

required to restore social peace. In these actions, workers were returning to the tactics used less successfully almost a decade earlier to defend themselves against fundamental changes heralded by the absorption of the Polish Socialist Party into the PUWP.[7] In the context of early 1957, contemplating the tragedy that had befallen their counterparts in Budapest, both the intelligentsia and the workers of Poland could convince themselves that they had "won." Nevertheless, each Polish group had acted separately to achieve its results.

In the Polish crises of 1968 and 1970, there were not even simultaneous actions by both groups. In the first crisis, the intellectuals and students found themselves quite alone. The workers showed no disposition either to identify with the quest of the intelligentsia for

[4] *Socialism and Bureaucracy*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1976, pp. 116-17.

[5] Ernest Mandel, "The Social Forces Behind Détente," in Ken Coates, Ed., *Détente and Socialist Democracy*, New York, NY, Monad Press, 1976, pp. 45-46.

[6] For some comments on the nature of workers' demands, see David Lane, *The Socialist Industrial State*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1976, pp. 97-101.

[7] See Jaime Reynolds, "Communists, Socialists and Workers: Poland, 1944-1948," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1978, pp. 516-39.

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greater freedoms of its own or to be greatly concerned about the "anti-Zionist" binge of 1967–68, in which Gomulka struggled to retain his grip on power against the challenge of Mieczyslaw Moczar and at the same time "cool" the intellectuals. In December 1970, the situation was reversed. Precipitous price rises brought the workers into the streets and firebombs into party headquarters, but a dispirited intelligentsia expressed little active sympathy with "bread and butter" concerns of the workers. Thus, the spheres of workers and intellectuals, in dissent as in everyday life, continued to be separate in Poland.

What did the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia tell us about worker-intellectual relations there? A decade later, there still remain questions about the degree of collaboration across class boundaries in the Czechoslovak reform movement of that time. To be sure, in March 1968, the philosopher Ivan Svitak told a group of mine workers in Ostrava that "the best guarantee that our process of regeneration will be socialist and democratic in nature lies in the alliance of workers and intellectuals, that is to say in you, the working class."[8] But such an alliance did not arise swiftly. Some support for a central reform demand of the intelligentsia—a free press—came in the form of "workers' committees for the defense of press freedom," which emerged first in the Ostrava region and then elsewhere. Still, neither the mandate nor the procedures and activities of such committees were ever clear. As one analyst put it, they could be regarded only as "a worthy initiative which, although promising spontaneous working class action and an alliance between workers and the intelligentsia, did not in fact go very far."[9]

Moreover, the attempts of the reformers to "sell" the nation on the dual package of political and economic reform encountered a mix of worker apathy and resistance. This response reflected the success of a government policy that, since 1948, had attempted to drive a wedge between the workers (who were exalted in almost cult proportions in official rhetoric) and the intelligentsia (oft-derided). This divisive view had "infected the party as a whole and all levels of society."[10] Under Antonin Novotny, the regime continued to play on worker "prejudices and disdain for intellectuals."[11]

As the events of 1968 unfolded, Novotny partisans denounced the reformers as "radicals" who sought "to rob the working classes of what they had achieved in 20 years' hard work." Indeed, the reformers' call for discipline and productivity—in addition to appeals for greater civil freedom—did seem to threaten the extreme egalitarianism of reward and the degree of security workers had achieved in jobs they performed with minimal effort. Furthermore, the same persons who had crippled implementation of the New Economic System shamelessly blamed its architects for the sorry state of the Czechoslovak economy in 1968.[12]

Whatever the distortions in such demagoguery, both the political emphasis of the reform and the social background of its vocal proponents made it seem alien to some, perhaps a majority, of the workers. Gordon Skilling describes the situation:

The workers were often unhappy with the prominent part taken by journalists, scholars, and writers after January and feared a "hegemony" of the intellectuals. . . . The economic reform itself was viewed with considerable reserve, and even opposition, raising as it did the specter of unemployment and by its emphasis on productivity and qualification, threatening the "equalization" of income under previous wage policy. The so-called workers' policy in the past had given them, they felt, "social security," assuring them both employment and a minimum and stable standard of living, and affording certain sectors of the working class a privileged position. Such attitudes were fostered by trade union and party functionaries, often of working-class origin, who saw their own positions endangered by reforms and speaking in the name of "their" class, inculcated the workers with their fears for the fate of socialism.[13]

As a consequence, no firm "coalition" of workers and intellectuals emerged in Czechoslovakia until August 1968, when the Soviet-led invasion persuaded the two groups to look beyond "class" or occupational interests. The effect was similar to the temporary unification of views wrought by invasion or the threat of it in 1956 Hungary and Poland. However, it was not long before workers and intellectuals returned to uncoordi-

[8] Ivan Svitak, *The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968–1969*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 52.

[9] Vladimir V. Kusin, *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 36. For more on the committees on press freedom, see ibid., pp. 34–37; and Svitak, op. cit., pp. 74–75, 96–97.

[10] H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 132.

[11] Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962–1968*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 29.

[12] See Alex Pravda, "Some Aspects of the Czechoslovak Economic Reform and the Working Class in 1968," *Soviet Studies*, July 1973, pp. 104ff.

[13] Skilling, op. cit., p. 580.

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The Soviet invasion of Prague in August 1968 unified the mass of the Czechoslovak capital's population in opposition.

—Helman Pabel.

nated pursuit of their respective and disparate goals.

Let us look more closely at these differing sets of aspirations. Many members of the intelligentsia, despite the group's generally successful accommodation to the socialist system and benefit from it, incline toward liberal reform for reasons both of self-interest and of principle. Decentralizing, market-oriented reforms of the economy promise rewards for scarce skills and knowledge. The intellectual is likely to see his specialized competence as "scarce" and to anticipate greater rewards in any move away from the "compression" of pay differentials common in command systems. "Marketization" also promises broadening of the range of goods, services, and housing available to the many intellectuals and professionals who are already well paid. Greater freedom to travel abroad offers the prospect of new earning opportunities, as well as professional growth.

More fundamentally, liberal intellectuals are attracted by the prospect of a more generalized "freedom," which would permit them to go where facts, theory, and the thought process lead. While virtually no large organization anywhere completely guarantees the specialist such autonomy, the politicization of broad spectra of life and the pervasiveness of the party apparatus in research institutes and universities (as well as in the factories and farms) in Eastern Europe tend to reduce such autonomy to a minimum. Intellectuals look to reform to bring a freer, looser, "decompressed" political environment, which they see as benefiting not only themselves but other classes as well.

But other classes—the working class the largest among them—have their own priorities. As Alexander Matejko puts it, for the intelligentsia "political freedom was and is a primary need, whereas for the blue-collar workers it is only a secondary need."[14] Indeed, given the social and economic history of the East European working classes, preoccupation with more mundane concerns—an adequate material existence and security of employment to undergird it—is no surprise.

And, whatever the ultimate consequences for productivity and efficiency, socialist economies have provided "full" and secure employment—often through an overstocking of labor, which creates a full-paid "underemployment" wherein individual workers do not work hard and many husband their energies for

[14] Alexander Matejko, *Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1974, p. 114.

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other, more remunerative "private" work.[15] However modest the general living standards may be, wage and welfare policies have provided a "floor" below which one cannot fall, whether one is diligent or not. These policies have also in some measure kept down top earnings, in response to and reinforcing egalitarian sentiments among workers.

Prescriptions for economic reform, particularly the emphasis on increased efficiency and a tighter tying of reward to performance and to scarcity of skills, seem to menace many worker interests. Unskilled workers fear the stated preference for skilled workers; lazy workers, the endorsement of the industrious and energetic; those in unprofitable factories, the possibility of closings and layoffs; and all workers, a new and more demanding tempo of work.

The need for financial and psychological "belt-tightening" among some portion of the working class in the short run lessens the receptivity of workers to the long-run reform promise of a more productive economy and an overall improvement in living standards. Promises for a greater role of workers in management—a change itself generally envisaged for later stages of the reforms—run up against worker coolness to contemporary forms of "participation" and perhaps some preference for revitalization of the trade unions as defenders of workers' interests *against* management.[16] As Matejko observed in the Polish context, "intellectuals, who may advocate reform, cannot count on the immediate support of the blue-collar workers."[17]

Through the early 1970's in Eastern Europe, then, the concerns of the dissident intelligentsia sparked uncertain response at best among the workers. The working class, when it showed signs of dissent and revolt, generally acted independently of the intelligentsia, manifesting different timetables and priorities. Such outbursts were episodic and lacking in organization. There was little evidence of any alliance between intellectuals and workers.

Prospects for a Coalition

Events in Poland, beginning in June 1976, have raised at least the possibility of a significant change in the general pattern just described. However, the Polish case must be judged against the backdrop of developments in other East European states to determine whether it is unique or symptomatic of a major new trend in the area.

As the summer of 1976 came to Poland, things seemed to be proceeding according to form. For example, there had been little worker participation in the protests that had been voiced by Polish intellectuals in late 1975 and early 1976 over proposed changes in the Polish constitution that would further strengthen regime controls and "cement" relations between Poland and the USSR.[18]

But an unprecedented sequence of events began with the riots by workers in Ursus, Radom, and other locales after the June 25 official announcement of sharp price increases. As in 1970, the workers acted on their own, responding to "bread and butter" issues of particular concern to them (in the process bringing both a rollback of the price rises and police repression). This time, however, the intellectuals came to the support of the workers in a most untypical fashion. On June 29, an open letter to the Polish parliament (the *Sejm*) from 14 intellectuals denounced government reprisals against the workers who had rioted, and observed that "on the agendum is the establishment of a real representation of the workers."[19] This was followed on July 11 by Jacek Kuron's open letter to Italian Communist Party Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer, calling for Eurocommunist support for the Polish workers' cause,[20] and then throughout the summer by further protests on the workers' behalf. Finally, in September, there emerged a Workers' Defense Committee (KOR). This group, which included a broad spectrum of mainly Marxist intellectuals, from Jerzy Andrzejewski to Jacek Kuron, promised economic, legal, and medical assistance to strikers' families; called for an amnesty; and demanded investigations of "police brutality" during and after the riots.

The creation of this "bridge" across the gap between worker and intellectual reflected, perhaps, a reassessment of the paths to, and potential for, political change in Poland. Indeed, the young Polish historian Adam Michnik, a "veteran" of the struggles against intellectual repression in 1968 and subsequently a member of KOR's directing committee, had earlier urged intellectuals to appreciate

the power of the workers who, by their firm and resolute attitude, have already wrested some spectacular

[15] See the study of the Ikarus factory work force summarized in Radio Free Europe, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter *HSR*), No. 2, May 17, 1978, pp. 7–10.

[16] On this in the 1968 Czechoslovak context, see Pravda, op. cit., pp. 121ff.

[17] Op. cit., p. 219.

[18] For documents protesting the proposed constitutional changes, see Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, Compiler, *Dissent in Poland 1976–1977*, London, 1977, pp. 11–24.

[19] Ibid., p. 71.

[20] Ibid., pp. 72–75.

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Workers from the tractor plant in Ursus block the Berlin-Warsaw train during disorders in the summer of 1976 protesting drastic food price increases announced by the Polish government.

—Stern Archiv from Black Star.

concessions from the government. . . . without any doubt it is of them that the government is really afraid; it is the pressure of this social class which is the sine qua non of the evolution of national life towards democratization.[21]

The pro-worker activism of KOR, fostered by implicit support from the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, by occasional spontaneous open letters of protest from workers,[22] and by the gingerly quality of the harassment by a regime concerned above all with "muddling through" a time of trial, proceeded along the lines KOR had laid out for itself. To be sure, KOR remained an organization of intellectuals who had decided to defend workers' interests—not a joint organization of workers and intellectuals as such. The degree of unity between the two groups with respect to demands and views must be regarded as questionable—despite Michnik's statement that "within one year, we have succeeded in creating an extraordinary unity among intellectuals, students, and workers."[23] Still, the dissenting intellectuals had learned the importance of joint action from the events of 1968 and 1970.

The government, aware of the significance of such action, attempted at various junctures to discredit the intellectuals of KOR before the workers. For example, a speaker at a Socialist Youth Union conference in February 1977 stated that "in 1968 these people [the intellectuals] expressed their contempt of the working class. They don now the garb of defenders of workers."[24]

The year 1977 saw some significant, if partial, successes for KOR and its causes. By late July, less than 13 months after the Radom-Ursus riots, all the jailed strikers had been released. KOR also was eventually able to achieve some measure of cooperation with a new organization, the Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO)[25]—a group with a non-Marxist and more traditionalist orientation. At the

[21] Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," *Survey* (London), Summer-Autumn 1976, p. 274.

[22] See *Dissent in Poland*, pp. 112ff., for the texts of workers' letters from Radom and Ursus.

[23] Quoted in *La Repubblica* (Rome), Nov. 16, 1976, and cited in Radio Free Europe, *Polish Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter *PSR*), No. 40, Nov. 29, 1976, p. 11.

[24] See *PSR*, No. 5, Feb. 18, 1977, p. 10.

[25] *Dissent in Poland*, pp. 180–86; and *PSR*, No. 16, June 15, 1977, pp. 1–2.

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end of September, KOR reconstituted itself as the "Committee for Social Self-Defense-KOR" (KSS-KOR).[26] Its earlier, more limited objectives partially achieved, the group took on some new, more general goals, committing itself to "supporting and defending all social initiatives aimed at implementing human and civil rights." While these more "global" objectives (like the renaming of the committee) might to some degree have blurred the earlier commitment to specifically workers' causes, KSS-KOR announced a new *samizdat* journal, *Robotnik* (The Worker), designed to support a unified defense of workers' interests, promote independent representatives of the workers in place of the "moribund" official trade unions, and work for greater worker control over matters such as factory conditions and housing.

The Polish situation just described was unique in Eastern Europe at the time—not at all with respect to the existence of dissent, but to the degree that it provided signs of a bridging in some measure of the old gap between workers and intellectuals. With regard to the latter phenomenon, the situation elsewhere in the area was quite different. This is clear from a brief review of the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary.

After roughly eight years of "normalization" under Gustav Husak, dissent resurfaced in Czechoslovakia in January 1977 in the form of the "Charter 77" manifesto. The "chartists" formed no committee as such and coalesced around no set of crises such as the June 1976 events had provided for their Polish counterparts. The political and economic scene in Czechoslovakia was very different from that in Poland. In Prague, there was an unpopular government, but one that felt itself rather more firmly "in the saddle" than did that of Poland's Edward Gierek. This sense of security was due to Soviet support, political resignation on the part of the populace, and a different set of economic facts. "Consumerism" had flourished in Czechoslovakia, sweetening the bitter pill of "normalization." Thus, there was unfertile ground for the seeds of protest, and by all indications, mass response to the chartists has hardly been overwhelming. To be sure, the number of signatories grew rapidly from the initial 250 or so (by mid-1978, to more than 1,000 signatories), and at each phase those identifying themselves as workers grew as well. But the total of the latter never reached the point where it was more than a modest minority of all signers. Moreover, some portion of the "worker" signatories were former students or former members of the intelligentsia—precipitated by political reprisal into the working class—rather than "authentic" proletarians.[27]

Prominent figures in the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR): left, Jacek Kuron; right, Adam Michnik.

—NOWA.

Basically, the chartists have lacked an issue broad enough, and conditions appropriate, to galvanize other groups. Their problem is not so much one of integrating intelligentsia and worker interests as of finding *any* significant mass base willing to offer support. Conscious of this isolation of dissidents, and probably prepared to face the subsequent protest from the West, including the "Eurocommunist" parties, the Husak regime in late 1979 went ahead with the trial of six activists connected with Charter 77 and the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) and, on October 22-23, sentenced five to a total of nineteen and a half years' imprisonment (the sixth to a suspended term).[28] Those convicted ranged from the writer Vaclav Havel (four and a half years) to Dana Nemcova, a mother of seven (two years, with a five-year suspended sentence)—an outcome probably inconceivable in Poland, where volatile public moods are an element with which Gierek's regime must reckon. Dissent in Czechoslovakia thus remains a virtual monopoly of the highly committed, and the meetings that since 1978 have occasionally taken

[26] On this and what follows, see *PSR*, No. 25, Oct. 13, 1977, pp. 5-9.

[27] See H. Hajek and L. Niznansky, "Czechoslovak Dissent: Sources and Aims," Radio Free Europe, *RAD Background Report* (Munich—hereafter *RAD*), No. 143, June 29, 1978, p. 7.

[28] See Radio Free Europe, *Czechoslovak Situation Report* (Munich), No. 33, Oct. 24, 1979, pp. 1-6.

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Jiri Hajek, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a signer of the Charter 1977 appeal, shown under house arrest in Prague in 1977.

—Vincent Mentzel.

place between Czechoslovak dissidents and some of their Polish KOR counterparts[29] may indicate that the former have more in common with the latter than with any significant segment of their own countrymen.

In Romania, 1977 saw manifestations of dissent by both intellectuals and workers, in characteristically differing and isolated forms. Early in the year, the writer Paul Goma's letter of support to Pavel Kohout and the Czechoslovak chartists emerged, followed by the "Letter of the 8"—a protest from Goma, his wife, and six others calling on Romania to honor the human rights prescribed in "basket three" of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[30] The regime combined harsh denunciation of the dissidents with permission for a significant number to emigrate, even as the number of signatories to the "Letter of the 8" grew. Significantly, the document said little specific about *workers'* interests and rights, and it is unclear if many of the signatories (whose number reached approximately 200 by mid-November 1977[31]) were workers—and if so, whether their protest was motivated by "class" or by ethnic interests (the original signatories included a number of ethnic Hungarians and Germans, whose complaints against the regime could have to do mainly with Ceausescu's policies of cultural homogenization).[32]

Goma was arrested in April 1977, released the following month, and then "exiled" to Paris later in the year. This combination of intimidation and enforced emigration has been used by the Bucharest regime to contain what, so far, seems to be a relatively small problem, involving mainly intellectuals. The chances that such policies would generate mass reaction must have appeared slim in a Romania where (in contrast to Poland) virtually no historical precedent existed for the recognition of the intelligentsia as the "conscience" of a nation in adversity.

Far different in implications were the disorders in Romania's Jiu Valley in July and August 1977, which saw thousands of miners strike on issues involving a new pension law, poor food, forced overtime, and poor equipment.[33] These were "workers' issues," and the regime's response was rapid. State and party chief Nicolae Ceausescu visited the area on August 3, promising reforms and announcing a 5 percent pay raise, and, for the moment, he at least partially defused the situation.

The workers had acted on their own, and in the wake of their action, Bucharest intellectuals generally remained silent. Reports are still vague, but it seems clear that, in the aftermath, many miners were fired, "delegates" of the spontaneous strikers were arrested, and activists were deported back to their native villages.[34] Yet neither workers nor intelligentsia organized effectively to press for amnesty of the sort achieved in Poland in 1977.[35] While Goma did observe later that "workers are the main victims" of internal repression in Romania,[36] Romanian intellectuals have yet to develop a "critical mass" of open dissidents who might, in the Polish fashion, seek contact

[29] See *ibid.*, No. 28, Aug. 23, 1978, pp. 1-2.

[30] See Radio Free Europe, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter *RSR*), No. 6, Feb. 18, 1977, pp. 12-15.

[31] Ibid., No. 35, Dec. 6, 1977, pp. 7-10.

[32] On the Jiu Valley events, see ibid., Nos. 26, 31, and 32, Aug. 12, Oct. 12, and Oct. 26, 1977.

[33] There are reports that some Jiu Valley miners expressed knowledge and support of Goma's letter. See *Libération* (Paris), Nov. 25, 1977, as cited in *RSR*, No. 35, Dec. 6, 1977, p. 8.

[34] See *RSR*, Nos. 32 and 34, Oct. 26 and Nov. 22, 1977.

[35] I find overstated the conclusion of Radio Free Europe analyst Patrick Moore, that the strikers had been able to "organize and advance demands in the manner of workers in developed countries—and not like villagers recently transferred to industrial sites." See "Dissent in Romania: An Overview," *RAD*, No. 112, June 5, 1978, p. 2.

[36] *RSR*, No. 35, Dec. 6, 1977, p. 8, citing United Press International and Agence France Presse dispatches of Nov. 24, 1977.

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with a working class at least segments of which have shown a readiness to fight.

The resolution of the 1977 crisis in the Jiu Valley followed a fairly traditional pattern for "personalistic" rule in a Communist state (which is more pronounced in Romania than in any other East European country): the appearance of the leader "on the scene" to cool tempers and to signal that cries had been heard at the top, and then moves to "crack down on the leaders [of disturbances] and introduce quick palliatives for the area's population as a whole."[37] So far, such a strategy seems to have minimized sustained dissent and to have prevented a bridging of the gap between the intelligentsia and the workers in Romania.

Hungary's situation is different yet. Janos Kádár's delicate political management and the fruits of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) have generated a legitimacy for his regime which could scarcely have been predicted from the perspective of 1956. Hungary today combines a rather liberal internal regime and a population generally satisfied and thus "resigned" to realities as they are. What this has meant is that, for some time, links of the dissident intellectuals to the working class have been "next to nonexistent" (though their moral links to dissidents elsewhere were manifested in the protest of more than 250 Hungarian intellectuals against the trials of Czech dissidents).[38]

Having no "issue" to take to the working class, Hungarian dissidents have, for the most part, dealt with questions (the quality of life in socialist society, the measure of egalitarianism appropriate to socialism, "consumerism" and its implications) which reflect both a rather low degree of crude political repression in Hungary and the "New Left" orientation of some of the dissenters. The writings of the Budapest dissidents have been complex, dense, and aimed at other intellectuals. Manifestos and broadsides have not been their métier.[39] Rather, their aim seems to be the diffusion of ideological alternatives, the starting among potential allies in the intelligentsia of a process of thought which goes beyond acceptance of the current, rather comfortable situation. Two volumes of *samizdat* essays which appeared in 1977, *Marx in the Fourth Decade* and *Profiles,* indicated some movement away from Marxism among some of the dissidents. (A subsequent Polish compilation of selections from these two volumes prepared at the request of Adam Michnik represented another instance of cross-national cooperation among Eastern Europe's dissenting intelligentsia.)[40]



Romanian dissident writer Paul Goma at a November 24, 1977, press conference in Paris after being exiled "for a year" by the Romanian government.

—Sipa Press from Black Star.

Thus, dissent emanating from the intellectuals has not spread far outward into Hungarian society. The relative self-confidence of the Kádár regime has allowed it to deal with the dissidents in a relatively "civilized" manner. Expulsions from the party have been followed by enforced emigration, either permanent or of indefinite duration. Iván Szelényi and György Konrád were dealt with in such a fashion in 1974. Similarly, in early 1978, György and Mária Márkus, Ferenc Fehér, and Ágnes Heller were sent off to the West with little rhetorical flourish or denunciation—indeed, with official statements verging on regret.[41]

[37] Patrick Moore, "Romania: A Crisis of Leadership," *RAD,* No. 212, Sept. 27, 1978, p. 2.

[38] See Peter Moravets, "Criticism and Dissent in Hungary," *RAD,* No. 185, Aug. 23, 1978. On the protest to the October Czech trials, see *HSR,* No. 21, Nov. 19, 1979, pp. 13-15.

[39] An exception was a letter of support from 34 intellectuals to the "Charter 77" group in Czechoslovakia, an event largely ignored by Hungarian authorities. See *HSR,* No. 3, Jan. 25, 1977, pp. 2-4.

[40] On this, see Moravets, loc. cit.

[41] See *HSR,* No. 4, Feb. 14, 1978, pp. 2-4.

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For all the differences in national situations in Eastern Europe, there does appear to be emerging one common theme in the dissident intellectuals' views of workers: explicit support for freely elected trade unions and for the workers' right to strike. In a very real sense, the intellectuals have accorded legitimacy to the workers' "economistic" demands. Thus, the "Letter of the 59" to the Polish *Sejm* on December 5, 1975, spoke of the "freedom of work":

There is no such freedom while the State is the sole employer, and while Trade Unions are forced to conform to the administration of the Party, which actually wields the power in the State. In conditions such as these—as the events of 1956 and 1970 testify—any attempts to protect the workers' interests are threatened by bloodshed and can lead to serious outbreaks of violence. For this reason employees must be assured their freedom to choose their own trade representation, which is independent of both State and Party. The right to strike must also be guaranteed.[42]

In like vein, András Hegedüs regards the increasing tendency of trade unions to defend particular workers' interests at the factory level in the NEM period as a desirable development.[43] And Jiri Pelikan, speaking no doubt for many like-minded Marxist and non-Marxist veterans of the Prague Spring and "Charter 77," makes an element of his "common platform" for the Marxist opposition in Eastern Europe the guarantee of "the autonomy of trade unions in defense of workers' interests which can, even in a socialist society, conflict with the interests of State power."[44]

Summer vacationers throng camp sites at Hungary's Lake Balaton in August 1978.

—Interfoto MTI via Eastfoto.

Although the "programmatic" aspects of the liberation of trade unions from state-party control are vague (perhaps the intellectuals look to the workers to make their own arrangements?), the important matter is the evident unity among dissident intellectuals, *including* Marxists, regarding the right of independent unions to defend workers' interests in a "workers' state." This seems to represent a serious response to the workers' concerns and view of the world.

Beyond this, however, there is little else, except a conviction concerning the necessity of cooperation between intellectuals and workers. The intellectuals recognize that they "need" the workers as a broad social base supporting change, and they see the workers as needing the intellectuals to provide continuity, the persistence in opposition which will break the pattern of "outburst-repression-concession-stabilization" which has characterized conflict between workers and regimes in the past. Thus, Pelikan observes that the socialist opposition "should see to it that outbursts of workers' struggle do not lose impetus after a few economic concessions and that a united front of workers, progressive intellectuals and youth unremittingly challenge the bureaucracy."[45] Similarly, KSS-KOR observes in its 1978 "Appeal to Society" that the concessions that "social pressure" forced out of Polish authorities in 1970 and 1976 were "short-lived." Indeed, "in no time at all, the authorities took back from the disintegrated community what it had obtained. Only steady, broad, and organized pressure can counteract this."[46] "Organized" pressure implies, above all, functional linkages between intelligentsia and workers.

But whether these perceptions are being realized in action is another story. The current situation differs from country to country. Hungary's smooth political surface "conceals" what, for the time, is likely to be a smooth reality as well. Kádár's talents for political management remain evident. In Romania, the Jiu Valley is seemingly quiet, and Bucharest offers little of

[42] *Dissent in Poland*, p. 13.

[43] Hegedüs, *Socialism and Bureaucracy*, pp. 89–92. Hegedüs sees a persistent lack of worker interest in participation in economic management in Hungary, which he attributes to "the alienation which developed under capitalism" and the continuing division of labor necessitated by realities of technological development. Ibid., p. 45.

[44] Jiri Pelikan, "The Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe and the Western European Left," in Coates, op. cit., p. 109.

[45] Ibid., p. 112.

[46] Translated as *RAD*, No. 236, Oct. 13, 1978, p. 8.

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

ROBOTNIK nr 33

1-VI-1979

WITAMY JANA PAWŁA II

I Ojciec mieje się faktem... Mówi [illegible] w Bazylice, w Radzie Polskiej [illegible], w pracy, pociągu i autobusie, w domu i w szkole, a najmniej w prasie i telewizji. Słowa wypowiedziane jeszcze w październiku ubiegłego roku przez Karola Wojtyłę, Jana Pawła II właśnie się realizują. Ojciec Święty w Polsce.

Przyjeżdża człowiek - urodzony tutaj, wychowany i wykształcony wśród nas, wiedzący co to okupacja, znający realia codziennego życia pod komunistyczną władzą. Człowiek, którego praca i postawa współdecydowała o sile i żywotności Kościoła Katolickiego w Polsce. Przyjeżdża Ten, którego katolicy uważają za następcę Chrystusa, Bożego Namiestnika, Głowę całego Kościoła, zaś wszyscy sprawiedliwi ludzie za wyraziciela najbardziej podstawowych praw ludzkich i zasad moralnych, za kontynuatora wspaniałych tradycji kultury europejskiej.

Najpierw był ogłoszony przez Niego zamiar: chce być tutaj w maju, w Krakowie, przez trzy dni, by uświetnić swą obecnością 900-lecie męczeństwa patrona Polski, św.Stanisława ze Szczepanowa. Władze PRL bały się i tej wizyty i tego terminu. Terminu - bo kult św.Stanisława, niepokornego biskupa zamordowanego przez króla Bolesława Śmiałego kojarzy się im z niebezpiecznym słowem "opozycja". Wizyty - bo przyjazd Papieża niebywale podnosi rangę Kościoła w Polsce. W latach 50-tych władze PRL nie zgodziły się na pielgrzymkę Pawła VI do obrazu Matki Boskiej na Jasnej Górze. Dzisiaj [illegible] już nie miały - po prostu musiały się zgodzić.

Toczyły się więc żmudne rozmowy w [illegible], Watykanie. Ostatecznie nie w maju, lecz w czerwcu, ale za to: nie trzy dni, a dziewięć, nie tylko Kraków, ale też Warszawa, Gniezno, Częstochowa...

Patrzy się na tę wizytę jako na fakt sensacyjny i polityczny. Przez dłuższy czas Polska będzie centrum świata: wielotysięczne rzesze dziennikarzy będą obserwować jak Jana Pawła II podejmować będą komunistyczne władze, jak witać Go będzie naród, co Papież będzie tutaj mówić. Ten wymiar wizyty jest oczywisty i łatwo dostrzegalny: miliony ludzi dążące do Warszawy, Krakowa, Nowego Targu, do Oświęcimia i Gniezna, do miejsc nasiąkłych historią i naszą chwałą, do miejsc zroszonych ludzką krwią i łzami pokażą, że dzieje Polski to nie tylko dzieje ostatnich paru dziesiątek lat, że ludzie w tym kraju żyją nie tylko uciążliwą codziennością, że Kościół w Polsce jest silny swoimi wiernymi i że jego siła musi współdecydować o obliczu tego społeczeństwa.

Ale wizyta Ojca Świętego w Ojczyźnie ma przede wszystkim olbrzymi wymiar duchowy i religijny. Wpłata się w naszą historię, wspominać ją będą następne generacje. Warto, byśmy wszyscy, pomijając cały tak widoczny zgiełk dziejący się wokół, podeszli do niej z powagą. W tym właśnie leży nasz obowiązek: wizyta Ojca Św. musi stanowić dla nas wyzwanie do życia godniejszego, lepszego, bogatszego, do życia i pracy w kraju o sprawiedliwym obliczu.

/red/

Od 17 do 27 maja trwała głodówka Kazimierza Świtonia w Bazylice Matki Bożej Piekarskiej. W liście do ludu Śląska i Zagłębia Świtoń pisał, że podjął głodówkę na znak protestu przeciwko niedopuszczeniu Jana Pawła II do wiernych Śląska i Zagłębia.

21 maja do Kazimierza Świtonia przyłączył się Zdzisław Bradel, członek redakcji niezależnego czasopisma katolickiego "Spotkania".

28 [illegible]tnia powołano w Krakowie [illegible] Wspólnotę Ludzi Pracy. Celem Wspólnoty jest:
-pogłębianie życia religijnego ludzi pracujących;
-rozpowszechnianie i pogłębianie wśród pracujących chrześcijańskich ideałów życia;
-obrona praw ludzi wierzących do pełnego i równego z innymi życia społecznego, publicznego i obywatelskiego, zgodnego z ich przekonaniami i poglądami religijnymi;
-walka o uznanie i szacunek dla tysiącletniej tradycji chrześcijańskiej w Polsce;
-walka o sprawiedliwy podział dóbr materialnych, zgodnie ze wskazaniami katolickiej nauki społecznej.

Komunikat o utworzeniu Wspólnoty podpisali:
Franciszek Grabczyk Nowa Huta Os. 1000-lecia 30m 4
Adam Macedoński Kraków ul.18 stycz[illegible] 92a.3[illegible]
Jan Leszek Franczyk.

W dniach 26 i 30 kwietnia rozkolportowano w Szczecinie ok. 2500 ulotek 1-majowych podpisanych przez uczestników ROPCiO oraz Grupę Sympatyków KSS "KOR".

Przeprowadzona w zakładach przemysłowych Żyrardowa analiza przyczyn absencji chorobowej ujawniła, że prawie 70% pracowników to ludzie chorzy, którzy powinni przejść na rentę lub zmienić stanowisko pracy. Zdrowie utracili przede wszystkim na skutek złych warunków pracy.

Part of page one of the June 1, 1979, issue of Robotnik *(The Worker), published by the Committee for Social Self-Defense/Workers' Defense Committee (KSS-KOR). The articles, reading clockwise from the top left, consist of a sober welcome to Pope John Paul II; word of a hunger strike by Kazimierz Switon, protesting the fact that the Pope would not be able to visit Silesia; a statement of purpose by a Christian Community of Working People calling for freedom of religious observance and "just distribution of material goods"; mention of the handing-out of 2,500 leaflets by the ROPCiO and KSS-KOR groups in Szczecin in April; and an analysis of industrial health problems in the factories of Zyrardow.*

—NOWA.

an intelligentsia "core" likely to provide support and ideological articulation of worker demands. So far, the Bucharest regime has taken tough measures toward the "Free Labor Union" (SLOMR) formed in February 1979.[47] The "Charter 77" group in Czechoslovakia has manifested courage but on balance has failed to bridge critical class and ethnic cleavages. Slovaks, workers, and peasants have stood aside, and the Husak regime in late 1979 imposed harsh sentences on major spokesmen of the movement.

In Poland, to a greater degree than elsewhere, action has followed rhetoric. When KSS-KOR announced in November 1977 that a "cell" of its journal *Robotnik* had been formed among workers in Radom, to struggle for workers' interests, one analyst in the West viewed the event as the "first concrete evidence of institutionalized links between the workers and the intelligentsia."[48] Yet, even here one cannot be sure how

[47] See *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News* (Washington, DC), May 1979, pp. 1-5; and *RSR*, No. 4, Mar. 19, 1979, pp. 18-22, and No. 8, May 4, 1979, pp. 3-5.

[48] See *PSR*, No. 28, Dec. 2, 1978, pp. 14-15.

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"institutionalized," how durable, such links will prove or whether intellectuals can keep workers', and therefore mass, concerns in the forefront of their activity.

Clearly, Poland remains for the present the most critical testing ground for the viability of a worker-intelligentsia alliance. On the workers' side, there are signs of more purposeful organizational work, as witnessed in the foundation of workers' committees to push for the creation of free trade unions, first in Katowice in February 1978, and then in the Baltic coastal cities in late April of the same year.[49] This trend continues in the founding of another free trade union committee, in Szczecin, in October 1979.[50] There have been some rural echoes of this organizational activism in the emergence of peasant dissent in the Lublin area,[51] and later in Grojec.[52] "Bread and butter" issues, centering at first on new peasant pension laws, expanded into demands by peasants for what amounts to a veto power over legislation affecting them; in the words of the Grojec activists: "nothing about us—without us."[53] It is of interest that there was even a heavy "worker" flavor in the peasant dissent, for a large proportion of the activists were "peasant-workers," with one foot in the private sector and the other in socialist industry.[54] As for the intellectuals, both KSS-KOR and ROPCiO have commented favorably on the new worker activism and have reported with concern reprisals against working-class activists and their families.[55] Moreover, 1978 also saw the foundation of the Society for Educational Courses (TKN) and its "Flying University" among Polish students, which among its many themes included sensitization of the students to the interests of the working class of Poland.

The Polish context, of course, cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the role of religion and mass religious consciousness. To be sure, religious issues—freedom of belief and ritual—have served to mobilize workers and peasants in other East European states, and in the USSR as well. In general, such issues seem of greater concern to nonintelligentsia groups than do the general issues of liberty which mobilize the intellectuals. In some states—for example, Romania—the "action" has been with religious minorities, typically Protestant groups, and religious divisions in the society have blunted the potential impact of such dissidence. Poland, however, combines a virtually universal nominal Catholicism with high levels of religious observance and an articulate and organized Catholic intelligentsia that is in touch with the secular intelligentsia. To top things off, a Pole, Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Krakow, has now ascended to the papacy as John Paul II. Catholicism thus provides an alternate—and more authentic—focus of national identity for Poles than the state or its ideology, as the mass response to the June 1979 papal visit to Poland once again reaffirmed. In such a situation, the support that the Church offers to intelligentsia seeking freedom of expression and to workers seeking economic justice, as well as the moderating influence it exerts with respect to the way in which demands for the latter are expressed, places it in a position of strength vis-à-vis a regime which, paradoxically, is dependent on the church's acquiescence in many important areas. Consequently, the Church will remain a critical actor in Poland.

No other East European state currently faces the "mobilization," albeit quite partial, of such a diversity of social strata and groups, as does Poland under Gierek's government.[56] At the same time, this very diversity creates problems of cooperation. Factory conditions and price subsidies on foodstuffs are matters of more direct concern to workers than to the intelligentsia, whose work environments differ from those of laborers and who expend a smaller proportion of their budgets for food than do laborers. The preoccupations of peasants, as *producers* of food the others consume and as both beneficiaries and victims of their own private-sector status, are not the same as those of either the workers or the intelligentsia, but the peasants tend to have more in common with the former than with the latter. While the intellectuals feel a political pinch, the workers and peasants feel an economic one.

The differences in perspectives between workers and intellectuals are evident in a 1978 KSS-KOR document analyzing the state of Poland's economy.[57] The independent-minded economists who drafted the document see the "big picture"—the irrecon-

[49] Ibid., No. 6, Mar. 3, 1978, pp. 8–9; No. 12, May 30, 1978, p. 8.
[50] Ibid., No. 23, Oct. 30, 1979, pp. 3–5.
[51] Ibid., No. 19, Aug. 6, 1978, pp. 7–10.
[52] Ibid., No. 22, Sept. 25, 1978, p. 12.
[53] Ibid.
[54] I am grateful to Professor George Kolankiewicz of the University of Essex for drawing my attention to this phenomenon. As he has observed, such peasant-workers are especially sensitive to the possibilities of double-taxing for pensions—an example of the unexpected structural problems created for the regime by social change.
[55] See "Review of Uncensored Polish Publications December 1977–April 1978," *RAD*, No. 152, July 6, 1978, pp. 13, 17.
[56] For a recent review of the spectrum of Polish dissent, see Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, September-December 1978, pp. 37–51.
[57] KSS-KOR, "Notes on Poland's Economic System: An Inside View," translated in *RAD*, No. 177, Aug. 9, 1978, p. 17.

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cilabilities inherent in the consumption aspirations of Polish workers, the shortages, a huge foreign debt, and the costs of price subsidies. Shortages cannot end, pay packets grow, and subsidies continue, all at the same time. To the worker, however, the "big picture" is vague, and the problems of the moment are paramount. The foreign debt means little to him, even if it ultimately affects his prospects in profound ways, and he fears the message of "belt-tightening" implicit in the KSS-KOR document. This conflict in perspectives does not bode well for the construction of firm and lasting linkages between intelligentsia and workers in the years to come.

The Outlook

Indeed, it may be that the conflict between the relatively egalitarian attitudes of workers, fostered if not completely satisfied by 30 years of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, and the more meritocratic convictions of the intelligentsia is insuperable. Likewise, conflict between the concrete, here-and-now issues that concern the workers and the more abstract strivings for "freedom" that motivate intellectuals may not be resolvable. This is a pessimistic assessment, but one shared by a number of observers of worker-intelligentsia relations in the East European societies.

For example, Zygmunt Bauman—analyzing the interplay of class structure and bureaucratic power in the Communist states—concludes that the workers, holding suspect the reformers' calls for greater play of market forces,

see in officialdom the only body called to defend them against mounting deprivations in the market sphere. A sort of alliance between the party and the workers against the managers and professions (. . . the most privileged classes in market terms) asserts itself more often than not as a persistent mark of the . . . power structure.[58]

Similarly, two Hungarian dissidents, writing under the pseudonym "Marc Rakovski," note how the "elite of the ruling class . . . presents itself as the protector of the working class against those strata [the economic and technical experts and the lower- and middle-level managers] which are trying to enrich themselves at the latter's expense."[59] The Hungarians György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, now émigrés, push their analysis a step further to argue that the intelligentsia—far from serving as a mediator between workers and the political elite—is on the road to becoming the dominant group within the ruling class, the intellectuals' possession of "teleological knowledge" giving them a claim to preeminence in a system of "rational (i.e., non-Marxist) redistribution." Intellectuals who defend the workers, then, take on the character of "defectors" from their own class.[60]

György Konrád, Hungarian author who, with Iván Szelényi, has argued that the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe is intent on gaining primacy within the ruling elite rather than on representing worker interests.

—UPI.

These general formulations may seem overly abstract, too simple, when held up against the quite complex realities of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976. Yet the "pessimism" of the Bauman-Rakovski view has much to support it, on the evidence. Workers' coolness toward the Czechoslovak reform package in earlier 1968 was transformed into support of a

[58] Zygmunt Bauman, "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in Socialist Society," in Frank Parkin, Ed., *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*, London, Tavistock, 1974, pp. 129-48.

[59] Marc Rakovski (pseud.), *Towards an East European Marxism*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978, p. 33.

[60] György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.

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generalized sort after the Warsaw Pact invasion, but worker resistance, as long as it continued, focused more and more on the sort of economic issues embodied in the trade union charter and statutes adopted in March 1969 rather than on broader issues of participation in management and the expansion of civil freedoms. And, while the fire-bombing of PUWP offices at first glance hardly seems the sort of act that workers who "look to officialdom for redress" from economic grievance would perpetrate, it is a form of communication with the locus of power, with the party. In the absence of institutionalized nonviolent mechanisms, it is a way of telling the party that the "social compact" between the regime and the masses is being violated. Workers have not looked to intellectuals for redress, whether or not they view them as a group with opposed interests.

Economic issues are the ones that will continue to catalyze workers' direct action. Thus, one can expect more localized protests at the factory or industrial-branch level when earnings appear endangered by upward revision of output norms, or by the tying of wages more tightly to productivity, and broader protest when price rises threaten purchasing power.[61] Either may be precipitated within one of two more general situations: (a) relatively constant working-class material expectations whose fulfillment is threatened by stagnating economic conditions, or (b) rising expectations fed by a record of recent substantial progress but impossible to fulfill without the sort of modifications in the "social compact" workers are unwilling to countenance—namely, a sacrifice of security and/or of slow and undemanding work rhythms for heightened reward for the skilled and diligent.

In all of these circumstances, there is little of the evident political content of issues dear to the hearts of the intelligentsia. The political issue that KOR seized upon at its foundation was the repression of workers after protest had occurred—a protest that had succeeded in securing a rapid rollback of the 1976 price rises before pro-worker intelligentsia activity had even surfaced. Unquestionably, worker-intellectual cooperation can develop around the relatively "narrow" political issue of specific anti-worker repressions—to which KOR's call for amnesty and restoration of jobs, as well as its welfare work among families of the imprisoned and fired, was an appropriate and well-received response. However, mobilization of the large mass of workers for the long haul has proved difficult. With the goals of amnesty largely achieved by the summer of 1977, Polish workers seem to have settled into a relative passivity. This is not to deny the significance of *Robotnik* or of the "free trade union" committees. Rather, it is to emphasize that by now, more than three years after 1976, a more mobilized working class would have spawned more such committees, more *samizdat* clearly its own, and, perhaps, more of its own organizational initiatives for at least tactical cooperation with sympathetic members of the intelligentsia. This has not happened.[62]

To their credit, the Polish and Czechoslovak dissident intelligentsia have focused on immediate worker concerns by generally continuing to advocate free trade unions for the workers and downplaying any appeal for the more conceptually elaborate, and practically difficult, mechanisms of worker participation in management, to which workers, finding it hard to envision their representatives on both sides of a bargaining table, have generally remained cool. Still, the divide between the groups remains wide. The KSS-KOR economic analysis mentioned earlier, as a document of the intelligentsia, takes into account the long-term implications of Polish economic problems in a way that Polish workers, self-organized to defend their own interests, could not—and under the current circumstances, perhaps should not—be expected to. The ability of intellectuals to articulate complex proposals, to be "objective" and to strike a balance between the claims of various groups, to persist in commitment over the long run to work for political change—all distinguish the intelligentsia as a privileged, even if dissident, element, and all distinguish it from the working class as well. The contrasts are highlighted by Rakovski:

Even among themselves, the members of the working class are not linked by a network of communication comparable to that which serves as the basis for the circulation of samizdat. This kind of communication is not a natural part of the lifestyle of the worker. To establish an opening through which the underground can communicate with the workers, the workers themselves must reach the stage of organized class struggle and institute, at least at factory level, associations which can then be stabilized. Then these organizations would be able to interact with the under-

[61] This distinction between two types of protest and their sources is suggested by Alex Pravda in his "Industrial Workers: Patterns of Opposition, Dissent, and Accommodation," in Rudolf L. Tökés, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1979.

[62] See Jacques Rupnik, "Dissent in Poland, 1968–1978: The End of Revisionism and the Rebirth of Civil Society," in Tökés, op. cit.; and Abraham Brumberg, "The Open Political Struggle in Poland," *New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Feb. 8, 1979, pp. 29–34.

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ground. But in Soviet-type societies, the working class is as incapable of organizing itself as [is] any other social group. While the rare moments of cataclysmic crisis in the system give rise to strike committees and workers' councils, these organizational results of popular uprisings never succeed in consolidating after normal reproduction has been reestablished. In such circumstances, to a working class which is deprived of its organizations, the ideas of the underground are not social facts, or else they are the particular business of an alien group.[63]

For the present, then, both the factual record and some of the analytic perspectives on socialist societies explored here warrant a good deal of pessimism about the maintenance of worker-intelligentsia coalitions as sources of major change in Eastern Europe. It is, of course, not beyond the realm of possibility that an intelligentsia-worker alliance might take shape despite the existing conflicts of interests between the two groups, and that this sort of an alliance would constitute a unified force for change. Such a development would require not only mutual recognition of opposing interests but also an agreement to "rise above" their conflict until mutual cooperation brought about institutionalized political mechanisms (now absent) through which it could be channeled. This kind of an agreement would amount to a recognition that a civil society—freer politically and less centralized economically, and therefore probably more inegalitarian yet more productive as well—would achieve no final resolution of conflict, because such is impossible. In addition, both groups would have to acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, that freedom and equality *are* in conflict, and that a new balance must be struck between them. It is important to understand, however, that the factors promoting such coalitions are weak. Moreover, the considerable repressive capacities of the Communist regimes are still a major element limiting the abilities of groups to organize politically for their own ends—and the USSR remains, judging by its actions in Afghanistan, quite ready to apply whatever forceful measures it deems necessary to guarantee the status quo in its East European backyard.

If prospects for the immediate future are dim, what of the longer term? Two points—a contingency and a trend—are worth noting. The contingency is the possibility that strong agitation for reform, emanating from and supported by either intelligentsia or workers, might result in a regime crisis sufficient to create, as just noted, the threat or reality of Soviet intervention à la 1968. Such circumstances provided the catalyst for worker-intelligentsia cooperation in that year in Czechoslovakia, and if the Polish situation deteriorated in the 1980's, they would probably do the same there. But this sort of catalyzing crisis, "resolved" in the end by Soviet power, ultimately entails drastic limitations of freedom for further actions by either group. The general defeat of reform and change is the greater fact; the final union-in-crisis of workers and intellectuals, the lesser one.

The trend involves the changing composition of the working class in the East European states. From its immediate postwar configuration—a small group composed of the surviving old proletarians—the working class expanded in size through the absorption of upwardly mobile peasants generally content with a lot far better than that of life in the villages. In the current third phase, a differentiated working class is, in its skilled and semiskilled components, increasingly populated by the children of the ex-peasants who made the transition from village to city, i.e., by people who have grown up in the working-class milieu. As the average educational level of working-class youth rises and as many find themselves remaining in the working class because of limited numbers of places in higher education, their receptivity to ideas of an abstract sort, to the programmatic language of the dissident intelligentsia, may grow. Certainly, the several years more of education that younger workers possess in comparison with their parents may help render the ideas of intellectuals more intelligible. A sufficient supply of such workers with a new "class consciousness" might provide the basis for the genuine working-class organization presently lacking.

The diversity of the present situations, country by country, presages a likely diversity in the future interplay of the forces discussed here. Stabilization is possible, if improbable, in Poland—just as exacerbation of the situations in other states to a "Polish" intensity is conceivable, if unlikely. Events often make fools of those who predict and project. For example, religion and nationalism, rather than a developing interclass cooperation, may prove the main challenge to the East European regimes in their fourth and fifth decades. What does seem probable, however, is that they will not pass through the 1980's without facing new tests of their durability.

[63] Rakovski, op. cit., pp. 67–68.

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Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways

By Zvi Gitelman

According to some Soviet Jews and Western observers, there has been an upsurge in antisemitism in the USSR in the last year or so. They attribute this development—coming at a time when the Soviet government has been allowing increasing numbers of Jews to emigrate—to various factors: Russian nationalism and xenophobia, official anti-Zionism and efforts to please Arab allies of the Soviet Union, maneuvering for leadership position in anticipation of Leonid Brezhnev's departure, or even popular resentment at the opportunity some Jews have had to emigrate to the West.[1] One commentator has gone so far as to say that antisemitism "is the official doctrine of the Soviet armed forces," and that the "Russian New Right" and their allies in the Communist Party "are openly proposing to make it the official ideology of the Soviet Union."[2]

[1] Craig R. Whitney, "Many in Soviet Concerned Over a Surge in Anti-Semitism," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1979; and Kevin Klose, "Soviet Jews See Growth in Anti-Semitism," *The Washington Post*, July 15, 1979.

[2] Reuben Ainsztein, "Soviet Union Today: Anti-Semitism Institutionalized," *New Statesman* (London), Dec. 15, 1978 (also in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, Dec. 29, 1978).

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Underlying such commentaries is the unstated assumption that both "unofficial" (or social, popular) antisemitism and government antisemitic policy can be adjusted as one might turn a faucet off and on.[3] It would seem more realistic, however, to view such sentiments and actions against Jews as the result of a complicated set of events and processes which feed on and interact with each other in ways not altogether different from the dialectic relationship between public opinion and public policy in more responsive political systems. It is misleading to speak of "more" and "less" antisemitism among Soviet people, because like all ethnic prejudices, this attitude tends to be deeply embedded, irrational, and therefore not easily changed. Where the main variance occurs is in the *manifestations* of the antisemitism long present in Russian and Soviet society. Certain external factors—events, official policies, and changes in the economic and social positions of Jews and non-Jews—may bring such attitudes to the surface. Yet the visibility and intensity of antisemitism need not depend on the objective situation of the Jews (or non-Jews), nor does the phenomenon require the presence of Jews. It was quite possible for the Polish government to stimulate an antisemitic campaign in 1968 when there were only about 16,000 Jews in a total population of over 30 million, and antisemites have even been known to "create Jews." Thus, the Nazis talked about the supposed Judaism of Franklin

[3] Steven Burg argues that the Soviet leadership employs antisemitism in a rationally calculated way as a means by which it "seeks to achieve its substantive policy goals." He develops what he thinks is a Soviet "calculus" of antisemitism, with 16 axioms, 2 diagrams, and a calculus formula. However, he can cite only one passing reference in a single *Pravda* editorial as evidence of officials' "moving against antisemitism," and his claim that the Soviet leadership "abandon[ed] antisemitism as a tool of policy in late 1969" is unsubstantiated. See his essay in Jeremy Azrael, Ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

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A demonstration outside the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1973 protests the Soviet refusal to grant exit permits to numerous Jews. The various signs say: "Let us go to Israel," "Let me go to Israel," "Visas to Israel instead of prison."

—UPI.

D. Roosevelt and others of their non-Jewish enemies, and reports from the USSR indicate that antisemites there consider some of the highest Soviet officials, Brezhnev among them, to be Jews or crypto-Jews.[4] The extent and intensity of antisemitism, or other ethnic prejudice, are therefore extremely difficult to ascertain or predict, since antisemitism does not depend only on objectively definable characteristics, on situations, or even on the greater or lesser presence or activity of its objects.

Efforts to determine the dimensions of antisemitism in the USSR are further hindered by the absence of empirical data on attitudes and human relations. Few surveys of ethnic attitudes have been taken by Soviet scholars, and, of course, none by outsiders. In fact, a screen of dogma is drawn over all interethnic relations. According to Premier A. N. Kosygin, "there is no, and there has never been, antisemitism in the Soviet Union,"[5] and that closes the subject to investigation or further discussion.

For the foreseeable future, as in the past, the only way to gather empirical data about ethnic relations in the USSR is to interview recent émigrés.[6] Obviously, this method has some intrinsic flaws: émigrés are not

[4] For example, pamphlets appearing in Leningrad and Moscow in February 1979 charged that "Zionists" had seized control of the Politburo of the Communist Party and claimed that only three Politburo members (A. N. Kosygin, M. A. Suslov, and G. V. Romanov) were "real Russians." See Craig Whitney, loc. cit. Whitney notes that "in any other country, such pamphlets might be discussed as the work of lunatics. Here [i.e., the USSR] they raise the question of who allowed them to be duplicated—duplicating machines are strictly controlled—and handed out."

[5] Statement at a New York press conference in 1967, repeated in Ottawa and Copenhagen in 1971, quoted in William Korey, *The Soviet Cage*, New York, NY, Viking Press, 1973, pp. 3, 329.

[6] The Harvard Project of the 1940's dealt with the subject to a limited extent. The "third emigration," in the 1970's, has also been tapped as a source of information about the USSR in general, and—to a very limited extent—about ethnic relations there. For a brief survey of studies basing themselves largely on interviews with recent Soviet emigrants, see Zvi Gitelman, "The Third Migration: Profile in Current Research," *Newsletter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies* (Columbus, OH), Summer 1978.

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likely to be representative either of the Soviet population as a whole or even of their own ethnic group. One would expect them to be among the least satisfied of Soviet citizens—upset with, among other things, their experience as members of ethnic minorities. Thus, one cannot gauge the precise scope and intensity of antisemitic feelings in the Soviet Union on the basis of the reports of Jewish émigrés. Yet, this evidence should not be totally disregarded. As we shall see later, different groups of Jewish emigrants from the USSR (grouped according to age, sex, education, occupation, and area of former residence) differ in the ways they felt they were regarded by other Soviet people. These variations help to broaden our insight into the complex interaction of policy, popular attitudes, and reactions in this area of Soviet life.

The focal point for any discussion of antisemitism in the USSR must be official Soviet government policies toward the country's Jews. As can be seen in the discussion which follows, these policies—while displaying some ambivalence and inconsistency—have over the years generally tended to place restrictions on the opportunities for Jews and to foster criticism of them. Such policies have been seen by Soviet Jews as indication of their inferior social and political status in official eyes. Moreover, whether intentionally or not, official policies have tended to reinforce or even be reinforced by popular antisemitism—or at least so believe many Soviet Jews. After examining these long-term continuities in Soviet policy, popular sentiment, and Jewish perceptions, we shall examine the dramatic shift in government policies which started with the launching of a strident campaign of anti-Zionism a decade ago. As popular antisemitism and Jewish sensitivities have risen, the Soviet government has taken other steps which, whether so intended or not, have only aggravated matters, until one can realistically speak of a qualitative change in the situation. In the conclusion, we shall briefly assess the implications of this change.

Continuities in Soviet Policies

Since the October Revolution, there have been a number of continuities in Soviet policies toward the Jewish population. The government has continued to identify Jews as a distinct ethnic group, to limit or control manifestations of Jewish culture, to combat the practice of Judaism, and to oppose Zionism.

Jewish nationality. Although before the October Revolution both V. I. Lenin and Yosif Stalin explicitly denied the nationhood of the Jews and favored their assimilation, Lenin's government declared the Jews a "nationality," and Lenin even approved the formation of Jewish sections in the Communist Party. While classification as a nationality implies some common cultural attributes among those designated as Jews, numerous persons who do not choose to associate themselves with Jewish culture are also officially identified as Jews. In fact, from the official point of view, being Jewish depends not on cultural, and certainly not on religious, affiliation, but simply on one's parentage. If one is the child of two Jewish parents, one has no choice but to be registered as a Jew, just as the children of two parents of any other nationality must take on that nationality when they receive their own internal passports. Only when the parents are of different nationality can the child choose the nationality of either parent.

The marked tendency of children of such mixed marriages to choose the nationality of the non-Jewish parent, especially if the latter is a Russian or a member of the dominant nationality of the particular region, already says a good deal about the social environment faced by Jews in the USSR. In a passage in a recently published novel, a Jewish narrator married to a Russian woman defensively explains his sons' choice of Jewish nationality:

Why are my sons registered as Jews? Is it respect for me? I think not. They respect their mother no less than me. But, you understand, the son of a Georgian [man] and a Russian [woman] generally registers as a Georgian, a son of an Uzbek [man] and a Russian [woman], as an Uzbek . . . . The husband doesn't take his wife's family name, but the wife takes the name of the husband, and the children, the name of their father. I think my children did the right thing.[7]

The necessity to explain the choice of Jewish nationality suggests that such a choice is an unusual, even deviant, act. This surmise is confirmed by Soviet survey data.[8] It is only recently, since mass Jewish emi-

[7] See Anatoliy Rybakov's *Tyazhëlyy pesok* (Heavy Sand), which appeared in successive issues of *Oktyabr'* (Moscow), Nos. 7–9, 1979. The quotation is translated from page 88 of the Yiddish version, *Shverer Zamd,* published in *Sovetish haimland* (Moscow), No. 6, 1979.

[8] See L. N. Terent'yeva, "Determination of One's Nationality by Youths From Families of Mixed Nationality," *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1969. Mordechai Altshuler summarizes a number of Soviet articles (including Terent'yeva's) in *Kahibutz Hayehudi Bibrit Hamoatsot Beyamainu* (Soviet Jewry Today), Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1979. On p. 44 of his work he notes that data gathered in six areas of the USSR between 1960 and 1969 show that from 72 to 100 percent of those who had a choice chose non-Jewish nationality.

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gration began, that there has been any perceived advantage in being Jewish in the USSR. As a current Soviet witticism has it, "a Jewish wife is not a luxury but a means of transportation."

Cultural policy. The social disadvantages incurred by being identified as a Jew in the USSR are not compensated for by any of the cultural rewards that theoretically attend identification as a nationality. Jewish nationality is largely without content from a cultural point of view. Fewer than a quarter of Soviet Jews have any familiarity at all with Yiddish—the only language (aside from one or two very minor ones) that is officially recognized as the bearer of Jewish culture. Attempts to convey Jewish culture in Russian, the language of most Soviet Jews, have almost without exception been rejected by the authorities, except insofar as there are translations into Russian of Yiddish belles lettres. Moreover, because Jewish culture outside the USSR is suffused with concepts and values originating in the Jewish religion or pervaded by the assumptions that Jews do constitute a nation and that Israel is their national home or, at least, their major cultural center, the authorities have felt that Soviet Jewish culture, in whatever form, must be isolated from Jewish culture elsewhere. In the 1920's, the government promoted a uniquely Soviet secular Jewish culture. However, this effort was decisively rejected by the authorities in the 1930's, and most of its vestiges were eliminated in the cultural purges and parallel antisemitic campaigns of 1948-52, when leading cultural figures were arrested or murdered, all publications were closed, and even the type in the last Yiddish publishing house was melted down.[9]

Only in the late 1950's were some small, partial steps taken to revive this culture. During the last decade, there have been a few more small, largely symbolic, gestures in the direction of supporting Yiddish

[9] On the attempt to develop a Soviet Jewish culture in Yiddish, see Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972.

A scene from a performance of the play "Overseas," staged by the Moscow Jewish Drama Company in August 1970.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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This wall plaque identifies the Moscow editorial offices of the Yiddish-language publication Sovetish haimland.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

culture. A few amateur theatrical groups have been permitted tours of some major centers of Jewish population in the USSR, the Yiddish journal *Sovetish haimland* has become a monthly (since 1961 it had been a bimonthly), and a few Yiddish books are published. The true intent behind these gestures is suggested by the altered format of *Sovetish haimland,* which began to publish summaries of its contents in English and Russian. It is also the only Soviet journal which does not publish the size of its pressrun. Most of its circulation seems to be by subscription, and it is not readily available on street stands. All this points to the role of the journal as a propaganda and public relations vehicle, designed with foreign consumption in mind. Although *Sovetish haimland* has begun to publish more material of a consciously Jewish nature, including even articles critical of some of the more blatantly antisemitic fiction and reportage published in the USSR, it seems to be regarded by most Jews as a subservient mouthpiece of the regime and, hence, a collaborator in what are seen as the latter's anti-Jewish policies. While more than three quarters of a sample of 148 Soviet emigrants interviewed by the author in Israel said they had never read the journal, many were prepared to condemn it as "a quisling journal" or "a typical Soviet rag."

Despite these official gestures, the fundamental position of Yiddish culture has not changed. There is still not a single Yiddish school in the country (there were 1,100 in 1931), and the "teach-yourself-Yiddish" column in *Sovetish haimland* cannot ensure that Yiddish will be understood by future generations. In fact, since the centers of the Yiddish-speaking population—Vilnius, Riga, Chernovtsy, and other cities incorporated into the USSR after 1939—have contributed a disproportionate share to recent Jewish emigration (some of them may have lost more than half of their Jewish population), the number of both producers and consumers of Yiddish culture has declined considerably in the last decade. This is likely to be verified when results of the 1979 Soviet census are made available.

Position on Judaism. As regards official opposition to Judaism, this policy, in theory, should not affect the large numbers of Soviet Jews who have no involvement with Judaism, yet just as in the case of Muslims who no longer practice Islam or Lithuanians who are no longer Catholic, the Soviet public tends to identify Jews with their historic religion. In fact, this tendency is particularly strong when it comes to Judaism, which is not a "universal" religion like Christianity or Islam—practiced by diverse nations and ethnic groups—but is a "tribal" religion that, by definition, is practiced by Jews. The distinction between religion and ethnicity, a relatively recent and largely Western one, has not historically been made in the case of Judaism. In the Soviet context, this means that policies attacking Judaism and discussions critical of that religion are assumed, by Jews and non-Jews alike, to refer to Jews, the only nationality associated with Judaism. Therefore, even Jews who are avowed atheists are perceived as somehow associated with Judaism, and criticism of Judaism is taken to be applicable to Jews generally.

Over the years, Soviet opposition to Judaism has varied in intensity but not purpose. While the fall of N. S. Khrushchev in 1964 may have brought some abatement in the Soviet antireligious campaign, e.g., a halt to the mass closings of synagogues that took

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place in 1957-64, little has really changed. What few minor concessions there have been in recent years have apparently been designed to enhance the Soviet image abroad. Thus, two Soviet students were permitted to enroll in the Jewish Theological Seminary in Budapest in the mid-1970's (neither has yet returned to the USSR), and it is said that two others will shortly commence theological training in the United States. There are a few students in the Moscow "yeshiva"; but they are woefully ignorant of even the fundamentals of Judaism, and their main task seems to be to display themselves prominently at synagogue services.[10]

Popular association of Jews with Judaism also affects this ethnic group adversely because of the tendency of the Soviet media and the populace to link Judaism and Zionism. Communists have always pointed out that the Jewish religion is a source of Jewish nationalism; they argue that Judaism teaches the superiority of the Jews and their obligation to lead a separate existence. Such ideas are often associated explicitly with Zionism. Thus, in one recent commentary it is alleged that "the ideological sources of Zionist gangsterism originate in the scrolls of the Torah," the latter being described as "a textbook unsurpassed for betrayal, perfidy, and moral dissoluteness."[11] Practicing Jews who may have no aspiration to go to Israel are tarred with the brush of Zionism, even while secular Zionists are improperly linked to Judaism. Moreover, Jews who adhere to neither are stigmatized by association.

Jews and Judaism in Soviet culture. Another way of discerning Soviet policy toward Jews is to see how this ethnic group is treated in Soviet culture generally. In this regard, an examination of all Soviet press articles dealing with Jews in the years 1968-77 fails to show any mention of the contributions of Jews as a group to the development of the USSR. Moreover, with only two exceptions (items on Soviet air force general Yakov Smushkevich and the philosopher Baruch Spinoza), articles lauding the achievements of individual Jews do not specify their nationality, although nationality is conventionally noted in such articles. For example, not one of the many articles on former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov indicates his (Jewish) nationality. In 47 articles that appeared in 1976-77 and referred to praiseworthy contributions by Jewish individuals, the nationality of the individual was never mentioned.[12]

In addition, another apparently exhaustive study reveals that after 1954, Jews and Judaism disappeared from Soviet history textbooks. Only in the late 1960's did Jews begin to reappear, and then only in a negative context. In texts on ancient history published after 1954, the words "Judea," "Israel," and "Jerusalem" were replaced by territorial designations such as Mesopotamia, Palestine, or, simply, "the provinces." Similarly, texts on modern history ceased mentioning the Jewish provenance of Heinrich Heine and Ferdinand Lassalle; and they quit connecting the Dreyfus affair to antisemitism, instead describing it in terms of class struggle or avoiding the subject altogether. Even

Despite the Soviet government's refusal to allow the publication or import of suitable texts, Levi Itzhak Gurevich, center, still carries on a small class in Jewish prayers and Hebrew language at the "Yeshiva" attached to the Arkhipova Street Synagogue in Moscow.

—Jesse Zel Lurie/Pictorial Parade.

[10] On Soviet policy toward Judaism before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, see Zvi Gitelman, "The Jews," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1967. For the period after 1967, see Thomas E. Sawyer, *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO, 1979, pp. 76-78.

[11] Vladimir Begun, *Vtorzheniye bez oruzhiya* (Invasion Without Arms), Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1977, quoted in William Korey, "Anti-Zionism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1978, p. 64.

[12] Based on a survey of all articles appearing in *Yevrei i yevreyskiy narod* (Jerusalem) for those years.

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in histories of most Soviet republics where Jews have played a significant historical role—the Ukraine, Moldavia, Lithuania, etc.—there is no attention at all to that nationality. The standard history of Belorussia is the exception. But all it says is that the Jewish Bund played a pernicious role in the republic, sabotaging the revolutionary movement and fomenting Jewish nationalism.[13]

Although the Soviet Union's libraries are rich in Jewish materials, there is almost no scholarship on Jews. The modern period is ignored completely, except for attacks on the Bund, Judaism, Zionism, and the state of Israel, and only one scholar publishes regularly on ancient and medieval Jewish history and literature, with two or three others publishing on modern, especially Soviet, Yiddish literature. Most of this work appears in *Sovetish haimland* and thus—as we have seen—is largely inaccessible to the vast majority of Jews and non-Jews, and even to the Soviet scholarly community. Linguistics seems to be the discipline least restricted, and from time to time in Soviet journals and scholarly books one comes across articles on Yiddish and even Hebrew linguistic matters, almost all of them written by people of the older generation.

Since the early 1930's, Soviet authorities have demanded that all the arts and literature reflect the official view of Soviet reality. For this reason, Soviet belles lettres serves as a more accurate indicator of official outlooks than is the case with literature in most other countries. At minimum, Soviet literature reflects approved or tolerated images and ideas. Therefore, it is highly significant that an analysis of more than 300 novels and stories published in Russian in the USSR between 1963 and 1971 found a decline in the number of Jews appearing as characters, and when they did appear it was most often in a negative, even criminal, light—as swindlers, speculators, people without feelings of patriotism, cosmopolitans ready to sell out their country, rapists, or parasites.[14]

It is in this context that the publication in 1979 of the novel *Tyazhëlyy pesok* (Heavy Sand) in three issues of the magazine *Oktyabr'* drew so much international attention.[15] Not only does Anatoliy Rybakov's novel—not a very good one by literary standards—portray in detail the fate of the Jews during the Nazi occupation, but it devotes considerable attention to ethnic relations, with some idealization of the friendship which developed between Ukrainians and Jews in the 1920's and 1930's. However, there is no evidence that the appearance of Rybakov's novel signals a change in Soviet policy, literary or otherwise. It will probably remain an isolated case which Soviet apologists can cite for their purposes.

Jewish reactions. The Jews have varied in their reactions to these Soviet policies. During the 1917 revolution and ensuing civil war in Russia, many Jews turned to the Red Army and to "Soviet power"—the only organized forces then not engaged in systematic physical persecution of the Jewish population—as their saviors. When the Soviet regime removed all the restrictions that its Tsarist predecessor had placed on Jews, and when all educational, economic, and social barriers disappeared as well, many Jews eagerly seized the opportunities and achieved leading places in Soviet society. Many were perfectly content to trade their traditional way of life and actively renounce it in return for the values of modernizing Soviet society. By the end of the 1930's, when both traditional Jewish culture and the artificial, secular Communist Yiddish culture which was to substitute for it had declined, there was a significant Jewish presence in those areas of the country and in those sectors of the economy and society from which Jews had been barred by the Tsars. Most of these Jews were quite content with this trade-off. Even though the higher echelons of many Soviet hierarchies—the party, the military, the police, and the foreign service—were increasingly closed to Jews, access to higher education continued to present Jews attractive career opportunities in industry, science, and technology. Since 98 percent of the Jews reside in urban areas and are concentrated in the largest cities, their access to superior education has been greater than that of other groups. As late as 1972, there were nearly 68,000 Jewish "scientific workers" in the USSR, twice as many as there had been in 1960, though the proportion of Jews among "scientific workers" had been in steady decline since at least 1950.[16]

[13] See Daniil Fish, "Jews in the High School Curricula on World and Russian History," *Yevreyskiy samizdat* (Jerusalem), Vol. 15, 1977, pp. 313–52.

[14] G. M. Manevich, appendix to "The Jewish Question and the Mideast Conflict," in ibid., Vol. 8, 1975, pp. 29–77.

The same author claims to have surveyed Soviet postgraduate dissertations written after 1945 in history and ethnography and to have discovered only two dealing with Jews, one written in 1948 and the other a dissertation by T. K. Kichko, "Contemporary Judaism and Its Reactionary Role." Kichko is the author of the notorious book *Iudaizm bez prikras* (Judaism Without Embellishment—1963) and later works on Judaism and Zionism.

On Jews in recent Soviet fiction, see also Anna Sergin, "Falsification and Hatred in Belles Lettres," *Shvut* (Tel Aviv), No. 6, 1978.

[15] In August 1979, an Israeli publisher secured permission to publish a Hebrew translation.

[16] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1922–1972 gg.* (The USSR National Economy in 1922–1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 105.

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Yet such acculturation did not protect Soviet Jews from antisemitism. This was particularly apparent in the 1940's and 1950's, when the Stalinist terror and social pressure against Jews was at its height. In this period, many Soviet Jews felt their nationality to be a virtual "disease," that to be Jewish was to be an "invalid of the fifth paragraph" (referring to the fifth paragraph of one's identity card, which lists nationality). They sought to change their nationality, but this often proved impossible because of government policies. Nevertheless, they sought to sever all ties with Jews and Judaism and to pass themselves off as Russians.

Others tried to deny the existence of antisemitism. In the words of one recent emigrant,

I had never thought about being Jewish until 1943 . . . . We never thought about our nationality . . . . But after the war I did think about it a lot . . . because there were acts of discrimination against Jews, and we couldn't help discussing those cases and wondering . . . . But we thought it was a temporary thing . . . something that can't continue because it's so ridiculous and so strange and so against Marxism-Leninism and against the great slogans, you know.[17]

It should be noted that there were still other Jews, particularly in Asian areas of the USSR and those peripheral regions annexed since 1939, who never renounced their Jewish culture and religion or sought to assimilate. And even before the 1970's, they were joined by persons who, as a result of continuing antisemitism, felt it necessary to "rediscover" their Jewishness as members of an emerging Jewish nationalist movement in the Soviet Union.

Fateful Policy Changes

Although the Soviet policies toward the Jews outlined above have generally continued to obtain to this day, there have been during the last decade or so two major, perhaps crucial changes. The first of these shifts was the launching of an intense anti-Zionist campaign in the late 1960's; the second was the easing (especially since 1971) of possibilities for Jewish emigration. Since all of the emigrants are ostensibly headed for Israel (indeed, of about 200,000 Jewish émigrés, about 160,000 have gone to Israel; the rest, mainly to North America), these policies seem to contradict each other. If the USSR is so hostile to Zionism, why does it permit the migration of its own citizens to the Zionist state, where, by all accounts, they make a significant contribution to Israel's economy and military capacity? It is not clear that Soviet policymakers intended to create this contradiction or are necessarily happy with it. Rather, the policies have gained a momentum of their own and have merged intentionally or unintentionally with deep strands of popular antisemitism to create a perhaps irreversible alienation of Soviet Jews from their society.

The anti-Zionist campaign. It is difficult to unravel the complex factors that led to and have sustained the current intense Soviet campaign against Zionism. Clearly, early Bolshevik efforts to combat Zionist ideology culminated and largely disappeared in the 1930's, once Zionism had been crushed in the Soviet Union. Establishment of the state of Israel after World War II revived the topic, yet even in the years immediately preceding the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet press still gave Zionism only passing attention. The word itself almost never appeared in the titles of articles, and almost never was an entire article devoted to the subject. It was only after the 1967 war that Zionism reemerged as a major topic of official discussion (see Table 1).[18] Although foreign policy considerations — the requirement to assuage Moscow's friends — were apparently paramount at the outset, the extent and intensity of the campaign suggest multiple targets and purposes. For example, one careful analysis of anti-Zionist items published in the Soviet press in the period 1969–71 concludes that they were not connected directly to events in the Middle East, and that there also was no direct correlation between the intensity of the campaign and rates of emigration (the campaign might have served, inter alia, as a camouflage for stepped-up rates of emigration). Rather, the analyst perceptively concludes, the campaign was a kind of peculiar "dialogue" between the Soviet government and its Jewish subjects, with the former attempting to persuade the latter not to attempt to leave the country.[19] Indeed, it may be that because of the

[17] From an unpublished transcript available to the author.

[18] This pronounced shift is acknowledged by V. V. Bol'shakov in "Criticism of Zionism in Soviet Historiography," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 9, September 1973. Bol'shakov writes: "Significant criticism of Zionism in the Soviet press began in 1968–70" with the articles and later the book *Ostorozhno sionizm!* (Beware Zionism!) by Yuriy Ivanov. The latter was termed "the first book in Soviet literature of the past 30 years to present a scientific critical investigation . . . of Zionism."

[19] Jonathan Frankel, "The Anti-Zionist Press Campaigns in the USSR, 1969–71: An Internal Dialogue?" *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London), No. 3, May 1972. See also Zeev Ben-Shlomo, "The Current Anti-Zionist Campaign in the USSR," *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs* (London), May 1970, and the appended documents.

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Table 1. Soviet Press Coverage of Zionism and Jewish Topics, 1963–77 (Selected Years)

Year	Zionism		All Jewish topics	
	Number of articles	Column inches	Number of articles	Column inches
1963	10		175	
1964	15		209	
1965	8		151	
1966	10	210	137	3,222
1968	36	1,485	343	6,875
1969	42	1,410	313	6,465
1970	204	7,465	592	4,025
1971[a]	61	1,920	125	2,995
1974[b]	19	1,615	147	2,890
1975	60	1,855	204	4,230
1977[a]	36	1,135	97	1,838

[a] Data available for six months only.
[b] Data available for nine months only.

SOURCE: These data are based on the multivolume *Yevrei i yevreyskiy narod* (Jerusalem), 1960ff., which reproduces in full articles from the central and provincial Soviet press that mention Jews or Jewish affairs. This table counts articles appearing under the rubrics of Zionism; Jewish religion, history, and culture; and Jewish history in Russia and the USSR. Articles on the state of Israel are *not* included, so that "Zionism" comprehends only those materials dealing with Zionist ideology or the Zionist movement. The table was compiled for the author by Amy Saldinger of the Department of History, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI).

high internal costs of coercive tactics and the prospect of attendant unfavorable publicity abroad, the anti-Zionist campaign is seen, at least in part, as a less controversial means of persuading Jews not to apply for exit permits. Not surprisingly, however, the campaign has acquired a dynamic of its own and has served as a vehicle for those motivated purely by antisemitism or by careerist ambitions and other considerations.

As Table 1 shows, the number of articles on Zionism and the space devoted to the subject rose steeply after 1967. Although there were fluctuations in the following years, Zionism was the main subject of at least half (and in some years almost two thirds) of the newspaper space devoted to Jewish topics.

Not only has Zionism become a steady and prominent feature in the press, but it is also the subject of books, brochures, films, and even television programs. Since 1962, at least 62 books and pamphlets dealing directly with Zionism have been published, and a few have been in editions of over 100,000. This is exclusive of materials on Israel, Judaism, and other themes which are almost invariably linked to Zionism, so that the amount of material disseminated on Zionism is several times greater than that found in publications directly treating the topic.[20]

Soviet materials devoted to Zionism may be divided into the scholarly and the journalistic-propagandistic, although sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The scholarly articles, appearing in academic journals and bearing references to primary source material, rarely attempt to link the Zionist movement of the past with current events. They give the impression that the "problem" of Zionism was solved by the Bolshevik revolution, and that it arose because of a specific domestic situation rather than as part of a worldwide movement. The publicistic articles, by contrast, are much more polemical. They focus on contemporary Zionism and approach the problem as international in nature.

In the scholarly literature, one may discern three approaches to the link between Jews and Zionism. One approach, rarely taken in recent years, describes the hardships and disabilities of the Jews under Tsarist rule, emphasizes their contributions to the revolutionary movement, and concludes that Zionism was the invention of the Jewish bourgeoisie and was decisively rejected by the Jewish workers. By portraying the Jewish proletariat sympathetically, this approach explicitly rejects the equating of Zionism with all Jews.[21] Other writers argue that not all Jews were persecuted under the Tsars and that Zionism enjoyed wide support among the Jews.[22] A third position holds that "objectively, Zionism played the role of ally to the most reactionary forces in the Russian Empire." In this view, the Jewish workers did not decisively reject Zionism, and only the October Revolution defeated this ideology, which, it is argued, had infected the great majority of Jews from all classes.[23]

While the scholarly articles offer Marxist-Leninist interpretations and render critical judgments of Zionism as it was or is, the publicistic articles do unrestrained violence to the facts themselves and have a highly polemical tone. The propaganda of the last decade attempts to link Zionism to fascism, racism, an international anti-Communist conspiracy, or Judaism—connections not made in the few articles on Zionism written before 1967. Outright falsifications abound. For example, a 1977 publication claims that "Zionists

[20] Based on an examination of *Novyye knigi SSSR* and *Knizhnaya letopis'*, both published in Moscow.

[21] A. V. Piaskovskiy, "Zionism in Prerevolutionary Russia," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 5, September-October 1973.

[22] L. Vostokov, "The Anti-People Activity of the Zionists in Russia," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 3, March 1973.

[23] Ye. S. Yevseyev, "From the History of Zionism in Tsarist Russia," ibid., No. 5, May 1973.

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tried to persuade Jews in the [Warsaw] ghetto not to fight. Zionists justified fascist genocide. . . ."[24] In fact, the leadership of the 1943 uprising was largely from Zionist parties and youth movements and from the Bund. Even during its "anti-Zionist" campaign in 1968, the Polish regime did not try to deny Zionist leadership of the uprising, nor did it rename those Warsaw streets named for Zionist leaders of the revolt. But Soviet authors play fast and loose with the wartime events.

The Bund is a particular bogey of Soviet propaganda. While only shadowy remnants of the Bund exist anywhere in the world today, it occupies such a prominent place in Soviet literature—much to the puzzlement of many Soviet readers who have no inkling of what the Bund is all about—that one gains the impression that it is a powerful anti-Soviet force. Anyone with the slightest acquaintance with Bundist literature (much of which was written in Russian—rendering irrelevant the complaint that "criticism of Zionism is difficult because much of the source material is written in Aesopian language and/or in Hebrew"[25]) knows the Bund was militantly anti-Zionist and was the main competitor of Zionism within the Jewish community. This fact has not deterred Soviet journalists from such statements as "Zionism . . . has undergone a tremendous metamorphosis from the petit bourgeois anti-Marxist national group of the Bund . . . to today's bandits of Moshe Dayan . . . ."[26]

What are the major themes of the anti-Zionist propaganda? There are only a few, and—as so often in such materials—they are repeated with only slight variations, giving the impression that there is a basic recipe for the product.

One prominent theme is the connection between Judaism and Zionism. Indeed, several books and pamphlets have appeared with titles such as *Iudaizm na sluzhbe sionizma* (Judaism in the Service of Zionism—Kiev, Politizdat Ukrainy, 1973), or *Iudaizm i sionizm* (Judaism and Zionism—Kiev, Znaniye, 1968) and *Sovremennyy Judaizm i sionizm* (Contemporary Judaism and Zionism—Kishinëv, Kartia Moldoveniaske, 1964 and 1968). To be sure, there are some differences of opinion on this matter among Soviet writers. Some plainly equate Zionism with Judaism. They point out that the Bible is studied in Israeli schools and claim that Judaism is the "official religion" of Israel. The result is, in the words of one

This Soviet cartoon about Israeli actions in Lebanon makes the typical equation of Zionism and fascism: the bombs bear the letters of the Russian word for "Zionism." The cartoon was published in Bakinskiy rabochiy *(Baku), March 30, 1978.*

—Reproduced in Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Soviet Antisemitic Propaganda*, London, Narod Press, 1978.

author, that "the evil system is a hybrid of Zionism with Judaism and is fostered by the darkest of evil forces, whose world center is in New York."[27] Other commentators maintain that Zionism manipulates and exploits Judaism for its own evil purposes. One writer, for instance, suggests that while "Judaism and Zionism are two sides of the same coin of capitalism and . . . stand shoulder to shoulder against the forces of progress and social justice," only the Zionists themselves (wrongly) equate Zionism with Judaism and the latter with Jews.[28] Another argues clearly that Judaism and Zionism are not the same thing, but form a mutually beneficial alliance. He notes:

Judaism is a religion, not the "civilization" of the Jewish people . . . . The alliance between Judaism and Zionism did not become very strong until recently . . . . Zionism is by its nature a political, not a religious, phenomenon.[29]

V. Semenyuk holds that the Zionists, faced with an Is-

[24] A. Teplitskiy, "In the Service of Imperialism and Reaction," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), July 1977, p. 63.

[25] V. V. Bol'shakov, loc. cit.

[26] K. Ivanov, "Israel, Zionism, and International Imperialism," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), June 1968.

[27] "For Believers and Nonbelievers," *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (Minsk), Mar. 20, 1968.

[28] Zenon Ryaboshapka, "The Exodus and Contemporary Life," *Sovetskaya molodëzh* (Moscow), Apr. 21, 1973.

[29] G. Bakanurskiy, "Hand in Hand: Zionism and Judaism in the USA," *Nauka i religiya* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1971.

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raeli population he characterizes as a "motley collection of people . . . who had to be transformed into a monolithic mass," hit upon Judaism as a means of "achieving a unified militaristic spirit."[30] A third view, manifestly a minority one, contends that "it is clear to any unprejudiced person that the great majority of Jews . . . have long broken with Judaism . . . . The great majority of laboring Jews . . . decisively condemn Zionism but still remain Jews."[31] Even this, it should be underscored, is not an unequivocal denial of the Judaism-Zionism link. In sum, then, there is no doubt that the great majority of Soviet writings on the subject connect Zionism to Judaism, and both to Jews, in one way or another.

Moreover, Zionism is seen not as the national movement of the Jewish people, but as a racist ideology premised on the belief in the superiority of Jews to all other peoples. Of course, the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism is cited extensively to support this theme.[32]

Another way of expressing the same notion, in a form even more odious to Jews, is the claim that Zionism is a variant of fascism. As one source puts it,

Many facts have convincingly demonstrated the fascist nature of the ideology and policies of Zionism. Fascism is disgusting in any of its guises. Its Zionist version is no better than the Hitlerite one.[33]

Some commentaries take one step further, charging that Zionists collaborated actively with fascists and German Nazis.[34] The equation of Zionism (and by association, all Jews) with Nazism is especially galling to Soviet Jews, who know very well that nearly 2 million Jews died in the USSR during the Nazi occupation, that about half a million Jews served in the Soviet armed forces, and that over 150,000 died in combat.[35] Even anti-Zionist Jews cannot help but be revolted by this theme of Soviet propaganda.

Then there is the argument that Zionists seek world domination.[36] Of course, this is very much in the tradition of historic antisemitic imagery, including the infamous "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion," which originated in Russia.[37] According to such accounts, Zionism seeks world domination chiefly by financial and political means. In discussion of Zionism's aim at world domination, the distinction between Jews and Zionists is generally erased completely. Thus, non-Zionist and even anti-Zionist organizations (the Bund, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Agudat Yisrael) and thinkers (Simon Dubnow, Hermann Cohen, Henri Bergson) are labeled Zionists, and political opponents of Soviet communism, such as the Czechoslovak reformers Frantisek Kriegel and Eduard Goldstücker, are also placed under this rubric, much as their predecessors of the 1950's, such as Rudolf Slansky, were accused of collaboration with the Zionists even though they had devoted their lives to the Communist movement and were outspoken opponents of Zionism.

It is true that some Soviet scholars and propagandists have evinced discomfort at the easy equation of Jews and Zionists and have warned (though not in print) that "even in the United States the great majority of Jews are Jews, not Zionists," implying that this was all the more the case in the USSR. Objections have also been raised to terms such as "Zionist capital" and "international Zionist conspiracy" as counterproductive from a propaganda point of view.[38] But such views seem not to be accepted by the propaganda machine or even by the leadership of such scholarly bodies as the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Of course, one can be critical of Israel and Zionism

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[30] V. Semenyuk, "Zionism and Judaism," *Znamya yunosti* (Minsk), Feb. 24, 1971.

[31] M. Gol'denberg, "Zionist Battlers for the Truth," *Nauka i religiya*, No. 1, January 1973.

[32] The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1977 which condemned Zionism as a form of racism. For Soviet arguments along these lines, see, for example, Yu. Andreyev, "Zionism as a Form of Racism," *Socialism: Theory and Practice* (Moscow), No. 10, 1977; and A. Zuban, "Zionism, a Form of Racism," in *Nash otvet klevetnikam*, Kiev, Prapor, 1976. This book is a collection of short articles by "ordinary Soviet citizens" of Jewish nationality.

[33] *Nash otvet klevetnikam.*

[34] For 23 different citations from the Soviet press in 1975–78 making this claim, see Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Soviet Antisemitic Propaganda*, London, 1978, pp. 67–76.

[35] See Solomon M. Schwarz, *Yevrei v Sovetskom Soyuze: 1939–1965*, (Jews in the Soviet Union: 1939–1965), New York, NY, American Jewish Committee, 1966; and Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jews Under Tsars and Soviets*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1964.

[36] V. Ya. Begun writes of "the Zionist movement's main strategic goal of establishing domination over the world," and V. Skurlatov writes of Zionism's "aspiration to world power." Quoted in *Soviet Antisemitic Propaganda*, pp. 48–49.

[37] This work purports to be the minutes of a secret meeting of world Zionist leaders. It was written in Russia nearly 100 years ago and was widely circulated in Nazi Germany. Today it is widely available in Latin America and in such Middle Eastern countries as Saudi Arabia. See Norman Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide*, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967.

[38] See "Protocols of the Anti-Zionist Elders," a report by E. L. Sol'mar on a meeting of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences held in February 1976, published in *Yevreyskiy samizdat*, Vol. 16, 1977, pp. 128–44.

Even A. Teplitskiy, loc. cit., criticized authors of a Soviet book on Zionism for displaying "carelessness in terminology, labeling Zionist and Judaic organizations Jewish."

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A photo of the painting "Summer Theater" by Soviet painter Mikhail A. Savitskiy, displayed in the winter of 1978–79 in Minsk as part of a collection depicting the brutalities of the Nazi occupation of Belorussia during World War II. A Nazi officer and a Jewish trusty wearing the Star of David survey a pile of dead prisoners.

—The New York Times.

without being in the least antisemitic. But, as should be clear from the instances cited here, current Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda rarely distinguishes between Jews and Zionists, and even anti-Zionist Jews are described as Zionists. Moreover, even if one were to assume that some Soviet commentators would like to differentiate between Zionists and Jews, and that their criticism of the former implies no prejudice against the latter, the *perception* of non-Jews as well as Jews in the USSR appears to be that there is no such differentiation, that the anti-Zionist campaign is one against Jews. The Soviet media make it crystal clear to even the most unsophisticated person that Israel and Zionism are Jewish phenomena, and this concretizes the issue for the recipient of the message. Because there are Jews in the Soviet Union, the anti-Zionist cause is turned from an abstract campaign against some unseen, unfelt evil into an attack on tangible objects, real people. From the point of view of the regime, this is useful, for such propaganda can genuinely arouse passions and support for the official line, in contrast, say, to propaganda on behalf of a national liberation movement in Africa or of "oppressed British workers." Thus, even if the campaign were not antisemitic—and there is considerable evidence that it is—its effects unquestionably add up to an attack on Jews, including those living in the Soviet Union.

How have Soviet Jews reacted to this virulent new outbreak of antisemitism under the guise of anti-Zionism? Many are revolted by it, but others respond in more complex fashion. While they resent the message, they project their hostility onto Israel and Zionists. If the latter did not exist, they reason, the position of Jews in the USSR would be much more comfortable. Others react in the same way that communities under pressure, including the Jews, have done the world over. Some deny the existence of the

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pressure or pass it off as a temporary aberration; others resign themselves to it as one would to an incurable disease; still others try to deny their nationality, in this case by "acting as Russian as possible." However, the post-Stalinist relaxation of Soviet life and the example of open activity by Soviet political dissidents brought different reactions to antisemitism from many Jews. Facing up to the bitter realization that they could never be accepted as Russians, they have "come out of hiding" and have asserted militantly their Jewish identity and their right to fill it with meaningful social, cultural, and even religious content. The search for identity has led some younger Jews to Judaism, which they view as an integral part of Jewish civilization. For some, this new-found conviction has brought the travails of labor camps and prisons; for others, emigration. (Religious Jews in particular have chosen to emigrate, further diminishing the small number of practicing Jews.)

While we can only guess at the overall distribution of reactions to antisemitism among Soviet Jews, we are now able to draw a more accurate picture with respect to those who have emigrated. In four surveys encompassing in all about 3,200 recent Jewish émigrés from the USSR, about three quarters of the respondents claimed frequent or occasional personal encounters with antisemitism in the USSR. One third to one half of those interviewed said that they had experienced antisemitism "often." The surveys included interviews in 1972 in Israel with 148 male immigrants from the Soviet Union who had had at least a high school education; interviews in 1976 in Detroit with 132 recent arrivals from the USSR; a 1973 survey in Israel among 2,527 immigrants from the USSR (of whom 447 had been active in the Jewish national movement there); and a 1976–77 survey comparing over 300 émigrés in Rome (bound mainly for the United States) with more than 200 Israeli immigrants having similar demographic characteristics.[39]

In the interviews, there was an observable tendency for males to indicate more frequent encounters with antisemitism than females did, which may be connected with the fact that antisemitic encounters were reported most frequently in connection with job seeking and by those with higher education. In other words, it seems that better-educated males, those who aspired to jobs which had greater prestige and required greater preparation, perceived themselves more discriminated against than those whose vocational aspirations were more modest.

This supposition is further buttressed by the finding (in the Detroit survey) that those born in the 1930's and 1940's—precisely the group that would have been seeking employment and advancement in the decade or two before its emigration—were more likely to cite antisemitism as their primary motive for emigration than were those born before 1930, although the latter claimed to have encountered just as many instances of antisemitism as the former. The older group, having reached the limits of vocational and social mobility, was not as pushed to emigrate by the antisemitic factors as it was by other considerations—family, Jewish cultural considerations, etc.[40]

Émigrés from the Ukraine reported somewhat more frequent antisemitic experiences that those from the RSFSR or the Baltic did. However, the data do not really indicate great geographic differences in this regard.

Perhaps the most startling finding was that a quarter of the former Jewish nationalist activists interviewed said they had "never" personally experienced antisemitism (the figure was only 10 percent in the case of all other groups surveyed). This disparity tends to confirm the impression that émigrés may tend to exaggerate or emphasize Soviet antisemitism to reassure themselves that they made the right decision in leaving their birthplace or to convince the interviewer that they were, indeed, victims of persecution. The latter consideration is especially relevant to those located in or bound for the United States, where they are admitted as political refugees. Thus, in the fourth survey mentioned above, two thirds of those interviewed in Rome, i.e., those not going to Israel, cited antisemitism as their primary reason for emigrating, while only 39 percent of an Israeli immigrant group matched to the Rome émigrés on all relevant background variables made this claim. In contrast, the Jewish activists could cite more "positive" reasons for emigration—in particular, a desire to live in a Jewish state and cultural milieu.

It may also be that precisely those among the émigrés who had felt the most acculturated were those who felt the greatest sense of injury from antisemitism. They considered themselves Russians, not

[39] The first two surveys were conducted by the author; the third represents the as yet unpublished findings of the Project on Rebirth of Jewish National Consciousness in the USSR, at the Center for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; and the final survey was by Elazar Leshem (see his "The 'Drop-out' Phenomenon Among Soviet Jews: Main Findings and Recommendations," Jerusalem, Center for Research and Documentation on East European Jewry, The Hebrew University, mimeo).

[40] For an elaboration of this point, see Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America?" *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, No. 1, 1977.

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Jews, and were deeply hurt by the discovery that Russians (and others) considered them Jews. The more conscious and committed Jews among the émigrés had fewer illusions on this score, were compensated by what they saw as the positive content of Jewish identity, and, while they may have wished to be accepted as equals, they did not wish to assimilate into the dominant population group.

Soviet policies regarding Jewish emigration. As noted above, one response of Soviet Jews to perceived antisemitism has been to seek to emigrate to less hostile environments, in particular to Israel. For reasons not altogether clear, Soviet authorities apparently decided in 1971 to permit limited and controlled emigration of Jews. The decision most likely resulted from a combination of internal and external pressures, coming to bear at a time when the USSR was anxious to reach agreements with the United States which would require ratification, and thus popular approval, in America. It is also quite likely that the Soviets calculated that a one-time gesture would be sufficient to exhaust the reservoir of potential emigration, placate Western opinion, and ease the pressures on the government. Obviously, this turned out to be a gross miscalculation, and all the subsequent experimentation with harassment, exile, imprisonment, "education taxes," and the like has not succeeded in stemming the flow of émigrés. Moreover, the apparent attempt to stem the emigration by intensifying the anti-Zionist campaign appears to have backfired—far from discouraging the growth of Jewish consciousness, it seems to have led more of the Soviet Union's Jews to conclude that their future lies outside the USSR.

Indeed, the mass exodus of Soviet Jews is a major historic development—one that has come to involve many diverse groups of Jews. The first group to leave were the least assimilated Jews and those from lower social strata. They included Baltic, Moldavian, Trans-Carpathian, and West Ukrainian Jews—people who had lived in traditional Jewish milieux until the 1940's and hence had not benefited from the opportunities enjoyed by secular Soviet Jews in the 1930's. They also comprised Jews from Georgia and Central Asia, who like their Christian and Muslim neighbors had preserved traditional outlooks and ways of life in Soviet society. The Jews of the RSFSR and the Ukraine, constituting nearly three quarters of the Soviet Jewish population, have tended to be more acculturated and initially showed much less inclination to depart the country, to which the vast majority were unquestionably loyal.

But in reaction to the doubtless unexpectedly large number of emigrants, the Soviet leadership adopted policies which adversely affected *all* Jews, those from the Russian heartland and the Ukraine as well as those from the periphery, those who were loyal Communists as well as dissidents. To the greatly increased propaganda against Zionism and Jewish nationalism, the deliberate erasure of Jewish history and culture, and the unflattering portrayal of Jews in the media, there was now added an obvious closing-off of educational and vocational opportunities. Between the 1970–71 and 1977–78 academic years, there was a 40 percent decline in the absolute number of Jewish university students, and an exactly parallel decline in the number of Jewish graduate students and in those enrolled in Moscow's higher educational institutions, generally considered the most prestigious in the country.[41] Clearly, such a strikingly consistent and strong trend can only be the result of a central policy decision. If we recall the rationale given by the authorities for imposition of an "education tax" on émigrés (compensation for the state's investment in their education), the reason for this decision becomes apparent: if Jews are going to emigrate, surely there is no argument to educate them. Why should the socialist fatherland prepare cadres for the Zionist state or any other capitalist country? Any Jew, whatever his geographic origins, cultural background, or political beliefs, becomes a potential émigré and must be treated as such.

Of course, this has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. With the new policy, Jews who had always considered themselves proud and loyal citizens and who could ignore some of the disabilities imposed on Jews as long as the way to a nonpolitical professional career was open, were forced to confront the fact that they or their children would be treated as disloyal people and their vocational and social paths would be blocked. Indeed, the large number of émigrés from the RSFSR and the Ukraine in recent years, and testimony by some of them, make it clear that the closing of educational opportunities in reaction to the first wave of emigration has been the major factor in creating subsequent waves.

Thus, increasingly, Jews need not personally experience antisemitism to conclude that their future is limited in the USSR. For example, among the émigrés

[41] For the all-Union data, see Central Statistical Administration under the USSR Council of Ministers, *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka, i kultura v SSSR: Statisticheskiy sbornik* (Public Education, Science, and Culture in the USSR: A Statistical Collection), Moscow, Statistika, 1977, p. 313. For the Moscow data, see Statistical Administration of Moscow City, *Moskva v tsifrakh 1917–1977 gg.* (Moscow in Figures, 1917–1977), Moscow, Statistika, 1977, p. 144.

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

A photograph of an exit visa issued to Semën Rafiyelovich Pichkhadze by the Soviet government on October 6, 1971, for emigration to Israel.

—De Andrade/Magnum.

in the four surveys mentioned above, about half infrequently "felt at home" in the Soviet Union. While this feeling of alienation was especially strong among those with pronounced Jewish cultural and religious backgrounds and among those from the Western periphery of the country—who had become citizens only in the preceding 30 years or so and found themselves a "third nationality" behind (1) the dominant local population and (2) the Russians[42]—one can expect the feeling to grow even among Jews who had been assimilating for three or four generations in the Soviet heartland.

In effect, a vicious cycle has been created: the greater the number of Jews who emigrate, the more the authorities resolve that this "unstable element" is to be denied higher education; the more education is closed off, the more émigrés are "created." Like the Germans, the other Soviet nationality to emigrate in substantial numbers,[43] the Jews are now definitively regarded as a "fifth column," and it is not clear what even those Jews whose most desperate desire is to disappear into the Russian population can do to convince the regime of their "reliability." Emigration thus becomes a "cause" as well as a consequence of policies directed against Jews.

Moreover, Jewish emigration has aroused negative popular reaction, perhaps fanned by the extensive media coverage given to émigrés. This coverage has stressed the troubles experienced by Jews who have gone to Israel and the United States, rather than the actual process of emigration and the reasons for it. The main themes are the misery of immigrants in capitalist countries, which are so inhumane as not to provide employment, free education, and free medical care; the social isolation of the immigrants and the hostility they encounter; and the desire of émigrés to return to the Soviet Union. At the same time, there is little encouragement for them to return. Said one commentator:

Our motherland has a good heart. Good—but not all-forgiving. A motherland is not something you can set aside for a moment and then take up again when necessity arises.[44]

Before 1971, the press always explicitly mentioned that the reason for emigration was reunification of families dispersed by World War II, and this was treated as a bona fide reason. When the emigration assumed mass proportions, emigrants were said to be leaving because they had been "deceived by Zionist propaganda," or else were unscrupulous opportunists whose main desire in life was to get rich quick, or fanatic enemies of the Soviet system.

No systematic evidence of popular reactions to emigration is available, of course, but from conversations with Jews and non-Jews who have no intention of emigrating and with those who have done so, one gets the impression that there are three types of reaction to the emigration. One reaction is simply jealousy:

[42] For some data on how émigré Lithuanians and Germans perceive Soviet Jews and other nationalities, see Juozas Kazlas, "Social Distance Among Ethnic Groups," in Edward Allworth, Ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States; Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

[43] For an interesting account of the Soviet view of Germans living in the Volga districts, see Richard Levine, "The German-Russians' Reaction to German Invasion," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1977–78.

[44] V. Sil'chenko in *Znamya kommunizma* (Odessa), Mar. 30, 1974. For examples of the literature on immigrants to Israel, see V. Gorbunov et al., "The Truth About the 'Promised Land,'" *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 12, 1972, and the pamphlet *Svidetel'stva obmanutykh* (Testimony of the Deceived), Moscow, n.p., 1972.

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A photograph of two Jewish physicists who applied for Soviet exit permits but were turned down and then fired from their jobs.

—Jesse Zel Lurie/Pictorial Parade.

the Jews are lucky and privileged, for they are allowed to leave the country while others cannot do so. A second reaction is sincere puzzlement as to why anyone would want to leave the USSR, with the conclusion sometimes drawn that Jews are ingrates who by their act of emigration are insulting not only the state but all its inhabitants. One well-educated woman who was shocked to learn that her neighbor, a retired scientist, had applied to leave, did not grasp his explanations and denied that there could be any antisemitism because, "after all, my boss (*nachal'nik*) is Jewish." The strong patriotism, even chauvinism, of many Soviet citizens and their profound ignorance and suspicion of foreign countries and customs lead many who have no special feelings about Jews to take the latter's emigration as a personal blow, and they become more receptive to the negative images of Jews projected by the Soviet media. Russian nationalist groups seem to be ambivalent about the emigration of Jews and other minorities: on the one hand, it is a slap in the face to Russia, on the other, it is seen to free her of alien elements.[45] A third reaction, devoid of ambivalence, is "good riddance" to the Jews. One need not be a passionate antisemite to feel this way (though surely there are not a few persons who could be so described); one need only calculate that the departure of the Jews opens up jobs, apartments, and places in higher education to those whom Nikita Khrushchev once called "our own cadres."

[45] One self-described antisemite says, "I welcome the emigration of Jews who leave hating or despising Russia. The emigration of the latter is not so much a blessing for Russia as it is for the Jews who remain here, since the émigrés can no longer infect them with their miasma." But, he continues, "Zionism is too secular an approach to the Jewish problem. The Jewish question can be solved only in the context of peaceful Christian theocracy, the sprouts of which have been distinctly revealed in Soviet Russia." Interview with G. Shimanov in *Yevrei v SSSR* (Jews in the USSR), reproduced in *Yevreyskiy samizdat,* Vol. 13, 1977, pp. 175–88. See also Dimitry Y. Pospielovsky, "The Jewish Question in Russian Samizdat," *Soviet Jewish Affairs,* No. 2, 1978.

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To sum up, then, what we appear to have been witnessing in the 1970's is a stiffening of Soviet anti-Jewish policies with an attendant increase in antisemitic sentiment. This marks a significant shift away from the more ambivalent policies which had pertained through much of the Soviet period. While the early Soviet leaders had spoken in favor of Jewish assimilation, they had accorded the Jews identity as a nationality. Although traditional Jewish culture had been repressed, by force when necessary, a substitute "Bolshevized" Jewish culture had been actively promoted. Then even that culture was repressed, but the doors were opened wide to Jewish participation and even leadership in the overall life of the Soviet Union. When the Jews were excluded from political leadership, they were still allowed a fair chance at cultural and scientific leadership. These fields, too, have now been greatly narrowed for Jews, and any chance for some version of Jewish cultural life has been eliminated. At the same time, however, Jews have been consistently denied the chance to assimilate, to "disappear" into the Russian or other populations. Official identification of Jews and the social importance of ethnicity in Soviet society leave the Jew suspended in an identity which has little, if any, positive value for him and which can have only "unpleasant consequences." The remnants of Jewish religion and culture are being forced to wither away, while the formality of Jewish identification is preserved.

In the past decade, the contradictions inherent in this situation have developed to the point of creating a profound qualitative change in the relationship between the Soviet regime and its Jewish citizens. It is not certain that this change was the result of any comprehensive policy decision. More, it appears to be the result of incremental changes, of cumulative policies. Whatever its origins, however, the change can be characterized as a final divorce between Jewish citizens and the Soviet system. Each has decided that it is unwanted by the other. The anti-Zionist campaign, which the authorities may have originally seen as an exigency of their overall Middle Eastern policy, has become an antisemitic campaign, whether or not it was so intended. It is in no small measure responsible, if not for the original thrust toward emigration, then certainly for the continuation of this mass movement, whose participants are no longer so much drawn to Zion as they are repelled by the country and the system which have in effect declared all of them to be untrustworthy and undesirable. Reconciliation between the regime and the Jews may be impossible, as each side feels injured and betrayed by the other.

Because of the large number of persons involved (there were more than 2 million Jews recorded in the 1970 Soviet census), the great majority of the USSR's Jewish population will remain in the country for the near term, if we assume no drastic easing of emigration restrictions. (In a decade, only some 10 percent of the Soviet Jews have departed.) However, the position of the Jews has been made sufficiently untenable that the 1980's are likely to see continued pressure for emigration and a concomitant worsening of the situation of those remaining. When the cycle will exhaust itself cannot be ascertained at the present time. But it looks as if, having been already erased from the pages of USSR history, the Jews will continue to disappear from the land itself.

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Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement

By William M. LeoGrande

One of the clearest indications of the changing international system has been the rapid growth, in both size and influence, of the movement of nonaligned nations. When the nonaligned movement was founded nearly 20 years ago, its 25 member states constituted an island of neutralism in a sea of cold war politics. Buffeted by the waves of international tension between East and West, these states, lacking much in the way of economic or military might, sought an alternative to bloc politics and cold war.

When the nonaligned nations gathered in Havana in September 1979 for their sixth summit, the 94 delegations in attendance could note with satisfaction that their movement's membership included virtually the entire Third World. Their deliberations would set the agenda for the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly (in which they would constitute an overwhelming majority) and for the continuing North-South dialogue on global economic issues. Moreover, the superpowers, which had so often ignored their entreaties in the past, were jealously courting their goodwill.

The choice of Cuba as host for the sixth summit, and therefore as chairman of the nonaligned nations until 1982, symbolized another change in the movement—the dramatic shift to the left in its political center of gravity. When the world's leading neutralists banded together in 1961, their principal aim was to ease international tensions and, hopefully, preserve the peace of the world. By 1979, the priorities of the movement had shifted to the issues of decolonization and international economics—issues on which neutrality toward the blocs proved to be more formal than real.

In addition, the evolution of the movement has increased its internal conflicts. The increase in its membership has made the movement more heterogeneous, and the growth in its influence has made its decisions more weighty. Both have served to strain to the limits the tradition of decision-making by consensus. However, the movement's most serious internal tensions have resulted from its radicalization. From the outset, the nonaligned movement included both radical and moderate wings. A moderate majority steered the movement through its first decade, emphasizing the bloc-neutral issue of world peace. The 1970's brought a new majority, a new set of issues, and an increasingly anti-Western thrust to the movement. By 1979, the conflict between the movement's radical and moderate wings no longer seemed containable. As they convened in Havana, the nonaligned nations brought to the summit no less a question than how to define the future course of their movement.

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The Emergence of Nonalignment

The nonaligned movement came into being in a global context which was to have important bearing upon its subsequent development. In 1955, the "Colombo group" convened the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian States, the first major gathering of Third World countries. The 29 nations in attendance addressed many of the issues which have since become

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Fidel Castro, Chairman of the Sixth Nonaligned Summit, discusses the progress of the conference with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

the dominant themes of the nonaligned movement. They denounced colonialism, spoke with urgency of the need to promote economic development in the Third World, and called for a relaxation of international tensions based upon the famous five principles of friendly cooperation and five principles of peaceful coexistence.[1]

Shortly after the close of the conference, two of its most prestigious participants, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, traveled to the Yugoslav island of Brioni for a summit with Josip Broz Tito, the only major "neutralist" leader not present at Bandung. Their joint declaration from the Brioni summit expressed support for the Bandung principles and, at Tito's urging, included a specific attack on the division of the world into hostile power blocs. The Yugoslavs, naturally, were interested in enlisting Third World support for their own antibloc foreign policy of "positive coexistence."[2]

It was not until 1961, however, that a major international conference brought together the Brioni theme of nonalignment and the Bandung themes of anticolonialism, economic development, and peaceful coexistence. In the intervening years, the cold war placed peace at the top of the international agenda and stimulated greater cooperation among the "neutralists" in the United Nations. One of the earliest peace initiatives by the neutralists was the 1960 joint resolution (from Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and President Sukarno of Indonesia) to the UN General Assembly calling for a summit meeting between US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to diffuse rising international tensions.

That joint venture was a precursor of the first nonaligned conference. At Tito's initiative, Yugoslavia,

[1] Carlos P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1956, pp. 92–102.

[2] Lars Nord, *Nonalignment and Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*, Stockholm, Raben and Sjögren, 1974, pp. 86–89.

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Egypt, and India set about the task of organizing a summit for the leaders of all nonaligned nations. Invitations were to be based on four criteria of nonalignment: (1) an independent foreign policy dedicated to peaceful coexistence; (2) support for national liberation movements; (3) nonparticipation in military pacts deemed "instruments of the cold war"; and (4) unwillingness to grant military bases to the great powers. The first criterion was so general as to be open to multiple interpretations, the second was so politically divisive that it was ignored from the outset, and the third was interpreted loosely enough to accommodate even nations with close military ties to bloc powers. Only the fourth criterion was applied with any consistency. Over succeeding years, nonalignment has come to be whatever a majority of the movement's members say it is.[3]

The First Nonaligned Conference was held in Belgrade in 1961 with 25 nations attending. It dealt with the same basic themes as the Bandung Conference before it, but while Bandung's emphasis had been on decolonization and economic development, the Belgrade meeting's first priority was world peace.[4] This stress reflected not only the Yugoslav influence but also the Third World's desire to play a positive role in relaxing international tensions. The neutralism of nonalignment was based upon the realization that isolationism or uninvolved neutrality would provide no refuge from the ravages of thermonuclear war. Nonalignment was thus "positive neutralism," a position from which to exert moral suasion in the interests of peace and, on occasion, to act as an honest broker mediating conflicts which threatened to escalate into conflagration. At the same time, the emphasis stemmed from a desire to avoid entangling alliances with the great powers which might jeopardize the security of weaker states over issues not of their choosing.

From the outset, the nonaligned nations vehemently denied an intent to create a "third bloc." Their consensus was that the division of the world into opposing blocs was precisely the cause of world tension; the demolition of such blocs was their goal. In any event, the practical possibility of forming a unified bloc was quite remote in light of the diversity of interests and ideology among the nonaligned nations.

The thematic balance of the conference was an important political issue. Denunciations of the cold war

[3] Ibid., p. 88.

[4] *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries*, Belgrade, Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod, 1961.

Some key participants at the First Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961: from left to right, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia; Sa'ib Salam of Lebanon; President Adan Abdullah Osman of the Somali Republic; Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan; Sheikh Suwayyil of Saudi Arabia; King Hassan II of Morocco; Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia; Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon; President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia; President Sukarno of Indonesia; President Oswaldo Dorticós of Cuba; President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud of Afghanistan; President Modibo Keita of Mali; and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

—UPI.

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could be bloc-neutral. The US and USSR were held equally to blame for international tensions, and pleas for peace could be directed at both without prejudice. However, denunciations of colonialism and underdevelopment were implicitly anti-Western. It was the developed capitalist countries which still held colonial possessions and dominated the international economic system to which the Third World belonged. Thus, so long as the nonaligned movement took world peace as its first priority, it could maintain a position equidistant from both East and West, but once the issues of colonialism and international economics came to the fore, nonalignment would tend to take on a decidedly anti-Western hue.

Among the great powers, both the USSR and China in general reacted favorably to the emergence of nonalignment. As for the former, peaceful coexistence had become the cornerstone of Khrushchev's own foreign policy, and the nonaligned nations' pleas for peace helped bolster his position against the ideological assaults of hardliners in both Moscow and Peking. Soviet policy toward the Third World was then also entering a more pragmatic and optimistic phase centered on the new concept of "national democracy," and even Yosif Stalin's legacy of animosity toward Tito was giving way to rapprochement.[5]

The Chinese were less sanguine about peaceful coexistence than were Soviet leaders, but given Chou En-lai's central role at Bandung and China's perennial desire to lead the Third World, the Chinese could hardly attack a Third World movement which was Bandung's lineal descendant. Consequently, China praised the nonaligned movement while warning against the illusion of peaceful coexistence with im-

[5] See, for example, John S. Reshetar, Jr., "The Soviet Union and the Neutralist World," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia, PA), November 1965, pp. 81-91.

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signs autographs after the conclusion of the Conference of Afro-Asian States in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.

—Wide World.

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perialism.[6]

If the Eastern bloc regarded the emergence of nonalignment with equanimity, the Western bloc, led by the United States, tended to ignore the movement because the combined political, economic, and military power of its members was so negligible. In the 1950's, it is true, US policy had been actively hostile toward neutralism. Not only had John Foster Dulles had a strictly bipolar vision of world politics (i.e., friends or enemies), but the weight of Bandung's anticolonial and development principles had seemed to be directed against the West. However, US policy had begun to moderate as the size and influence of the neutralist camp grew and as it became clear that this camp was not merely a new anti-Western bloc. Although suspicions remained, US policy by the early 1960's was no longer openly antagonistic toward either neutralism or nonalignment.[7]

The second and third nonaligned summits (at Cairo in 1964 and Lusaka in 1970) did not differ markedly from the Belgrade meeting.[8] The promotion of world peace, which had been the original impetus for the movement's creation, continued to be its first priority. This was still the issue which united the movement rather than dividing it along ideological lines. The issues of colonialism and economic development, with their anti-Western thrust, were more contentious, and the ideological cleavages within the nonaligned movement became visible around them in Cairo and Lusaka. Moderate members (e.g., India, Kenya, Nigeria, Ceylon) tended to concentrate their attention on the cold war, while the more radical nations (e.g., Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Cuba) pressed for equal emphasis on the anticolonial and economic themes. In Cairo, the radicals fared well because the movement's newly independent African members were staunchly anticolonialist and because the summit followed close upon the historic 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)—one of the early milestones of Third World solidarity on international economic issues.

In contrast, the Lusaka summit was quite conservative. In the six years between Cairo and Lusaka, the radical group in the movement lost nearly all of its most prestigious leaders; Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria all departed from the scene. As a result, the final declaration from the Lusaka summit was "depoliticized."[9] Avoiding economic issues, it condemned "big powers" but reserved no special opprobrium for capitalism or imperialism. Only on the issue of colonialism was the more radical tone of the Cairo declaration retained.

The Lusaka summit was the last meeting of the nonaligned movement which would be so moderate; it marked the end of the movement's initial stage of development. By the time the nonaligned nations assembled for their fourth summit in Algiers in 1973, the international environment had changed markedly. Cold war had given way to détente, with a consequent reduction in the urgency of the peace issue, and international economics had come to the fore as the most urgent issue for the Third World. The shift in the movement's major concerns was accompanied by the emergence of a new international leader whose prestige in the movement rivaled that of its founders—Cuba's Fidel Castro.

Cuban Nonalignment in the 1960's

Cuba was a founding member of the nonaligned movement and, during the 1960's, its only representative from Latin America. The island nation found itself caught in the cross fire of the cold war—a perilous situation that epitomized the fears which had given birth to nonalignment. The declarations from the early summits consistently called for the US to halt all hostile acts against Cuba and to withdraw from the Guantánamo naval base.

Despite this support, Cuba placed relatively low priority on its role in the nonaligned movement.[10] Faced with what it perceived as a formidable threat from the United States, Cuba would probably have preferred a formal Soviet commitment to its security—even if that meant ineligibility as a nonaligned nation. Furthermore, Cuban foreign policy was sharply at odds with the then-prevailing consensus within the movement. While the nonaligned summits focused on easing international tensions between the superpowers, Cuba remained deeply skeptical about the prospects for peaceful coexistence unless and until it extended to coexistence between big and small powers. As one of the nonaligned movement's most radical members, Cuba consistently advocated putting

[6] See, for instance, Harold M. Vinacke, "Communist China and the Uncommitted Zone," ibid., pp. 113-20.

[7] See, for example, Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "The United States and the Neutralists: A Decade in Perspective," ibid., pp. 92-101.

[8] On these two gatherings, see respectively *Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries*, Cairo, n.p., 1964; and Nord, op. cit., pp. 90-163.

[9] Nord, op. cit., p. 141.

[10] The Belgrade and Cairo summits, for instance, were attended by President Osvaldo Dorticós instead of Fidel Castro; the Lusaka summit was attended by Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa.

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greater emphasis on anticolonial and economic issues. Indeed, for the Cubans, the problems of cold war, colonialism, and underdevelopment all sprang from the same root—imperialism—and hence could not be successfully addressed in isolation *or* by the movement's continued neutrality toward the West.[11]

In advocating a staunchly anti-imperialist view of nonalignment, Cuba had little tolerance for the movement's heterogeneity or its proclivity for papering over ideological rifts with bland generalities. Cuba's delegates were always urging the movement (usually in vain) to be bold in addressing world issues, to identify the nation's "responsible" for conflict, to formulate solutions to world problems, and to act forthrightly to make those solutions a reality. The Cubans were asking for more unity of will and purpose than the movement possessed.[12]

While Cuba's position at the early summits was consistently anti-imperialist, it was not explicitly pro-Soviet. In Belgrade and Cairo, President Dorticós never once mentioned the Soviet Union, and Cuba's specific recommendations on several issues (e.g., peaceful coexistence and the partial nuclear test ban treaty) were at odds with prevailing Soviet policy. At both meetings, Dorticós was careful to describe the Cuban revolution as a national liberation struggle, portraying the US-Cuban conflict in anti-imperialist rather than cold war terms:

The Cuban conflict emerges not from the tensions of the cold war between nuclear powers. . . .

It is a conflict between an imperialist power accustomed to imposing its domination and exploitation of the nations of Latin America, and a people that decided to make a Revolution and to forge their true independence. . . .[13]

Cuba's reticence to identify itself too openly with the USSR was due in part to very real differences between Cuban and Soviet foreign policies. In the mid-1960's especially, Cuba felt that the Soviets were not providing sufficient internationalist assistance either to national liberation movements or to "progressive" Third World governments.[14] But the reticence was also good practical politics. In the nonaligned movement of the 1960's, Cuba was already on the radical fringe; to have lauded the Soviet Union would not have improved Havana's standing.

Yet the logic of Cuba's anti-imperialist conception of nonalignment certainly implied that strict neutrality between East and West was an irrational policy for the Third World. If colonialism, underdevelopment, and world tension all stemmed from imperialism (i.e., the international *capitalist* system), then the Third World and the socialist camp obviously had many common interests. Some sort of cooperation against the developed capitalist nations would be a natural strategy for both.

It was not until 1970 (when Cuban-Soviet relations were on firmer ground and the nonaligned movement was at its most conservative) that Cuba finally articulated this logical corollary of its anti-imperialist stance:

The real division in the world is between exploited and exploiter countries; between oppressed and oppressor countries. . . . Let us not place the developed socialist countries and the developed capitalist countries under the same flag. The socialist countries are the strongest support and most pugnacious force of the anti-imperialist front, we cannot leave out or isolate them if we expect to engage in a battle with the imperialist countries headed by the U.S. . . .[15]

In Lusaka, this view was distinctly in the minority. But its expression was a portent of things to come.

The Algiers Summit and Beyond

The 1973 Algiers summit inaugurated a new stage in the development of the nonaligned movement. In the years between the Lusaka and Algiers conferences, the global economic position of the Third World deteriorated precipitously. A series of droughts and floods in 1972–73 ended the world food surplus and sent world market prices soaring. The Third World's bill for imported food more than tripled. Simultaneous inflation and recession in the developed Western countries further aggravated the Third World's balance

[11] See Dorticós' addresses to the Belgrade and Cairo summits, included in the published documents of the conferences cited in fns. 4 and 8.

[12] At times, the Cubans' frustration burst into the open. At Lusaka, Roa was moved to comment: "It calls for an enormous amount of tolerance to put up with some spurious nonaligned regimes made up of notorious murderers of the people," *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Sept. 27, 1970.

[13] Osvaldo Dorticós, "Position of Cuba at the 2nd Conference of Nonaligned Countries," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), Vol. 4, No. 39, November 1964, pp. 8–19.

[14] On Cuban-Soviet relations during this period, see D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969; and Jacques Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

[15] Raúl Roa, "Speech at the Nonaligned Conference in Zambia," *Granma Weekly Review*, Sept. 27, 1970.

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

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro addresses the Fourth Summit Conference of the Nonaligned Countries in Algiers in 1973; directly behind Castro is President Houari Boumediene of host country Algeria.

—Wide World.

of payments position; inflation pushed up the cost of the Third World's imports from the West, and recession shrank the West's market for Third World exports. Economic growth in the non-oil-producing nations of the Third World came to a virtual halt.[16]

The economic crisis unified the underdeveloped nations around the demand for a more favorable set of international economic relations. Earlier attempts to place this issue on the global agenda had failed, but the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel produced an unprecedented belief that through unity the underdeveloped world could overcome the developed world's reluctance to grant any real concessions. The high point of this new militance on economic issues was, of course, the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), advanced at the 1974 and 1975 Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly. It was at the nonaligned summit in Algiers, however, that the Third World forged its own unity, set its economic agenda, and mapped its strategy for these UN sessions.

With the cold war in abeyance as a result of the Soviet-American détente of 1972, international economics moved to the fore as the Third World's priority issue. Thus, the tone of the Algiers summit was considerably more radical than that of earlier conferences. The Economic Declaration of the Algiers conference opened with the bitter observation that détente, so long sought by the nonaligned nations, "did not have any beneficial effect on the developing countries and international cooperation." The reason, the conference concluded, was imperialism:

Imperialism is still the greatest obstacle on the road towards emancipation and progress of the developing countries. . . . Imperialism does not only oppose the economic progress of the developing countries, but also adopts a more aggressive attitude towards those who oppose its intentions, and endeavors to impose political, social, and economical structures which stimulate foreign domination, dependence or neocolonialism on them.[17]

Behind such radical language, however, was a sharp disagreement over precisely who the "imperialists" were. The most dramatic issue of the 1973 summit was whether to cast global economic issues in a strictly North-South dimension, castigating both Western "imperialism" and Soviet "social-imperialism"; or whether to distinguish between the developed socialist and the developed capitalist countries, reserving condemnation for the latter. Draft resolutions for the summit, authored by Algeria, criticized both East and West, presenting a view similar to China's "three worlds" theory.[18] These prompted L. I. Brezhnev to respond in a message to the conference that the socialist countries were the "natural allies" of the nonaligned. The real division in the world, he advised, was "not between 'big' and 'small,' 'rich' and 'poor,' but between socialism and imperialism."[19]

In Algiers, Fidel Castro, attending his first nonaligned summit, led the opposition to Algeria and Libya's theory of "two imperialisms." Unlike Cuban spokesmen at earlier summits, who had avoided men-

[16] For discussion of these various trends, see Joan Edelman Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1977, pp. 149f.

[17] *Nonalignment: Fourth Summit, Algiers*, Belgrade, NIP, 1973, p. 37.

[18] On the anti-Soviet tone of the conference's preparatory documents, see Fidel Castro, "Speech at the 4th Conference of Nonaligned Nations," *Granma Weekly Review*, Sept. 16, 1973.

[19] For the text of Brezhnev's message, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 5, 1973.

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tion of Cuba's socialist character or its friendship with the USSR, Castro addressed these issues head on:

I want to remind you that Cuba is a socialist country, Marxist-Leninist, whose final goal is communism. We are proud of this! . . .

The theory of "two imperialisms," one headed by the United States, and the other allegedly headed by the Soviet Union . . . has been echoed . . . by leaders and spokesmen of nonaligned countries. . . .

Any attempt to pit the nonaligned countries against the socialist camp is profoundly counterrevolutionary and benefits only imperialist interests. Inventing a false enemy can have only one aim, to evade the real enemy. . . . Any estrangement from the socialist camp means weakening and exposing ourselves to the mercy of the still powerful forces of imperialism. It would be a stupid strategy, a case of severe political shortsightedness.[20]

Reviewing the resolutions of the first three nonaligned summits, Castro reminded the conference that it was the forces of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism led by the United States which the nonaligned nations had consistently condemned.

Not only did Castro's performance elevate him to prominence as one of the movement's foremost leaders, but it also succeeded in defeating efforts to put the conference on record as condemning the Soviet Union. The final declaration was masterfully ambiguous in defining imperialism. However, every specific reference was to a developed Western nation, and the Economic Declaration singled out the "negative policies of developed countries with market economies." Only in the Political Declaration was there a single reference to the need for underdeveloped nations to maintain vigilance "against any kind of hegemony" ("hegemony," of course, being China's code word for Soviet domination).[21]

Cuba's new interest in the nonaligned movement grew directly out of the new activism of Cuban foreign policy in the early 1970's. Once internal equilibrium had been restored after the disastrous sugar harvest of 1970, Cuba emerged from the shadow of domestic preoccupations to play a major role in world affairs.

Initially, Cuba's new foreign policy appeared to be considerably more moderate than the policy of the previous decade. The failure of Cuba's attempts to export revolution to Latin America produced a strategy aimed at breaking Cuba's isolation by diplomatic rather than paramilitary means. Cuban tolerance for nations with different social systems rose markedly.[22]

In the Western Hemisphere, Havana's diplomatic strategy of normalizing relations with any willing moderate government proved to be a great success. The sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1963 began to erode, and pressure built within the inter-American system for Cuba's at least partial reintegration. By 1974, when the sanctions were finally relaxed, 11 governments had already recognized Cuba. Even in the United States, the emergence of détente produced the first faltering steps toward a normalization of US-Cuban relations: the signing of an antihijacking agreement in 1973 and the relaxation of the economic embargo for US corporate subsidiaries abroad in 1974.[23]

The transition from cold war to détente also reduced the direct security threat that Cuba perceived stemming from the US. Consequently, Cuban policymakers could pay greater attention to Cuba's larger, global relations, which had previously taken a back seat because of the immediate concern with deterring a US attack. Anticolonialism and economic development had always been part of the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution, but the circumstances of the 1970's allowed Cuba to pursue such matters with a vigor it had deemed impossible in the 1960's.

These changes in policy led naturally to an increased Cuban role in the nonaligned movement. The prominence of international economic issues and the anticolonial wars in Africa were moving the political center of nonalignment toward the left just when Cuban policy was adopting a more global orientation. Long on record as emphasizing colonial and developmental issues, Cuba became a leading voice in the movement when these issues came to the fore.

As Cuba's role in the nonaligned movement grew, the sensitive issue of Cuba's relationship with the USSR naturally became more prominent. By the time of the Algiers summit, Cuban-Soviet relations were extremely close, with the major tensions of the late 1960's having given way to close cooperation and a virtual identity of views. Thus, when Castro defended the Soviets against the theory of "two imperialisms," a few delegates questioned Cuba's credentials as a nonaligned nation.[24] In 1973, this was not a serious

[20] Castro, "Speech at the 4th Conference of Nonaligned Nations."
[21] *Nonalignment: Fourth Summit, Algiers,* pp. 25ff.
[22] Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Fall 1978, pp. 83–108.
[23] For an account of this process, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s,* Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1978, Ch. 4.
[24] See, for instance, the comments by Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi, as reported in *The New York Times,* Sept. 8, 1973.

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challenge, but subsequent events would raise it anew.

Despite the predictions of many Western commentators, Cuba's military involvement in Angola in 1975 did not damage its reputation in the nonaligned movement. Even though the operation was conducted in close cooperation with the Soviet Union, Cuba's long history of solidarity with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) blunted Western charges that the Cubans were merely Soviet puppets.[25] However, a more significant influence on the situation was South Africa's intervention. The bulk of Cuban combat troops arrived in Angola to repulse the South African invasion, and the Cuban presence was implicitly sanctioned by the condemnation of South Africa and recognition of the MPLA government by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[26] The nonaligned movement went even further at its 1976 conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, by openly praising the Cuban involvement:

The Conference congratulated the Government and people of Angola for their heroic and victorious struggle against the South African racist invaders and their allies, and commended the Republic of Cuba and other states which assisted the people of Angola in frustrating the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa's racist regime and its allies.[27]

The fifth summit was a victory for the Cuban view of nonalignment in other ways as well. Economic issues were defined as the "most acute problems" internationally. Their resolution was given the "highest priority," and the Western nations were held to be primarily responsible for "resistance" to the NIEO. "Imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Apartheid, racism, Zionism, and all forms of alien domination," were routinely denounced. But "hegemony" was notably absent from the list, and all the critical references to specific countries were to the Western nations (e.g., France, England, West Germany, Israel, and particularly the United States). As had earlier summits, the Colombo meeting deplored the US embargo against Cuba and the continued existence of the US base at Guantánamo. Moreover, the conference selected Cuba as the site for its next summit.[28]

Thus, even though pressing political matters on the home front (as well as a rumored security problem for him in Sri Lanka) prevented Castro from attending the Colombo summit, the outcome of this meeting brought the movement closer to the Cuban view of nonalignment than it had ever been before. No previous summit had put greater emphasis on economic issues or had been as explicit in its criticism of the West for its dominant position in the global economy, and no previous meeting had been clearer in its support for national liberation movements or in its implicit praise of the Communist camp's support of them. In the 1960's, statements by Cuban delegates had reflected the views only of the most radical wing in the nonaligned movement. By the 1970's, the movement itself had become so radicalized that Cuba's views were widely shared.

If the nonaligned nations had come to agree with Cuba on the essentially antagonistic nature of the Third World's relations with the West, there was considerably less certainty about Cuba's contention that the Communist camp represented a natural ally of the nonaligned. Cuba's deployment of combat troops in Ethiopia, accomplished with much greater Soviet involvement and cooperation than the Angolan intervention, catalyzed debate around this issue.[29]

Despite US attempts to brand the Cubans as "mercenaries" in Angola, most nonaligned nations had viewed Cuba's intervention there as a legitimate one. In Ethiopia, the diplomatic equation was more complex, and the outcome, less positive from Cuba's standpoint. The Soviet Union's readiness to replace the United States as Ethiopia's patron, even at the expense of its friendship with Somalia, struck many observers as crass geopolitical jockeying. Cuba's close cooperation with the Soviets in Ethiopia gave credence to Western charges that Cuban policy was being set in Moscow. Thus, the suspicions of Soviet motives in Africa that were harbored by many nonaligned nations tended to be generalized to Cuba.

Little of this sentiment was publicly expressed in Africa because the Cuban-Soviet intervention was justified as a defense of established borders. Neverthe-

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[25] On the history of Cuban ties to the MPLA, which dated to the mid-1960's, see William M. LeoGrande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," *Cuban Studies* (Pittsburgh, PA), January 1980, pp. 1-45.

[26] Some Cuban troops did arrive in Angola before the South African invasion (estimates range from 500 to 3,000), but the major buildup came later. See ibid. On the OAU condemnation of South Africa, see *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1976.

[27] See the conference's Political Declaration, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC), Aug. 23, 1976.

[28] For the texts of the Colombo conference's declarations, see ibid., Aug. 23 and 24, 1976.

[29] See the discussion of the Belgrade foreign ministers' meeting which follows. Unlike the Angolan campaign, the Ogaden war was planned largely by the Soviet Union, which put several thousand advisers into Ethiopia in early 1978. See LeoGrande, loc. cit.

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less, the changing perception of Cuban-Soviet military cooperation became the principal topic of debate at the 1978 Belgrade meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers. Tito opened the conference with a speech which, though it never mentioned the Cubans by name, accused them of assisting the introduction of "new forms of colonial presence or bloc dependence in Africa." In the debates that followed, a number of delegates attacked, either directly or indirectly, the Cubans' role in Africa. India accused Cuba of "bringing in the cold war by the back door," and Egypt suggested that the site of the sixth summit should be changed, lest some members boycott it.[30]

[30] "Tito Addresses Nonaligned Ministerial Conference," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), July 25, 1978; *The New York Times*, July 26, 29, 30, and 31, 1978.

Cuba's answer to these charges was a preview of the conception of nonalignment which Cuba would later champion at the sixth summit. Its representatives at Belgrade argued that the movement had historically supported the principles of self-determination and nonintervention, and that Cuba's involvements in Angola and Ethiopia were undertaken in defense of these principles. Though the movement had consistently opposed cold war military blocs, the Cubans maintained, it had never construed the blocs as "equally enemies of the nonaligned countries . . . Cuba would never accept that"; on the contrary, the movement had always condemned the specific policies of the West, not those of the Communist camp. While the Cubans professed no desire to reduce the movement to an appendage of the Soviet Union, they called on its members to recognize that "the socialist countries, by

Cuban soldiers remain in the Ogaden assisting Ethiopian forces in October 1978. The message spelled out in the foreground is "Long Live Internationalism."

—Bernard Couret-Gamma/Liaison.

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the very nature of their system and their politics, are natural allies" of the nonaligned.[31]

Despite Cuba's close cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Ogaden war, the nonaligned movement's moderates, led by Yugoslavia and Egypt, could not get the Belgrade conference to adopt even an implicit censure of Cuba's actions. Though some African states (notably Nigeria and Kenya) voiced concern about the prospect of a long-term Cuban military presence in Africa, none was willing to defend Somali aggression or, conversely, to protest too loudly the Cuban and Soviet efforts on Ethiopia's behalf. The Belgrade meeting reaffirmed Havana as the site for the sixth summit and rejected an anti-Cuban resolution condemning foreign military involvement in member states.[32]

Shortly after the Belgrade meeting, full-scale war erupted between Vietnam and Cambodia. Cuba's position on this issue proved to be much more damaging diplomatically than any of its African involvements. In the UN debate over Vietnam's active role in the overthrow of Pol Pot, no delegation was more vitriolic than Cuba's in its denunciations of Pol Pot and Norodom Sihanouk or more unwavering in its defense of Vietnam, Havana's longtime friend and ally. When the nonaligned nations composed a compromise resolution on Cambodia which called for the withdrawal of *all* foreign troops (but did not mention the Vietnamese by name), Cuba opposed it.[33] Solidarity with Vietnam took precedence in this case over Cuba's support for the principle of territorial integrity, thus making Cuba's defense of the same principle in Ethiopia appear more expedient than sincere, the egregiousness of Pol Pot's terror notwithstanding. Hence, the stage was set for battle over the Cambodia issue at the Havana summit.

Toward the Havana Summit

Sensing that the sixth summit could prove to be as pivotal for the nonaligned movement as the 1973 summit in Algiers, a number of countries launched intense diplomatic efforts in early 1979 to influence its outcome. The radical wing of the movement, led by the Cubans (and including Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, among others), saw the upcoming summit as an opportunity to consolidate the leftward course the movement had been on since Algiers. Ideally, they hoped to win endorsement of their explicitly anti-imperialist definition of nonalignment, including, if possible, the thesis that the Communist camp constituted a "natural ally" of the nonaligned.

As host for the sixth summit, Cuba was responsible for preparing a draft of the final conference declaration, consulting with member states on revisions, and then submitting a revised draft to the summit's participants. Cuba's authorship of the initial draft obviously gave the radicals an important advantage, though it also placed upon the Cubans a consensus-building responsibility which forced them to be more conciliatory than they might otherwise have been.

The moderate wing of the movement, led by Yugoslavia (and including Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, and Egypt, among others), mobilized their own diplomatic efforts, aimed at countering Cuba's campaign in favor of its draft resolution. Yugoslavia lobbied particularly hard to prevent the movement from abandoning its nominal neutralism (however anti-Western in content) and endorsing the Cuban thesis that the Soviets were the "natural allies" of the nonaligned. President Tito himself made three major international trips and conferred with many additional delegations in Belgrade in his efforts to build a consensus around the Yugoslav position.[34]

The diplomatic maneuvering also extended beyond the bounds of the movement's membership. The Soviets lauded the increasingly anti-imperialist direction of the nonaligned nations and proclaimed their common interests with the Soviet camp. Beyond this, Soviet efforts seem to have been relatively restrained.[35] Since the central issue of the summit

[31] Isidoro Malmierca, "Speech at the Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries," and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez, "Statement during a Press Conference in Belgrade," *Granma Weekly Review*, Aug. 13, 1978.

[32] At the Khartoum OAU meeting just prior to Belgrade, Nigeria's head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, thanked Cuba and the USSR for its aid to African states but pointedly warned them "not to overstay their welcome . . . lest they run the risk of being dubbed a new imperialist presence." See *The New York Times*, July 20, 1978. The controversy on this point at Belgrade is summarized in ibid, July 26, 1978.

[33] On Cuba's opposition to the Security Council resolution on Cambodia, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), Jan. 15, 1979.

[34] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 29, 1979.

[35] Soviet press commentary dwelt mainly on the diplomatic efforts of the United States, characterizing them as an attempt to split the nonaligned movement and to drive a wedge between the movement and its natural allies. See, e.g., A. Klimov, "On the Havana Conference," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1979, pp. 43-50; and the commentaries reported in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 9, 20, 21, and 28, 1979.

The Yugoslavs criticized the Soviets' public position (see especially the interview with Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milorad Pesic, *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 29, 1979) but did not mention Soviet diplomatic activities. This suggests that such activities were probably fairly limited, for the Yugoslavs did not hesitate to criticize both Cuba (see the Pesic interview) and the US (see the interview with Tito, *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 23, 1979) for efforts of this sort.

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promised to be the movement's relationship to the USSR, an activist approach on the part of the Soviets might well have produced a backlash. Moreover, the Cubans, as hosts of the summit, were already engaged in extensive consultations with prospective participants, and since Cuban and Soviet views were virtually congruent, the Soviets could rest assured that their position would be well represented.

The United States, which had heretofore regarded the movement's triennial summits as having little real influence on global affairs, became deeply concerned about Cuba's efforts to further radicalize the movement, and deeply involved in the attempts to thwart it. A variety of factors converged to heighten US interest in the sixth summit. In the realpolitik of Henry Kissinger's foreign policy, the tangible assets of economic and military might had weighed heavily, and official declarations from the economically underdeveloped and militarily weak Third World had counted for little. But the Carter administration's greater sensitivity to world opinion (witness the human rights dimension of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy) made it more disposed to efforts aimed at revitalizing the image of the US among the nations of the Third World. The selection of Cuba as host for the sixth summit was a stark indication of how radicalized the nonaligned movement had already become and raised the specter of a Third World (non)aligned with the USSR. This specter, in turn, catalyzed a US response.

Washington, which had been feuding with Cuba ever since the Ethiopian-Somali war and the vitriolic public exchange between Castro and Carter over the 1978 Katangan invasion of Zaire (Shaba II), sought at first to undermine Cuba's prestige in the movement by focusing on Cuba's "alignment" with the USSR. The inability of Yugoslavia and Egypt to muster any real support for censuring Cuba at the Belgrade meeting, however, demonstrated the futility of this strategy. As the Havana summit approached, the United States shifted its diplomatic efforts toward influencing the text of the summit's final declaration. The US goal, like that of the movement's moderates, was to undo as much of the anti-imperialist language in the Cuban draft as possible.[36]

Substantively, the content of the draft (which Cuba circulated among the member states in July 1979) did not depart sharply from the positions adopted by the Colombo summit. In tone, however, it clearly reflected Cuba's anti-imperialist conception of nonalignment. Its condemnations of imperialism were more numerous and specific (naming particular countries) than those of earlier declarations; its analysis of international economics placed the blame for underdevelopment more directly on the developed market economies than ever before; and it spoke repeatedly of cooperation between the nonaligned states and the Communist camp (sometimes referred to elliptically as "peace-loving forces"). Nowhere, however, did it refer to the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of the nonaligned nations. In their extensive consultations with member states, the Cubans had apparently discovered that the movement was not ready to break so openly with its tradition of neutrality toward the blocs. The absence of the "natural alliance" thesis from the Cuban draft provided the first indication that the question of the movement's relationship to the USSR would not be directly engaged but would instead be dealt with obliquely, through other issues.[37]

The Sixth Summit

As the sixth summit began, a sharp clash was expected between Castro and Tito on the issue of the nonaligned movement's relationship to the USSR. Tito's willingness to undertake the arduous trip to Havana despite his tenuous health was a good measure of the Yugoslavs' resolve to blunt the radical thrust Cuba seemed intent on imparting to the movement.

Castro's opening address to the summit, like his 1973 speech in Algiers, frankly set forth Cuba's views on the main issues under debate. He did not, however, dwell on the movement's relationship to the Communist camp or insist on the "natural alliance" thesis. He chose, instead, to emphasize the need for unity in the struggle against imperialism and to promise that Cuba would not "try to impose our radicalism on anyone."[38]

When Tito addressed the conference, he too stressed the need for unity and the need to "resist all attempts to insinuate alien interests into our ranks." "We have, from the very outset, been consistently opposed to bloc politics and foreign domination, to all forms of political and economic hegemony," he argued. "We have never been anyone's rubber stamp."[39] Tito's low-key address, delivered from a chair at the foot of the dais, was hardly the spirited rebuttal of Castro that many delegates had expected.

[36] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 3, 1979.

[37] Accounts available to the author.

[38] Fidel Castro, "Speech at the Inaugural Session of the 6th Summit of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries," *Granma Weekly Review*, Sept. 9, 1979.

[39] "President Tito Addresses Havana Nonaligned Summit," *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 4, 1979.

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Cuban Premier Fidel Castro delivers an address to the Sixth Nonaligned Summit, to which his country played host.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

Yet it hardly needed to be. If it seemed anticlimactic, it was because the issue itself had no climax. Castro was unwilling to provoke a conflict over the "natural alliance" thesis because he was astute enough to know that the consensus of the movement was against Cuba on the issue.

Julius Nyerere's speech was a bellwether. Perhaps the most respected African leader and a consistent supporter of the liberation of Southern Africa, Nyerere could never be mistaken for an imperialist stooge. Yet on the issue of a natural alliance between the nonaligned movement and the Communist camp, he stood with the moderates, warning that such a course would cause the movement to "cease to be an influence on the world, and fall apart." His remarks drew long applause.[40]

In the final declaration from the summit, virtually all the draft's references to cooperation with the Communist camp were omitted. To the numerous condemnations of "imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, Zionism, and apartheid," the evils of "bloc politics" and "hegemony" were added. Finally, a large number of criticisms directed at the policies of specific Western countries were replaced by more ambiguous references to "imperialist forces." In short, though the substantive positions adopted on many global issues made the final declaration from Havana more "anti-Western" than any preceding declaration, it did not even implicitly embrace the Cuban thesis of a natural alliance between the nonaligned nations and the Communist camp.[41]

If the "natural alliance" issue produced less conflict than anticipated, the issues of Cambodia and Egypt generated more. The credentials fight over Cambodia proved most bitter, for on this issue, the Cubans were not prepared to lose. When Pol Pot had been overthrown, Cuba had broken with the majority of nonaligned nations by opposing the compromise resolution they had presented to the UN Security Council. In solidarity with Vietnam, Cuba had argued that Pol Pot's barbarity and Cambodia's border raids against Vietnam justified Vietnam's intervention and, implicitly, overrode the principle of territorial integrity.[42] Cuba had recognized the Heng Samrin government forthwith.

The question of which Cambodian regime the nonaligned movement should recognize arose first at the June 1979 meeting in Sri Lanka, held to prepare for the Havana summit. Cuba contended that Heng Samrin's government should assume Cambodia's seat, but this view was distinctly in the minority. Pol Pot's delegation was seated for the preparatory meeting, and the credentials issue was referred to the ambassadorial conference scheduled for the eve of the summit.[43]

The extent of Pol Pot's support was surprising, since there was virtually universal agreement that his regime had been genocidal. While many nations invoked the principle of territorial integrity in Pol Pot's defense, this was clearly only a partial explanation for their unwillingness to recognize Heng Samrin. No doubt some nations were genuinely uneasy about accepting a government brought to power by external intervention, especially when the old regime was still active on the battlefield. However, no one suggested that the movement should continue to recognize Idi Amin as the true representative of Uganda, even though the Tanzanian intervention there was as justified (or unjustified) as Vietnam's foray into Cambodia.

[40] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 7, 1979.

[41] *Final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, 3-7 September 1979*, Havana, mimeographed, 1979.

[42] See *FBIS-LAM*, Jan. 12 and 15, 1979.

[43] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 28, 1979.

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Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito pictured at the September 1979 summit of nonaligned states in Havana.

—Patrick Frilet-Sipa Press from Black Star.

Prince Sihanouk's active denunciation of the Heng Samrin government also contributed to Pol Pot's support, despite the Prince's acerbic descriptions of Pol Pot's reign.[44] Sihanouk had once been a highly respected neutralist leader, and his voice carried considerable weight. Moreover, there was strong precedent for the movement's refusing to recognize a de facto government in Cambodia. In 1970, the peripatetic Prince had succeeded in blocking the movement's recognition of the Lon Nol regime, which had ousted Sihanouk the year before.

But the main reason for the nonaligned movement's resistance to acceptance of the Heng Samrin government had little to do with the virtue of Pol Pot, the prestige of Prince Sihanouk, or the principle of territorial integrity. At root, Heng Samrin's opponents, led by Yugoslavia, saw the Cambodian credentials fight as a concrete manifestation of the general issue of the movement's relationship to the Soviet Union. Pol Pot's government was a renegade Communist regime brought down by Vietnam with close Soviet cooperation and support. For the moderates, it was this Soviet connection that rendered the Tanzanian-Ugandan comparison irrelevant. Tanzania's intervention had had nothing to do with bloc politics, but for those who viewed Vietnam (and Cuba) as nonaligned in name only, the Cambodian intervention was bloc intervention by proxy. Yugoslavia had helped inaugurate the nonaligned movement in large part to provide itself with a bulwark of world opinion to deter Soviet intervention against its own renegade brand of socialism. For Yugoslavia, destined soon to face the trauma of Tito's death, it was imperative that the movement refuse to legitimate the overthrow of Pol Pot in any way.[45]

As the ambassadors of the nonaligned nations assembled in Havana in late August, the general expectation was that the Cambodia credentials fight would end in a compromise patterned after the 1970 decision at Lusaka to leave Cambodia's seat vacant rather than give it to either Sihanouk or Lon Nol. Heng Samrin's supporters, including both Cuba and Vietnam, were advocating such a compromise, knowing full well they did not have the support to win full recognition for the new regime; however, Pol Pot's supporters were uncompromising. Hence, the summit opened on September 3 with the credentials issue still unresolved.

On September 6, the foreign ministers met to consider a Cuban resolution urging that the seat be left vacant. Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca, presiding over the meeting, asked for opponents of the resolution to speak against it; 16 delegations did. Then, rather than calling for a vote, Malmierca concluded that since only 16 nations were opposed to the resolution, it was approved. He adjourned the meeting and left the hall as a roar of protest erupted.[46]

Not to be defeated by such sleight of hand, the resolution's opponents (especially Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia, Yugoslavia, and India) appealed directly to Castro, demanding that the issue be reconsidered. That same night, a special meeting of the movement's 25-member Coordinating Bureau was convened. It proved to be the most rancorous meeting of the sum-

[44] See the excerpts from Sihanouk's speech to the United Nations, *The New York Times*, Jan. 12 and 13, 1979.

[45] Though the moderates' position was rarely stated explicitly in these terms, Pol Pot's supporters acknowledged in private that such was their perspective. Moreover, their view was only slightly veiled in their public comments. See the remarks by Singapore's Foreign Minister to *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1979; and the subsequent UN debate on Cambodia's credentials, as reported in *The Washington Post*, Sept. 20 and 22, 1979.

[46] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 7, 1979.

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mit. Castro himself argued the Cuban case for the compromise resolution, and did so in the strongest terms. At one point, he accused Pol Pot's supporters of being "saboteurs, wreckers, and imperialist stooges." Over the vocal opposition of Malaysia and Singapore, the Coordinating Bureau accepted the Cuban compromise of leaving Cambodia's seat vacant pending a review of the issue at the 1981 foreign ministers' meeting. The heads of state, in turn, accepted the Coordinating Bureau's recommendation.[47]

Though Cuba won on the Cambodian issue, it was a Pyrrhic victory. In no sense did the final outcome represent a genuine consensus within the nonaligned movement. When the issue of seating Cambodia came before the UN General Assembly just a month later, the compromise of leaving the seat vacant was soundly defeated, with many nonaligned nations voting in favor of Pol Pot. Moreover, Malmierca's handling of the foreign ministers' meeting on Cambodia engendered much bitterness. Charges that Cuba had used its control over arrangements to manipulate the meeting were voiced even by delegations which were not generally opposed to Cuba on the issues.[48]

Forging a nonaligned position on the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel proved to be nearly as contentious as the Cambodia credentials fight. The movement began the summit sharply divided. Radical Arab nations sought Egypt's expulsion as part of their general strategy of ostracizing Anwar al-Sadat, but the OAU, meeting prior to the summit, had resolved to oppose any outright condemnation of Egypt. Cuba seemed to favor some compromise. The draft declaration condemned the Camp David agreements and Egypt in no uncertain terms, but Cuba preferred some form of "censure" to outright expulsion.[49]

The moderate bloc at the conference, reinforced by African states, succeeded in deleting from the final declaration any explicit attack on the accords. At the last minute, however, Cuba introduced a resolution to suspend Egypt's membership in the movement for 18 months until the 1981 foreign ministers' meeting. The threat, of course, was that Egypt might be expelled from the movement at that time unless its foreign policy changed. After an all-night debate, the Cuban resolution was adopted.[50] The suspension of Egypt, which had challenged Cuba's credentials at the Belgrade meeting and had threatened to organize a boycott of the sixth summit, must have come as satisfying revenge for the Cubans.

Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, right, with Ahmed Sékou Touré, President of Guinea, at the September 1979 nonaligned summit in Havana.

—UPI.

Neither the radicals nor the moderates could claim the sixth summit as a clear victory. Given the nonaligned movement's history of consensus decision-making and the desire of both Cuba and Yugoslavia to avoid an open split, most issues were settled by compromise. The pivotal group at the summit turned out to be the states which were not so radical as the Cubans but more radical than the Yugoslavs (Tanzania being the most vocal example). Precisely because this middle group did not operate as a bloc at the summit, each issue found some of these states siding with the radicals and others with the moderates. In competing for the support of this middle group, both Cuba and Yugoslavia were forced to shift their own positions toward the center. Only the Cambodia issue proved unamenable to compromise.

The moderates scored some notable successes at the summit. Foremost among these was frustration of the radicals' desire to put the nonaligned movement on record as a "natural ally" of the Communist camp. The sixth summit did not fundamentally alter the movement's definition of its relationship to the power blocs. In addition, the moderates managed to tone down much of the final declaration's anti-Western rhetoric; to defeat Heng Samrin's bid for recognition;

[47] *The New York Times*, Sept. 7 and 8, 1979.

[48] For a summary of the complaints over Cuba's handling of the conference, see ibid., Sept. 12, 1979.

[49] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 9 and 10, 1979.

[50] Ibid.

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and to avoid any explicit denunciation of the Camp David accords.

Yet the Cubans and their radical supporters also had much to be pleased with in the summit's outcome. While Heng Samrin was not seated, neither was Pol Pot; though Camp David was not denounced, Egypt's membership was suspended; and while the movement would not explicitly ally itself with the Communist camp, the actual content of the summit's final declaration was more critical of the West than that of any previous declarations had been.

The language of the Economic Declaration provides a good illustration of the sorts of victories the radicals gained. This declaration generated much less intense debate at the summit than other matters because the member states remain united in their support of the NIEO. Most of the specific recommendations contained in the document conformed with those of the declaration issued by the Colombo conference. But where the 1976 declaration had blamed the *policies* of the developed market economies for the failure to achieve a New International Economic Order, the Havana declaration defined the problem as a *structural* one resulting from the dominant position of the developed market economies in the global economic system.[51] This difference is more than mere nuance. The linchpin of Cuba's position that the interests of the nonaligned and the Communist camp coincide (hence the basis of the "natural alliance" thesis) is the argument that an objective (i.e., structural) conflict of interest exists between the Third World and the West. Thus, the Havana summit's Economic Declaration took a quiet but not inconsiderable step closer to Cuba's view of nonalignment as anti-imperialism.

Cuba and the Future of Nonalignment

Cuba's objective at the sixth summit was to accelerate the movement's leftward shift, to make the membership recognize what Cuba regards as the inherently anti-imperialist content of its principles and interests. This, as it turned out, was more than the consensus of the movement could bear. While the Cubans did not hesitate to press hard for their positions on the Cambodian and Egyptian issues, they were unwilling to risk splitting the movement on the larger issue of a "natural alliance" with the Communist camp.

Cuba's views thus are still more radical than the movement's consensus. Nevertheless, despite concerted diplomatic efforts by the United States, the results of the Havana summit were more radical than those of any prior summit. The radicalization of the nonaligned movement continued, albeit not as rapidly as Cuba might have liked.

The greatest diplomatic problem generated for Cuba by the summit was an exacerbation of the fear that the Cubans would misuse the chairmanship of the movement, guiding it toward the sort of "natural alliance" with the Communist camp which the conference had clearly rejected. This fear, always present among the movement's moderates, was reinforced by Cuba's handling of the Cambodia issue during the summit itself.

In an obvious effort to assuage such concerns, Castro closed the conference with the promise that Cuba would never exploit the chairmanship to its own benefit, but would use it instead to "struggle and work for others."[52] In presenting the results of the summit to the UN General Assembly several weeks later, Castro emphasized his role as spokesman for the nonaligned movement rather than that of Cuban head of state, and he concentrated his remarks on international economics, the issue around which the movement was most united.[53]

Though his UN address was well received, Castro could not create greater unity among the nonaligned than their inherent ideological diversity would allow. The fragility of the consensus reached at Havana was quickly revealed at the United Nations, first in the defeat of the "nonaligned proposal" to seat neither Pol Pot's nor Heng Samrin's Cambodia in the General Assembly (Pol Pot won easily, gaining a substantial number of votes from nonaligned nations),[54] and later in Cuba's failure to win a Security Council seat. As chairman of the nonaligned, Cuba should have defeated Colombia with no difficulty, yet the election remained deadlocked through 156 ballots. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, Cuba's plurality eroded, and the nonaligned states themselves (led by India and Nigeria) engineered Cuba's withdrawal and the subsequent election of Mexico.[55]

If the tone of Castro's UN address is any indication, Cuba will probably be very cautious about exploiting the movement's chairmanship to give the movement a

[51] Paragraphs 2f. of Economic Declaration, in *Final Declaration*.

[52] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 10, 1979.

[53] Fidel Castro, *Address Before the 34th Session of the General Assembly*, New York, NY, Cuban Mission to the UN, mimeographed, 1979.

[54] For a discussion of Pol Pot's victory, see *The Washington Post*, Sept. 22, 1979.

[55] Ibid., Jan. 11, 1980.

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The Pol Pot delegation wins its credentials fight against the representatives of the Vietnam-backed government of Heng Samrin for Democratic Kampuchea's seat in the United Nations General Assembly in September 1979. The tally boards show 71 members voting "Yes," 35 voting "No," and 34 abstaining.

—Brian F. Alpert/Keystone.

more leftist cast than the resolutions of the sixth summit warrant. The setbacks at the UN on the Cambodia issue and the Security Council election demonstrate that the moderates among the nonaligned nations have reached the limits of their tolerance for radicalism. Though the Cubans will no doubt interpret the summit's resolutions in radical terms, they are unlikely to risk their newly won prestige by using the chairmanship to push the movement beyond those limits. This is especially true in the new international atmosphere created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Widely (though not universally) condemned in the Third World, the intervention has certainly put an end to any chance that the nonaligned movement will in the foreseeable future acknowledge the Soviet Union as its "natural ally."[56]

Yet neither is the Afghanistan intervention likely to produce a sharp reversal in the orientation of the movement. The leftward shift of the nonaligned movement since 1973 has not come about as the result of the beneficence of the Soviet Union or the diplomatic skill of the movement's radicals. The anti-Western (as distinct from pro-Soviet) consensus which has existed since 1973 is rooted in realities that John Foster Dulles recognized two decades ago: the issues of decolonization and international economics, even when expressed in bloc-neutral terms, tend to be inherently anti-Western in nature. As long as these issues dominate the priorities of the nonaligned movement, it is unlikely to become much more moderate. For now, the movement seems to have reached an uneasy equilibrium in which the radicals content themselves with implicit criticisms of the West, while the moderates are satisfied with having avoided the movement's abandonment of explicit neutrality toward

[56] Nigeria's UN ambassador, Akporode Clark, commented: "I think that after Havana, the nonaligned movement is undergoing tremendous strain. But in the end, certain things become clear. There are no natural allies." See ibid.

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the blocs. Unless Cuba tries to use its chairmanship of the movement to upset this balance, the nonaligned nations will probably maintain their tenuous and imperfect unity.

The movement's future attitude toward the West depends primarily on the dynamics of the decolonization and economic issues. While the number of colonies in the world has dwindled greatly over the years, the remaining colonial issues (as the *nonaligned* define them) include some of the world's most intractable political problems—e.g., Namibia, South Africa, and the Middle East. Though they may be few in number, these issues consistently produce the most vociferous denunciations of the West at nonaligned summits.

The North-South dialogue on global economic relations is rarely couched in explicitly anti-Western terms; nevertheless, its development has contributed greatly to the Third World's animosity toward the West. While the Third World's grievances against the developed nations may, in theory, apply equally to both the advanced capitalist and advanced socialist countries, most of the Third World's economic linkages are in fact with the West. Thus, the real antagonisms generated by international economic issues have tended to be between the nonaligned nations and the developed *capitalist* ones.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan does not change these realities—rather, it adds a new dimension to them. Through the past decade, the stance of the nonaligned movement has reflected the Third World's uneasy relations with the West. The Soviet Union has rarely been a principal in the issues which are close to the hearts of the nonaligned. Thus, while it has avoided condemnation, it has also been unsuccessful in persuading the nonaligned that it is their "natural ally," despite the movement's anti-Western consensus. The future, however, will surely bring deeper Soviet involvement in the Third World, both politically and economically. As that happens, the Soviets will run the risk (as the example of Afghanistan dramatically demonstrates) of producing among the nonaligned a new set of grievances which are anti-Soviet rather than anti-Western in character.

In its first decade, the nonaligned movement's politics were defined by the cold war conflict between East and West; in its second decade, its politics were defined largely by the members' grievances against the West alone. As the movement enters its third decade, its politics and policies will increasingly be determined by an interaction with both of the world's power blocs that is more complex than that which characterized the movement's first two decades.

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Books

Soviet Energy: Supply vs. Demand

By Edward A. Hewett

ROBERT W. CAMPBELL. *Trends in the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry.* Baltimore, MD, and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

JEREMY RUSSELL. *Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy.* London, Saxon House, D. C. Heath Ltd., and Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 1976.

IAN F. ELLIOT. *The Soviet Energy Balance: Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and Alternative Power Sources.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD. *Soviet Natural Gas to 1985.* QER Special No. 24. London, Economist Intelligence Unit, August 1975.

JOSEPH T. KOSNIK. *Natural Gas Imports from the Soviet Union: Financing the North Star Joint Venture Project.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER. *The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

FUNDAMENTALLY, two issues motivate Western interest in Soviet energy, particularly Soviet oil and gas. One is the prospect that the Soviet Union and the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) collectively will very soon begin to buy more oil than they sell on world markets. By 1985, CMEA's net addition to world oil demand could be substantial—possibly 5 to 6 percent—exacerbating an already bad situation.[1] Consequently, in predicting future supply and demand conditions in the world oil market it is increasingly important that we learn as much as possible about developments in the supply and demand for oil, as well as for other energy sources, within the CMEA countries.

A second issue of interest is how much energy Eastern Europe will be able to buy from the USSR, and conversely how much it will be forced to buy on world markets for hard currency. The European members of CMEA[2] have by and large industrialized on the basis of cheap primary products, including plentiful and cheap oil, which they obtained mainly from the USSR in exchange for manufactures, many of which could not be sold on Western markets. This is an exchange with rapidly escalating costs for the Soviets. New oil is costly to extract and ship, and any oil shipped to Eastern Europe represents considerable hard-currency sales forgone. The question therefore is just what the Soviets will (or can) do to reduce the costs to themselves of this exchange, and hence increase the costs to Eastern Europe.

These should be treated as separate issues. It is of no consequence to world oil markets whether the Soviets ship their oil to Western Europe and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) supplies all of Eastern Europe's oil plus West European needs not covered by Soviet shipments, or the Soviets ship their oil to Eastern Europe and OPEC covers all of West European oil demand plus the East European demand not covered by Soviet oil shipments. Either way, world supply and demand for oil are the same, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe enter as net buyers of oil in the early 1980's. But it is of great consequence for Eastern Europe which of these alternative scenarios comes to pass. A Soviet

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[1] See the prediction in US Central Intelligence Agency, *The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985,* ER 77-10240 U, Washington, DC, April 1977, p. 15.

[2] In light of varying usage for such terms as Eastern Europe and CMEA, clarification is in order. In this article, "CMEA" refers to Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. For this analysis, Vietnam was excluded because it was not a member during the period for which data are available (it joined in June 1978). Also, for reasons of comparability of statistics, I have included Cuba in all data on CMEA, even those before 1972, when Havana joined the Council. "Eastern Europe" refers to the six East European members of CMEA.

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decision to shift more of its oil exports toward the West would place enormous stress on the hard-currency trade balances, and therefore the economies, of Eastern Europe.

Aside from these issues of international consequence, the Soviet oil and gas industries are interesting for the insight they offer into the general principles of the operation of central planning in the USSR. They are major industries built upon large reserves, and are seemingly amenable to central control. Yet, as we shall see, they manifest several of the major flaws of the Soviet economy—the emphasis on quantity over quality and difficulties in achieving advanced levels of production technology.

Each of the six studies under review touches on at least one of the three issues mentioned here. While the authors treat numerous other issues, the present essay will focus on what the authors have to say about these three matters. At the conclusion, there will be some suggestions about the most necessary and potentially fruitful areas for future research.

AS INDICATED at the outset, the issues of the volume and of the distribution of Soviet energy exports are separable though related. To arrive at a prediction with respect to the former, one must forecast both the supplies of each energy carrier and domestic demand—the difference between the two being the exportable surplus. On the supply side, such an analysis requires an understanding of the geology of the particular energy carrier and also the policies of central planners regarding investments, research and development, and imports of advanced technology. The demand side requires simultaneous analysis of the demand for *all* primary energy sources, because oil, gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power are all somewhat substitutable for each other. Again, in the case of the USSR, government policy plays a prominent role here. If, for example, Soviet planners decide to push lignites as substitutes for oil and gas in electricity generation, that suppresses domestic demand for oil and gas, freeing up production for export.

The studies under review are for the most part concerned with supply prospects for Soviet energy. Robert Campbell's book, which supplements his earlier work,[3] is a first-rate piece of research on the Soviet oil and gas industries. Jeremy Russell's study covers all primary energy sources in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and hence tends to be somewhat less comprehensive than Campbell's on the USSR per se. Ian Elliot's book is a straightforward account of the Soviet energy balance as of the early 1970's, based exclusively on Soviet sources, which he trusted rather more than he should have.[4] The piece on the Soviet gas industry by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is a competent one, but the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has more recently published a somewhat better analysis.[5]

[3]Robert W. Campbell, *The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968.

[4]For a more satisfactory examination of the energy balance itself, see Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet Fuel and Energy Balances*, Research Report R-2257, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1978.

[5]US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR: Development of the Gas Industry: A Research*

(continued on page 55)

Reviewers in This Issue

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Since the problems of the Soviet oil and gas industries differ in several important ways, I shall discuss them separately. Turning first to oil, we find that much is known about the determinants of Soviet supplies of this commodity, thanks to Campbell's work and to release and public discussion of the CIA's work on this subject.[6] Output in old fields in the USSR is declining very rapidly, so increments to output from new fields must first replace the losses in the former before supplying net additions to total output. One factor contributing to the precipitous decline in output in existing fields is the heavy Soviet reliance on high-pressure water injection techniques to force crude from the basins, an approach that yields high output for a period of time but decreases the total output from the field over its life. Eventually the water breaks through to the well itself before a good deal of the crude is recovered. Submersible electric pumps are a traditional solution to this, and about one third of Soviet crude production comes from the use of such a technique. But Soviet submersible electric pumps are unreliable; therefore, the USSR has had to rely on imported equipment, especially from the United States.

Russell and, especially, Campbell discuss a number of other technology-related bottlenecks impeding attainment of higher oil production in the USSR. One of the more interesting ones mentioned by Campbell is related to the fact that the Soviets are being forced to drill deeper wells. The turbodrill—on which they rely quite heavily—is not well suited to such undertakings. Indeed, it was selected for use in drilling wells in the first place because it did not require the high-quality (too high for Soviet industry) parts that other drilling technologies did. Now the Soviets must face up to the problem of producing such parts or, more likely for the present, importing the needed machinery and equipment from the West.

The problems of technology in the oil industry are in some degree a function of the way in which the Soviet economic system itself is structured. Incentives for the maximization of current output encourage the use of wasteful techniques such as high-pressure water injection and discourage both application of new technologies in the field and exploration. As Campbell shows, there has actually been a decline in exploration in recent years. As a consequence, not only is the reserves/production ratio falling, but so too is the ratio of proved to total reserves.

None of these studies makes a serious attempt to predict Soviet oil production in the near future, although some venture guesses.[7] More disappointing, however, is the fact that none engage in any serious analysis of the current or future domestic demand for oil. Such one-dimensional analyses can hardly be a reliable basis for assessing prospects for Soviet oil exports. Yet, this emphasis on supply-side problems in the oil industry is characteristic of almost all studies of the export problem. Even the CIA's prediction that the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia will, by 1985, be importing (net) 3.5 to 4.5 million barrels of oil a day from the world market was based on a carefully documented and complex analysis of Soviet oil supplies but apparently only on a simple demand equation linking Soviet and East European oil demand to gross national product. While CIA spokesmen subsequently clarified the estimated range of imports, it remains clear that the demand analysis in this study was much cruder than the supply analysis.[8]

The gas industry in the USSR differs substantially from the oil industry—a point on which Campbell, Joseph Kosnik, the EIU, and the CIA are all in agreement. Reserves are huge, easily a third of the world's proved and probable reserves, with over half located in the northern part of Tyumen' region. The major difficulties in this industry are, therefore, not the reserves but getting them out of the ground under what are frequently very harsh climatic conditions and then shipping them to users. These reflect in part the problem of finding sufficient investment resources to manufacture (or import) and lay pipe, and to install compressor stations. But technological problems are important bottlenecks as well. Soviet-built compressors are unreliable, and it is necessary to import Western-built compressors to guarantee smooth functioning of the pipes. Furthermore, for the quantities of gas the pipes will be shipping, the most economical type is 48 inches, or greater, in diameter. Soviet technology associated with using that kind of pipe, particularly in severe northern climates, is not yet fully developed (compressors the problem again).

Paper, ER 78-10393, Washington, DC, July 1978. For discussion of the original CIA estimates and clarifications in subsequent studies, see United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Soviet Oil Situation: An Evaluation of CIA Analyses of Soviet Oil Production*, Staff Report, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978.

[6] US Central Intelligence Agency, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production*, ER 77-10270, Washington, DC, April 1977.

[7] For example, Russell estimates that oil production will be 640 million tons in 1980 (p. 57). This obviously high figure was evidently a result of simple extrapolation.

[8] See the sources cited in fn. 5.

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Soviet natural gas production in 1977 was 320 billion cubic meters (bcm), up from 40 bcm in 1960—a 13 percent per annum growth rate. Net exports, which were insignificant in the 1960's and negative in the early 1970's, were 14 bcm in 1977.[9] The EIU predicts natural gas production will reach an annual output of 630–645 bcm in 1985 (p. 12), and that net exports will reach approximately 38 bcm in 1985 (p. 25). The CIA is somewhat more pessimistic regarding production, predicting output of 560–600 bcm in 1985; but it expects net exports to reach 46.8 bcm in that year.[10] The differences between the two analyses seem to flow from different assessments of how much capital and hard currency the Soviets will commit to breaking the bottlenecks in this industry, and of what the growth of domestic demand for natural gas will be. Nevertheless, whichever estimate one accepts, it is obvious that the natural gas industry will expand rapidly enough to satisfy domestic needs and provide substantially increased exports, which will replace some of the export proceeds lost as oil exports fall.

One of the unknowns in natural gas is the role large Western-financed projects will play in Soviet energy in the 1980's. Kosnik gives a competent review of one possible project of this sort, North Star (the piping of Siberian gas to Murmansk for export in liquefied form). He shows that it is feasible and potentially profitable but that US government participation in the financing is an important precondition. In spite of the energy crisis, the political and environmental barriers facing a US-USSR agreement on liquefied natural gas are formidable; consequently, Kosnik's book is for now of mostly academic interest.

Table 1. Gross Consumption and Net Exports or Imports of Energy, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1975

(millions of tons of standard fuel[a])

	Apparent consumption	Net exports (+) or net imports (−)	Ratio of net exports (imports) to consumption
Bulgaria	41.5	−27.7	−.67
Czechoslovakia	97.7	−31.3	−.32
East Germany	119.2	−29.8	−.25
Hungary	35.5	−13.2	−.37
Poland	150.0	+12.1	+.08
Romania	74.5	−5.1	−.07
Eastern Europe (total of above)	518.4	−95.0	−.18
Soviet Union	1,481.8	+199.5	+.14

[a] One ton of standard fuel = 7 million calories.

SOURCES: Jeremy Russell, *Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, Saxon House, D. C. Heath Ltd., and Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 1976, p. 116; and Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet Fuel and Energy Balances*, Research Report R-2257, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1978.

HAVING pondered the issue of how much oil and gas the USSR will be *able* to export in the early 1980's, we come to the question of *destination*. How much of the USSR's exportable oil and gas will be shipped to CMEA, and how much of it will be sold for hard currency in the West? Simply assembling the data to think intelligently about this issue is a formidable task. One must establish the recent history of energy demand and supply in Eastern Europe, the Soviet role in satisfying East European demand, and changes in Soviet demand and supply. To do so requires the use of many sources in different languages, with data which, at times, diverge for identical variables. Moreover, it seems certain that the future will differ substantially from the past; hence, there is guesswork involved as well.

A good introduction to the subject is Jeremy Russell's very useful overview of the individual energy balances of the USSR and of the countries of Eastern Europe and how they intermesh. Unfortunately, the book is not as useful as it might have been, because the numerous tables are either not footnoted at all or footnoted so cryptically as to be virtually useless for someone wishing to replicate the numbers.[11] Also, some of the numbers appear to be off by a full decimal place, which means one must be especially careful in using the data.[12]

Table 1 combines data from the Russell book and a recent report by Robert Campbell to provide a general view of Eastern Europe's energy balances relative to the USSR for 1975. In the mid-1970's, the six East European countries considered here collectively consumed about 18 percent more energy than they produced, while

[9] US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR: Development of the Gas Industry . . .*, p. 65.

[10] Ibid., pp. 26 and 78.

[11] Not only is there a problem with footnoting of tables, but it would also seem that some tables were left out. For example, on pp. 42–44 Russell refers in both text and tables to Tables 2.5–2.6, neither of which appears in the book.

[12] For example, Russell says that Romanian natural gas reserves are 4,000 bcm (p. 104), when they are 400 bcm, and that Czechoslovak natural gas reserves are 1,000 bcm (p. 99), when they are 100 bcm.

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the USSR produced about 14 percent more energy than it consumed. The indication is thus of a current self-sufficiency in energy for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe combined, and that remains true even if one adds Cuban demand, which amounts to about 13 million tons standard,[13] all covered by Soviet oil. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland still receive most of their energy from domestically produced coal, and Polish coal reserves are sufficient to support net energy exports. Romania is virtually self-sufficient, and consumes virtually all of its domestically produced hydrocarbons.

Almost all of the East European energy deficit is covered by oil and gas imports. Table 2 shows the importance of Soviet oil and gas exports in meeting CMEA's deficit in these critical products in the years 1970 and 1975.[14] Traditionally, the USSR has covered all of CMEA's *net* demands for crude oil and oil products. Thus, in 1970, the Soviet Union exported to CMEA 39.1 million tons of crude oil and 7.4 million tons of oil products, for a total of 46.5 million tons; CMEA's net imports of crude oil and oil products from all sources were 43.1 million tons. The difference reflected net exports of petroleum products by East European countries to the West. Essentially the same situation prevailed in 1975, although at higher levels of shipments. To be sure, in neither year did Soviet exports of petroleum and petroleum products fully cover *gross* CMEA imports. For example, in 1975, CMEA (exclusive of the USSR) imported 75.9 million tons of crude petroleum and 8.6 million tons of petroleum products, a total of 84.5 million tons, while Soviet exports to its CMEA partners totaled 71.9 million tons. In effect, the latter states imported 12.6 million tons of crude and products from non-Soviet sources and then

Table 2. Trade of CMEA (Exclusive of the USSR) and of the USSR in Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Natural Gas, 1970 and 1975

Commodity	CMEA (exc. USSR)[a] trade with all countries	USSR trade with other CMEA countries	USSR trade with non-CMEA countries
		(millions of tons)	
Crude oil			
Exports			
(1) 1970	.3	39.1	27.7
(2) 1975	.8	65.1	28.0
Imports			
(3) 1970	43.7	0	0
(4) 1975	75.9	0	6.5
Oil products			
Exports			
(5) 1970	9.8	7.4	21.6
(6) 1975	12.0	6.8	30.5
Imports			
(7) 1970	9.5	0	1.1
(8) 1975	8.6	0	1.1
Net trade in oil and oil products			
(9) 1970	−43.1	46.5	48.2
(10) 1975	−71.7	71.9	50.9
		(billions of cubic meters)	
Natural gas			
Exports			
(11) 1970	.1	2.3	1.0
(12) 1975	.1	11.3	8.0
Imports			
(13) 1970	2.7	0	3.6
(14) 1975	10.4	0	12.4
Net trade in natural gas			
(15) 1970	−2.6	2.3	− 2.6
(16) 1975	−10.3	11.3	−4.4

[a]Comprising, for purposes of this table, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Data for most CMEA states (exclusive of the USSR) are from Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member Countries of CMEA), Moscow, 1977, pp. 333–90. However, for Romanian exports and Bulgarian imports of oil products, I have substituted data reported in the US Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, *International Oil Developments: Statistical Survey*, Washington, DC, Mar. 10, 1977, p. 27. Data for the USSR are from *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornik* (Foreign Trade of the USSR: Collection of Statistics), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1971 and 1976; and *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR: itogi devyatoy pyatiletki i perspektivy* (Foreign Trade of the USSR: Results of the Ninth Five-Year Plan and Prospects), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1977, p. 123.

Row 9 is the sum of rows 1 and 5 minus rows 3 and 7. Row 10 is the sum of rows 2 and 6 minus rows 4 and 8. Row 15 is row 11 minus row 13, and row 16 is row 12 minus row 14.

[13] One ton of standard fuel = 7 million calories.

[14] This table illustrates a typical problem with data relating to energy trade. Soviet data show natural gas exports to Eastern Europe in 1975 of 11.3 bcm, which is higher than the 10.4 bcm natural gas imports from *all* countries reported in East European data. This discrepancy probably reflects different procedures for dating the shipments of Soviet gas, but I cannot prove that.

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reexported it in the form of oil products. Table 2 also shows the beginning of a substantial increase in natural gas shipments to Eastern Europe. Although I have not compiled a set of similar data for 1976, I suspect they would tell the same story. Since 1976, it has become much more difficult to construct this picture because in 1977 the Soviets stopped publishing data on quantities for all energy trade (and, in fact, for much of primary products trade).

In 1976, oil consumption for CMEA (exclusive of the USSR) was at 95 million tons, up from 59 million tons in 1970—amounting to an annual growth rate of 8.2 percent. It is evidently generally accepted that oil consumption for these countries will reach 120–140 million tons in 1980, which implies an annual growth rate between 1976 and 1980 of something between 6.0 and 10.2 percent. Production of crude in CMEA (exclusive of the USSR) was 17.5 million tons in 1976 and has grown at about 1 percent a year.[15] Thus, one can predict that in 1980 these countries as a group will be a net importer of some 100–120 million tons of crude petroleum and petroleum products. The question is: How much of that will the USSR supply?

If there is a way to answer these questions aside from sheer guessing, it is in the study of what Arthur J. Klinghoffer calls the "politics of oil." This is an extremely difficult subject to explore, because the Soviets have consciously revealed almost nothing about how they reach decisions on the countries to which they will export their oil. In such a situation, all one can do is study Soviet actions in an attempt to infer the criteria they use to make their decisions. This is what Klinghoffer sets out to do—covering all Soviet oil trade. It is too bad for our purpose that the best parts of the book are the chapters on Soviet trade with countries *other than* those in CMEA. The book contains a number of interesting hypotheses that deserve serious empirical inquiry, but unfortunately there is not the space to discuss most of them here. One that deserves comment, however, is his contention that the Soviets will continue to cover most of the needs of the other CMEA members for oil and oil products—even if that means importing and then reexporting oil—because oil shipments give the Soviets leverage over CMEA. Klinghoffer was writing during a period when the Soviets were importing record (for them) amounts of oil, and he may have been unduly influenced by that. Still, he could be right that the USSR's gross oil exports to Eastern Europe will continue to grow even in the face of a domestic production slowdown and the consequent need for higher oil imports. The Soviets, though, are not saying what they will do. They continue to push the East European states to conserve, to find other oil sources, and to invest in Soviet energy industries. So far, conservation seems to have had little effect; the major Soviet investment projects recently completed or contemplated are for gas and nuclear energy, not for oil; and the USSR still covers net imports to the bloc.

None of the studies that touch on Eastern Europe—those by Klinghoffer, Russell, and (tangentially) Campbell—really succeed in fully delineating the dilemmas the USSR now faces in its economic relations with the other CMEA countries, what options the USSR has in dealing with those dilemmas, and what it has chosen to do so far. There is not space to go into all dimensions of these problems here. But let us—for purposes of illustration—consider the problems regarding the oil trade. Historically, the Soviets have shipped oil to the other CMEA countries in exchange for "transferable rubles" (TR's), the unit of account in intra-CMEA trade. Then the Soviets have used the TR's the only way they could: to buy East European manufactured goods. In this trade, the nominal price of oil has stayed close to the world market price multiplied by the exchange rate, but the nominal prices of the manufactures have stayed above those of comparable products in world markets multiplied by the exchange rate.[16] Because East European manufactures are generally salable for hard currency only at large discounts, this arrangement amounts to a large Soviet subsidy to East European oil purchases. Had East European states been forced to sell their machinery and equipment on Western markets for what they were really worth and to purchase oil with the proceeds, the result might have been to double the effective price they would have had to pay for oil.[17] For Eastern Europe that would have meant sharply reduced living standards, temporary unemployment, and, almost certainly, political upheavals. The price increases posted by

[15] This is apparently an estimate by Polish economists. It has been cited several times in the Hungarian press, e.g., in *Figyelo* (Budapest), May 24, 1978, p. 11.

[16] See, for example, my *Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, Ch. 2, for a discussion of this point.

[17] This assumes that on the average East European manufactures sold now in intra-CMEA trade could be sold in the West only for one half of their nominal CMEA price. No one seriously has tried to estimate this figure; it could easily be 35 or 60 percent, although I doubt that it is much higher than 60 percent.

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OPEC beginning in 1974 increased the subsidy element involved in the Soviet practice of shipping oil to Eastern Europe in exchange for TR's, and the Soviets responded by upping the price in 1975 from about 18 TR's a ton to 36 TR's a ton. This action increased the effective price (in manufactures) to Eastern Europe of Soviet oil, but at the same time it allowed Eastern Europe to continue to purchase oil with its manufactures. From the point of view of East European leaders, such an arrangement is the best of those realistically available for the early 1980's. It permits them to maintain the current structure of industrial output and employment, to effect gradual increases in living standards, and to avoid political upheavals. However, it is a very costly alternative for the USSR, which continues to give up enormous earnings of hard currency (and thus imports of high-technology equipment) to the degree that it ships oil to Eastern Europe instead of to the West.

Of course, every time the OPEC price for oil goes up, so does the implicit Soviet subsidy to Eastern Europe. What the Soviets receive in exchange is politically stable, loyal allies. But this exchange must now be undergoing the deepest scrutiny by Soviet leaders. Soviet domestic growth rates are falling rapidly. That situation and recurrent harvest difficulties mean substantial hard-currency requirements. Therefore, the Soviets can be expected to pressure Eastern Europe further in an effort to see how much "slack" there is to be taken up in the subsidy—that is, how much it can be reduced by forcing Eastern Europe to buy more oil in the West, by requiring more East European investment in the USSR (which can also entail hard-currency outlays), and by pushing Eastern Europe to increase the quality of its exports to the USSR. Indeed, casual observation suggests that all these things are already occurring, but much more research is needed to document precisely what is happening and what the apparent effects are on Eastern Europe.[18] In addition, we need a serious attempt to ascertain how Soviet decisions on matters such as this are reached, and what the various competing positions are. Regrettably, Klinghoffer does not even attempt to analyze the internal dynamics of the Soviet policymaking process concerning oil exports. Although this task is admittedly very difficult and would require pulling together shreds of widely dispersed evidence, it seems essential to any quest to understand Soviet intentions concerning future Soviet-CMEA links.

IN THESE SIX studies, and in other more recent work on similar topics, the focus has been almost totally on the supply of Soviet energy. As a result, much more information is available on the prospects for Soviet energy supplies than was available even 10 years ago. But prediction of energy supply is useful only if we also can predict energy demand, and very little effort has gone into the study of the Soviet demand for energy. In the near future, this is where the majority of research time on the Soviet Union should be directed. There are two basic questions here: (1) What are the possibilities for moderating the growth rate of total energy demand in the USSR? (2) What are the possibilities for substitution among the various fuels (for example, gas and coal for oil)?

The first question has received little attention to date, but it can no longer be ignored now that Soviet planners are apparently making serious efforts to conserve energy.[19] Leslie Dienes is one analyst who has given serious thought to the second set of issues, quite appropriately emphasizing the geographic character of Soviet supply and demand problems.[20] But much more could be done here too. There exist numerous econometric studies of Western countries which employ approaches potentially useful for studying supply of and demand for energy in the USSR. And it must be emphasized that truly useful predictions of Soviet export prospects for a particular energy source—oil or gas—cannot be obtained until we have filled in the picture with adequate studies of Soviet energy demand.

Likewise, very little is known

[18] East European investment in the USSR is being channeled primarily through five-year plans in CMEA, which are drawn up by CMEA's powerful Joint Committee for Cooperation in Planning. The best known of the projects in the 1976-80 CMEA five-year plan was the Orenburg Gas Pipeline, to which Moscow's CMEA partners donated labor (in some cases) and equipment (purchased with hard currency).

The Soviet campaign to upgrade the quality of the manufactures it is receiving through CMEA is alluded to frequently in Western press reports, but its most tangible manifestation was in a recent speech Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin gave to the 33rd Session of CMEA. He called for a committee to study the technical standards of manufactures traded in CMEA. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 28, June 1979, p. 5. For more details on the five-year plans, see Edward Hewett, "Recent Developments in East-West European Economic Relations and Their Implications for U.S.-East European Economic Relations," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 174-98.

[19] See, for example, the recent lengthy decree on energy conservation and increased production, in *Pravda* (Moscow), June 14, 1979.

[20] L. Dienes, "The Soviet Union: An Energy Crunch Ahead?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1977; and idem, *Soviet Energy Policy and the Hydro-Carbons* (American Association of Geographers Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, No. 2), Syracuse, NY, 1978.

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about the supply of and demand for energy in the other CMEA states. This means that in order to produce carefully documented forecasts of net CMEA energy imports it will be necessary to do for those countries the type of demand studies suggested above for the USSR. Moreover, a great deal of effort will be necessary merely to generate projections of CMEA energy *supply* comparable in quality to those which we now have for the USSR. Obviously, East European energy supplies are inadequate for domestic needs, and energy production is growing only slowly. But it is still necessary to forecast these production growth rates and, in particular, to assess the possibilities of increasing lignite production in those countries (particularly, Poland) where considerable efforts are being undertaken in that direction.

Finally, since Soviet leaders are likely to allocate oil exports to CMEA or the West in light of their perceptions of the probable impact of such decisions on the overall health of the East European economies and hence on political stability in the region, it is important for the analyst to develop better tools for considering such matters. As for the economic dimension, it is essential to build econometric models of the East European countries which incorporate the results of the supply and demand studies discussed above and which highlight the interrelationships between energy imports, economic activity, and the balance of hard-currency trade. With such models, it would be possible to simulate the impact of various Soviet energy export policies on East European economies. On the basis of such simulations, one could venture some guesses about the consequences of Soviet policies for political stability.

Unfortunately, quantitative studies such as those suggested are seriously hindered by growing difficulties in assembling data on Soviet and East European energy. As noted, the USSR has not released any data since 1976 on quantities of energy exported or imported. Moreover, it no longer publishes important data on the production of individual energy carriers by (Soviet) region. Data for other CMEA countries are scattered sporadically throughout their respective statistical yearbooks. The CMEA yearbook provides some assistance.[21] But only a few of the most useful data series can be found there, and even they are sometimes incomplete.

This is what makes the recent releases by the CIA so welcome. Few private scholars can match the information-gathering capabilities of this organization, and it really makes little sense to try. It would be a genuine service to the scholarly community at large, however, if data bases with longer time series such as are useful in econometric research could be provided. Moreover, it would be desirable to have better documentation for the data offered. All too frequently the interesting CIA publications on Soviet or East European energy are full of unfootnoted tables with numbers that (unexplicably) differ somewhat from what the outside scholar can derive from published sources with which he is familiar.

What we find, then, is a challenging set of economic puzzles in an area of immense importance. Western observers and analysts have a long way to go before they can make reliable predictions concerning the future direction of the foreign trade of the USSR and its CMEA associates with regard to the critical energy carriers, oil and gas. To the extent that the present volumes help in this task, they are welcome, but much still remains to be done.

[21] Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member-Countries of CMEA), Moscow, annual.

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China's Energy Prospects

By Kim Woodard

H. C. LING. *The Petroleum Industry of the People's Republic of China*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

CHU-YUAN CHENG. *China's Petroleum Industry: Output Growth and Export Potential*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

VACLAV SMIL. *China's Energy: Achievements, Problems, Prospects*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

SELIG S. HARRISON. *China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

RANDALL W. HARDY. *China's Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

SEVINC CARLSON. *China's Oil: Problems and Prospects*. Washington, DC, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1979.

AS WE ENTER the 1980's, China's energy development, petroleum industry, oil export potential, and technical cooperation with foreign countries in energy-related fields are topics that stimulate considerable interest the world around among scholars and government leaders alike. There are, of course, legitimate scholarly and academic reasons for studying any aspect of Chinese society, historical or contemporary, and all of the studies listed above address themselves to our purely academic interest in China's energy development, satisfying the criteria of research, format, and documentation normally applied to such works. A specialized scholar pursuing in-depth knowledge of China's energy development would want to be familiar with all of these works, as well as with the growing number of journal articles on the subject.[1]

At the same time, as with many areas of research, studies of China's energy policies have important policy implications. These revolve around the answers to the following questions: (1) What are the key *constraints*—in terms of resources and domestic and international economics and politics—that critically affect the pace of China's energy development and the scope of policy options available to Chinese energy planners? (2) What is China's present and potential role in regional and global energy commodity markets (i.e., what is its oil export potential)? (3) What is the present and potential role of foreign capital and technology in China's energy development program (which is part of the broader question of the role of such capital and technology in the overall Chinese program of accelerated modernization)? (4) How does the present and future pace of China's energy development affect that country's role in regional and global strategic balances? The reviewed works contribute to our general store of knowledge on the underlying facts of China's energy situation and, in some cases, draw policy inferences suggested by these facts.

THE BOOKS by H. C. Ling and Chu-yuan Cheng are both primarily descriptive studies of the Chinese oil industry. Ling provides a relatively brief and aggregate analysis of petroleum resources, production, refining, and transportation, followed by translations of 24 documents from the Chinese press on various aspects of the oil industry. Cheng's volume includes a far more detailed analysis of the petroleum industry. Particularly valuable are his histories and descriptions of individual oilfields, refineries, and equipment manufacturing plants. The Cheng work also includes a chapter on the role of petroleum within the Chinese economy and another on oil export potential. Unfortunately, the statistics in both books are—through no fault of their authors—now seri-

[1] The reviewer provides an extensive list of English-language articles on China's energy in the bibliography of his forthcoming book, *The International Energy Relations of China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.

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ously out of date and should not be used for reference purposes.[2] Moreover, since both of these volumes are limited in scope to the petroleum industry and are oriented backward, rather than forward, in time, their utility is restricted to rather narrow technical questions, and they contribute little to analysis of the policy issues raised above.

From a technical viewpoint, Vaclav Smil's book is unquestionably the best study currently available on the entire Chinese energy sector. The broad energy perspective that he adopts is critical to an understanding of such issues as the potential substitution of coal for petroleum within the domestic economy (thereby releasing petroleum for export). Smil reviews each major Chinese energy industry in turn. His chapters on the hydropower industry and on noncommmercial[3] energy fuels are unique in the literature. The last chapter in the book attempts some energy balance projections through the year 2000. Although Smil based these on fixed exponential growth rates and did not employ a computer model, the general range and conclusions of these projections are in close accord with the reviewer's own computer-based projections. While Smil clearly recognizes the constraints operating on China's energy development, the technical background and interests of the author have prevented him from addressing in any systematic way most of the policy issues raised above. However, the book does provide a good point of departure for an understanding of domestic energy development in China, and Smil continues to flesh out the details in articles appearing on a regular basis in the energy literature.[4]

Although Selig Harrison and Randall Hardy might each find the other a strange companion, their volumes should be considered together. Both address themselves, once again, just to the petroleum industry, and—unlike the authors previously mentioned—both make a serious effort to raise most of the policy-relevant questions listed above. But the conclusions of the two authors differ radically, especially with regard to the question of China's oil export potential.

Harrison's book and an earlier article[5] have been partly responsible for the excitement that has surfaced in recent years over China's prospects as a major oil exporter. Harrison's book begins with us seated in the US National Security Council as the likes of Henry Kissinger and David Packard debate the implications of an American offshore drilling rig's operating in contested waters off Taiwan. From that point, the drama accelerates to hints that China's continental shelf may constitute another Persian Gulf in terms of oil reserves, to a projection that there is a 50 percent chance of China's reaching its target of 400 million tons a year (8 million barrels a day) of crude oil production by 1990,[6] and on to darker predictions of hostility and possible conflict over the issue of who owns the as yet undiscovered sea of oil beneath the contested waters of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Despite its dramatic flair, the book is carefully researched and is based almost entirely on interviews conducted throughout East Asia. It is also beautifully written and addresses in a serious vein the regional and global political implications of rapid offshore oil and gas development along the Chinese continental shelf.

Hardy, like Harrison, raises the issue of China's oil export potential in a basically political framework, but his conclusions could scarcely be further removed from Harrison's optimism regarding the prospects for offshore oil development and substantial exports of crude oil. As his title implies, Hardy's expectations regarding China's future oil production and export potential are guarded and modest. He carefully documents the reasons why we should not expect China to be producing 400 million tons of crude oil by 1990 and devotes a chapter to the constraining effect of domestic energy consumption requirements on oil export potential. Although he does not provide any original energy balance projections or energy commodity trade statistics, his general observations about China's energy future are, I believe, accurate and concisely stated.

Sevinc Carlson's monograph on the Chinese oil industry provides

[2] Beijing has only recently begun to publish official output statistics for some of the major energy industries. Studies published by foreign experts prior to 1978 are subject to a wide margin of error in data estimates, and more recent studies should be used whenever possible for statistical purposes.

[3] "Noncommercial" energy commodities include firewood, crop residues, dried dung, and other miscellaneous agricultural fuels.

[4] See, for example, Vaclav Smil, "China's Energy Performance," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), September 1977, pp. 63-67; Vaclav Smil and Kim Woodard, "Perspectives on Energy in the People's Republic of China," in Jack M. Hollander, Ed., *Annual Review of Energy*, Vol. 2, Palo Alto, CA, Annual Reviews, Inc., 1977; and Vaclav Smil, "China's Energetics: A System Analysis," US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 323-69.

[5] Selig S. Harrison, "China: The Next Oil Giant," *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Fall 1975, pp. 3-49.

[6] Harrison cites Japanese sources for this unofficial production target (p. 268, fn. 6). The target is frequently mentioned to foreign visitors to Taching oilfield and may date to as early as 1970.

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yet another recent overview of the subject. Like Hardy, Carlson is cautious in her analysis of the prospects for China's petroleum industry and petroleum exports. In addition, the monograph provides some rich detail on energy-related political developments since 1975. However, Carlson's work is seriously marred by errors and inconsistencies in her handling of the data, only some of which are corrected by the errata sheet circulated after its publication. On page 24, Carlson reports a 28 percent increase in crude oil production capacity in 1978, while on page 62 she reports an 11.1 percent increase for the same year. Electric power in 1977 is variously reported at 203 billion kilowatt-hours (p. 25) and 223 billion kilowatt-hours (p. 79). Inconsistencies occur even within a single sentence, such as "In energy production, coal output increased by 12.4 percent, from 483 to 618 million tons . . ." (p. 25). The 483-million ton figure Carlson assigns to 1977 is actually the figure for 1976, and the growth rate mentioned is a compounded rate for the two-year period 1976–78. The nonstatistical analysis is also internally inconsistent at various points in the text. In short, the Carlson monograph should be handled with care by specialists and avoided by general readers.

ANY EFFORT to assess the key *constraints* on the pace of China's energy development immediately reveals the enormous complexity of the Chinese energy system. By the end of the 1970's, China already ranked as the world's third largest energy producing and consuming country, comparable to Saudi Arabia in primary energy production and to Japan in aggregate energy consumption. Two thirds of the Chinese energy system is still supported by the coal industry, which ranks with the coal industries of the United States and the Soviet Union as one of the three largest in the world. China's crude petroleum and natural gas industries, which boomed during the 1970's, are still not large by world standards. Furthermore, the growth rate of those two industries is declining rather sharply, from maximum annual increases of 20–25 percent to a range of 8–10 percent a year.

This decline in growth rates, overlooked by so many authors in assessing the future prospects of China's petroleum industry, is a natural event in the life cycle of petroleum industries around the world. Slowing in the pace of growth results from a combination of the scale effect (the same growth rate requires increasing capital inputs as the industry expands) and of basic resource constraints. China's recoverable crude-petroleum resources are now estimated at between 10 and 20 billion metric tons (70–140 billion barrels) by most foreign analysts. The total crude-petroleum resources of the United States, recovered and recoverable, amount to roughly twice this range.[7] As any petroleum industry matures, new deposits become more difficult to discover and tend to be located deeper in the ground and at sites more remote from the principal industrial centers — raising the average cost of extraction and slowing the growth rate for crude petroleum production. For a variety of technical and geological reasons, crude oil output reaches a peak or an extended plateau when about one third of recoverable resources have been extracted from the ground. Recent reports suggest that the largest of China's oil-producing zones, the Taching oilfield in the Northeast, is already in its plateau phase.[8] While other oilfields are being discovered and developed, the incremental cost of further increases in crude petroleum output is rising, and the growth rate is falling. This trend should continue, regardless of the pace of offshore development. It simply reflects the maturing of China's petroleum industry and has ample precedents among oil industries around the world. The resource constraint and the falling growth rates for the petroleum industry mean that attainment of the official production target of 400 million tons a year by 1990 is not even unlikely; it is virtually impossible.

The constraint imposed by limited oil and gas resources cannot easily be overcome by substitution of other energy sources, such as coal and hydropower. China's coal and hydropower resources are indeed among the largest in the world, and sufficient to sustain the coal and electric power industries for centuries to come. But, in the case of these resources, the production infrastructure can be expanded only slowly and at a cost in terms of capital inputs that is high relative to annual output levels. China's coal production capacity is already stretched taut at current output levels. New output requires the addition of new capacity, at very high costs in capital and time. Moreover, even if all the new coal mines originally slated to be constructed by foreign companies under the modernization program were completed, they would add less than 100 million tons of new capacity over a five-year period, the equivalent of about a 6 percent

[7] See Woodard, op cit., p. 326.

[8] V. G. Kulkarni, "Mission Impossible for China: 400 Million Tons by 1990," *Petroleum News: Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong), October 1979, pp. 8–9.

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annual increase. As it is, many of the foreign projects have been delayed,[9] and China's own capacity for manufacture and installation of coal production equipment is not likely to be able to take up all the slack. In addition, the coal industry in China is fundamentally constrained by a limit on the demand for its products, just as is the case with coal in the United States. There are a limited number of applications in industry for coal, and petroleum enjoys substantial advantages in transportation and agriculture. The substitution of coal for petroleum is therefore constrained on both the production and consumption sides of the energy balance.

As for hydropower, it does indeed represent a huge and still largely untapped energy resource in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite three decades of development, hydropower still contributes only about 1 percent to the consumption of commercial energy fuels in China.[10] At the same time, the contribution of hydropower to total electric power output is rising steadily.[11] Nevertheless, hydropower, like coal, is capital-intensive and slow in construction. China's energy planners also face serious locational constraints on the development of large-scale hydropower projects: e.g., the possibility of displacement of valuable agricultural land in the north and east and the distance from major industrial centers of potential sites in the west.

BEYOND THESE constraints on the production side of the energy balance, there will be over the next several decades important constraints on the consumption side which will further limit China's potential energy exports. Despite its large aggregate energy capabilities, the PRC is still a Third World country in terms of per capita energy consumption. Efforts to raise personal standards of living imply rising public consumption of commercial energy. The large and still growing population therefore exercises a systemic constraint on the amount of energy commodities available for export. In addition, the very high growth rates in China's "modern" economic sectors — industry, transportation, and the cities — as well as pressure for mechanization of agriculture, place a high premium on domestic consumption of commercial energy commodities, particularly petroleum products. The trend on the consumption side of the energy balance, which can be readily documented from China's energy and economic growth statistics, is toward greater use of commercial energy commodities for each additional increment of economic growth.

All of these constraints operate in roughly the same direction: to place a ceiling on China's oil export potential. Even allowing for substantial offshore development, the reviewer's own energy balance projections for the PRC indicate that crude petroleum exports should reach a plateau of about 25–40 million tons a year (0.5–0.8 million barrels a day) sometime between 1985 and 1990.[12] If we assume that recoverable petroleum resources are in the range of 10–20 billion metric tons (70–140 billion barrels), crude petroleum exports should then *decline* during the 1990's under the pressure of domestic consumption requirements and slowing primary energy production. China's crossover to a situation of net petroleum imports might be reached by about the year 2000. If offshore discoveries are unexpectedly large and recoverable petroleum resources are double the most optimistic foreign estimates, then crude petroleum exports would reach a plateau at about 60–80 million tons a year (1.2–1.6 million barrels a day) during the 1990's. Coal exports could peak at 15–20 million tons a year in the 1990's, and petroleum product exports at 3–5 million tons a year (60,000–100,000 barrels a day) somewhat earlier.

These figures make clear that while energy commodity exports may be important to China from the point of view of foreign exchange earnings, there is virtually no hope that the PRC will become another major source of petroleum for the world market. Even if China were to attain tomorrow the peak projected value under the highest resource scenario, it would be providing less oil to the international market than would be needed to compensate for the decline in Iran's oil exports during 1979.

[9] As part of a general retrenchment in Beijing's 10-Year Development Plan (1976–85), many of the 120 industrial projects in the plan are being delayed or canceled. The precise impact of this retrenchment on the coal industry is not yet clear as regards individual projects. But the general effect would be to delay, or even cancel, some contracts for foreign construction of coal mines in China. For discussion of the retrenchment, see "China's New Economic Priorities," *China Business Review* (Washington, DC), July-August 1979, pp. 36–39.

[10] "Commercial" energy commodities are produced and distributed on a national or regional basis and are part of the money economy. They include coal, petroleum products, natural and manufactured gas, and electricity. Commercial energy is to be distinguished from "noncommercial" energy commodities produced and distributed on a local basis in rural areas (see fn. 3). The latter fuels may account for as much as a third of total energy consumption in some Asian countries.

[11] The 1978 contribution of hydropower is about 25 percent of total electric power output (256 billion kwh), or 65 billion kwh.

[12] Woodard, op. cit., p. 335.

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At the same time, Chinese oil exports may be significant within the framework of the regional petroleum market in Asia. Crude petroleum already ranks as the largest commodity by value in trade between China and Japan. China also provides crude petroleum and petroleum products to North Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand.

WHAT ABOUT the prospects for foreign capital and technology in China's energy development program? While there is insufficient space here to discuss the issue in much depth, I feel the outlook is generally more favorable for energy plant and equipment purchases than for energy commodity exports by China. Maintenance of a rough balance between the two appears to be a basic element figuring in China's planning for the energy and trade sectors. From the early 1960's until the end of 1978, the PRC purchased about US$4 billion worth of foreign energy plants and equipment, including construction services and chemical fertilizer plants. This figure was almost exactly matched by oil revenues earned from 1973 through 1978.[13] One can expect this relationship to continue into the foreseeable future. With the sharp rises in world crude petroleum prices during 1979, Chinese crude is now selling at over US$20 per barrel, expanding earning capacity even in the absence of further increase in crude oil exports.

As is well known, Beijing during 1978 embarked on an ambitious program of contracting with foreign companies for plant and equipment. This aspect of the modernization program was sharply curtailed during 1979, and many of the orders were canceled. But these events do not spell the end of significant energy plant and equipment purchases by the PRC. They simply amount to a readjustment that reflects more realistically the constraints on China's foreign exchange earnings and domestic ability to absorb massive inputs of foreign technology.

Perhaps the most promising area for an expansion of the use of foreign capital and technology in China's energy development program is in joint offshore projects. As of the end of 1979, joint offshore development activity was expanding at a steady, if cautious pace. A dozen American, French, British, and Japanese companies are engaged in seismic surveys of designated zones stretching from the Pohai Gulf to Shanghai and from an area southwest of Taiwan to the Gulf of Tonkin. Chinese rigs engaged in preliminary drilling report significant discoveries in the Pearl River delta and near Hainan Island.[14] If the seismic surveys reveal promising structural profiles of the offshore sedimentary basins, we should expect a rash of joint venture exploration agreements during 1980 or 1981.

Joint offshore ventures have a number of advantages from the Chinese perspective. Economically, they bring rapid introduction of advanced foreign technology and hence sharply reduce the time required for offshore exploration. The joint offshore ventures also relieve China of at least part of the capital risk entailed in offshore exploration, which is a very expensive process in its early phases. Joint offshore exploration is likewise a way of holding foreign corporations at arm's length while taking advantage of the technology they offer, for offshore operations can be based at coastal enclaves such as Hong Kong or Shanghai, thereby insulating the PRC from unwanted foreign pressure and cultural influence. In many ways, the situation resembles the comprador system of the 19th century.

Joint offshore development provides important political dividends for Beijing too. The involvement of American and Japanese companies, even in uncontested areas of the continental shelf, tends to strengthen China's jurisdictional claims in contested areas. To be sure, Gulf Oil Corporation is apparently operating in both a Taiwan concession and in a Chinese zone closer to the coast.[15] But it is very unlikely that it or any of the other companies involved in joint ventures with China would do anything to upset Chinese claims to offshore areas in contested waters.

Moreover, in the long run, joint offshore ventures may in some instances offer a relatively easy way out of the thorny political and legal problems involved in settling jurisdictional claims to the continental shelf. If joint exploration agreements were reached, for example, between Beijing and various Japanese companies for exploration in the areas claimed by the two countries, designation of formal sovereignty over the disputed areas would become a largely academic affair. Division of the discoveries through contract arrangements would replace division of the shelf through treaties. Such an arrangement would speed exploration of the entire shelf and might set an important precedent for settlement

[13] Ibid., pp. 506–07, 545.

[14] China's offshore discoveries in the South China Sea are reported by numerous sources. See, for example, Roger Gale, "Offshore China: Oil Surveys Nearly Complete," *Energy Daily* (Washington, DC), Dec. 5, 1979, pp. 1–3.

[15] "Disputes in the South China Sea," *Petroleum News: Southeast Asia*, October 1979, Supplement.

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of similar disputes elsewhere in the world.

THE FINAL, and perhaps most important, policy problem raised by China's energy development is the likely impact of that development on China's strategic position in the global community. This strategic question can be approached from two directions—the *vulnerability* of China's energy infrastructure and the *strategic capabilities* of the Chinese energy system.

To a great extent, the analysis of future vulnerability and capabilities rests on the accuracy of projections of the Chinese energy balance. This balance can be projected under a variety of assumptions and scenarios but cannot be *predicted*. Prediction implies the selection of a single projected scenario, and assignment to that scenario of a probability of 1.0. Under a variety of scenarios, my projections indicate that by the end of this century China should be expected to achieve energy system capabilities roughly comparable to those of the Soviet Union in 1975. On the assumption that the size of the domestic energy system bears some relationship to the economic and political power of a country, this means that we should expect a world with three superpowers within the next two decades.

No other country is in a position thus to rival the Soviet Union and the United States within such a short time frame. There are many parallels between China's path of energy development and the paths already trod by the two superpowers—operation from a massive fossil resource base; near self-sufficiency in the initial stage of energy development; development of diversified energy equipment manufacturing industries; enjoyment of a temporary petroleum "export bubble," followed by decline in petroleum exports and eventual crossover into net energy imports. If history is any guide, the period of rapid energy development and basic self-sufficiency in energy supplies is accompanied by industrial growth and expansion of both conventional and nuclear military power. On the basis of the current pace of development in the Chinese energy system, one should anticipate further expansion of the PRC's industrial and military capabilities.

The same developments that promise to bring China superpower status may, paradoxically, also increase that country's strategic vulnerability. China's commercial energy infrastructure is already characterized by a high level of vulnerability to attack from the Soviet Union because of its concentration in the geographically exposed provinces of the northeast. Although China's coal and electric power industries are gradually being dispersed geographically, this process is slow and will have only a marginal effect on China's strategic exposure over the next two decades. Offshore oil and gas development would do little to ease the vulnerability and might exacerbate it unless China develops naval capabilities sufficient to protect its offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Joint offshore ventures, however, could conceivably mitigate the exposure by placing a cordon of foreign (particularly American) equipment and personnel around China's coastal perimeter.

Beijing is attempting to lessen China's strategic vulnerability by promoting a highly visible alignment with Western Europe and the United States against Soviet "hegemonism." The PRC hopes to distract Soviet concern from China's sensitive northern border and to focus that concern on the strategic confrontation with Western Europe. Despite the cool reception of Premier Hua Guofeng during his recent tour of Western Europe, the prospects for a tacit security alignment between China and the West are still improving. The movement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's January 1980 tour of Chinese defense facilities seem to point in the direction of closer Sino-American military cooperation. But both sides appear to be approaching their security relationship with caution born of experience.

China is pursuing a second line of response to its strategic vulnerability that is perhaps both quieter and more effective. This second line of response is the careful construction of regional coalitions, involving Japan and the market economy countries of Southeast Asia. Petroleum exports to neighbors within the region are just one of many strands of the web of relationships that Beijing is attempting to weave around its perimeter. Trade relations, cultural exchanges, political support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a low-key approach to remaining differences are all part of the policy of regional coalition.

Vietnam's conquest of Cambodia was a direct challenge to this policy, and precipitated China's punitive war against Vietnam in early 1979. Indeed, political forces in East Asia appear to be gradually shifting toward a realignment along two axes—a Sino-Japanese axis and a Soviet-Vietnamese axis. Countries throughout the region are being pressured to declare for one side or the other and are by and large moving toward the Sino-Japanese axis for a variety of political and commercial reasons. These events tend to reinforce the impres-

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sion that China's international energy policies have a strong regional bias.

ON BALANCE, we can say that China is becoming an energy giant, but a hungry one. The massive development needs of China's own population are at the root of both the country's strength and its weakness. Those needs stimulated the rapid expansion of the PRC's commercial energy system and tore China loose from dependence on either the West or the Soviet bloc. But the same needs continue to place demands of very high priority on the products of that system, constraining the progress of energy relations between China and the rest of the world.

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Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe

By Peter Grothe

DAVID ABSHIRE. *International Broadcasting: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy.* Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1976.

BURTON PAULU. *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe.* Minneapolis, MN, The University of Minnesota Press, 1974.

MAURY LISANN. *Broadcasting to the Soviet Union: International Politics and Radio.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

GERHARD WETTIG. *Broadcasting and Détente: Eastern Policies and Their Implications for East-West Relations.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1977.

ZEV KATZ. *The Communications System in the USSR.* Cambridge, MA, MIT Center for International Studies, 1977.

GERTRUDE JOCH ROBINSON. *Tito's Maverick Media: The Politics of Mass Communication in Yugoslavia.* Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1977.

MANY OF Lenin's teachings have been abandoned by Soviet leaders over the years for pragmatic reasons, but his warning that "ideas are more fatal than guns"[1] is apparently of the same relevance to the current Politburo as it was to Lenin during his time. An estimated 40 to 60 million persons in the USSR, and millions more in Eastern Europe, listen to "ideas" on Western radio, and according to David Abshire, Chairman of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, concern over the effects of these broadcasts is so great that in 1971, for example, the USSR spent six times as much money jamming them as it did on its own international radio transmissions. In the same year, according to Burton Paulu, a single station, Radio Liberty, was attacked by the Soviet media on 416 separate occasions. These and similar data suggest that Western radio is more than just a minor irritant to the Soviet leadership.

The reason for this is simple. The major Western stations—the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFE-RL), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Welle, and RIAS (an American-funded station broadcasting to East Germany from West Berlin)—provide the only systematic, continuous, and effective breach of the information barrier which Communist rulers have attempted to erect around their states. Western radio is a full-fledged major competitor to the Communist media, and to the extent that Western radio is believed, the credibility of the Communist media, and, indeed, the authority of the Communist parties themselves, is challenged. Abshire, reflecting on the possibility that George Orwell's fictional society, *1984*, might come into being, quotes the conclusions reached 15 years ago by Ithiel de Sola Pool:

Most of the things of a positive character that are happening in the Soviet Union today are explainable only in terms of the influence of the West, for which the most important single channel is radio. There is now enough communication to . . . assure that any Western idea circulates in the Soviet Union. The pessimistic expectation that totalitarianism could develop an accepted heinous civilization of its own by 1984 or any other year has been defeated primarily by the forces of communication, and above all by international radio.[2]

[1] Lenin wrote: "Why should a government which is doing what it believes to be right allow itself to be criticized? It would not allow the opposition to buy lethal weapons, and ideas are more fatal than guns." Cited in Paulu, p. 8.

[2] Abshire, p. 53. The citation is from Ithiel de Sola Pool, "1965 Address in Workshop of Communications with the Peoples of the USSR," Nov. 19, 1965, New York School of Education, Department of Communications in Education, and Radio Liberty Committee.

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SCHOLARS AND JOURNALISTS have speculated for three decades about the impact of Western broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but only during the last several years has it been possible to formulate a more clearly etched picture of what the impact actually is. In part, the increased information available to Western analysts is a result of an explosion in the number of radio sets in use in the USSR. In 1950, there were 3.5 million sets in the Soviet Union; in 1974, the figure was more than 60 million.[3] This enormous increase has produced an expansion in audience for Western as well as Soviet broadcasts and greater ease (and interest) in obtaining audience feedback. The Soviets themselves have taken polls which reveal a lot about Soviet citizen reaction to domestic and Western media, and some of these polls have been published.[4] In addition, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have conducted polls about the listening habits of their respective target audiences.[5] Finally, as the dissident movement has become bolder and more active in the USSR and Eastern Europe, it too has provided considerably more feedback.

The books under review here, especially those by Maury Lisann, David Abshire, and Gerhard Wettig, plus other published material using this expanded data base, suggest a variety of results of Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. First, they indicate that dissident intellectuals have received a powerful shot in the arm as a result of their use of Western broadcasts to the Communist countries. Authors of *samizdat* materials, for instance, who used to reach thousands of people with their views, can now reach millions by seeing to it that their manuscripts reach Radio Liberty, which regularly broadcasts such materials — or excerpts therefrom — back into the USSR. In like manner, when leading dissidents want to reach millions of their fellow citizens, they release information to Western reporters, whose printed reports are picked up by the radio stations beaming signals back into the Communist-ruled states.

Of greater long-run concern to the Kremlin leadership, despite the fact that the human rights dissident movements receive the bulk of public attention in the West, is the status of the non-Russian nationality groups within the USSR, and Western radio, by broadcasting to the non-Russian nationalities, has played a significant role here also. By providing news about the lives and traditions of these peoples, in their own languages, Western stations have helped non-Russian peoples preserve their national identities and aspirations.

Western radio—especially Radio Free Europe—has played a similar role for the East European states. Abshire sums up his findings in this regard as follows:

It [the USSR] particularly sought to undermine their sense of national identity, attempting to eliminate a major source of potential resistance to Soviet influence. By allowing the peoples of Eastern Europe uncensored access to the facts about their own lives . . . international broadcasting has helped to preserve national heritages, defend legitimate interests, and widen the sphere of intellectual-cultural freedom. (p. 67)

According to a former member of the Polish government and other informants, Warsaw Pact governments have enjoyed somewhat more leverage in their dealings with the Soviet government because of the availability of information broadcast on Western radio. That is, they have had a wider range of options in many cases because they have not had to rely on the Soviets as their sole source of information.

Finally, an important and intriguing aspect of Western radio transmissions to the Soviet Union and the East European states is the effect the Western stations have on the media policies of those states. The Communist regimes are finding that, because of competition from Western radio, they have to make their media products more lively and timely. Further, they often have to publish their own versions of events discussed on Western radio even though they probably would have preferred to pass over many of these in silence.

The pressure to respond to Western broadcasts is especially great since even Western estimates of the number of people who listen to Western radio are unlikely to do justice to the impact these stations actually have on the populations of the USSR and Eastern Europe. Because of what Paul Lazarsfeld has called the "two-step flow of communication,"[6] foreign broadcasts can be expected to influence many more than just original listeners. News heard on foreign radio but not found in the domestic media is quickly spread by word of mouth. In fact, it is no secret that Soviet and East European officials themselves often talk openly with one another and with foreign visitors

[3] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 7, 1974, p. 6.

[4] See Lisann's compilation of information from Soviet polls, p. 147; and Pavel Gurevich, "Concrete Sociology: The Thirst for Information," *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), August 1968.

[5] See Lisann, pp. 163–65.

[6] Lazarsfeld developed this notion at length in Paul Lazarsfeld and Elihu Katz, *Personal Influence*, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1965.

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about reports heard on the various Western stations. The officials need not agree with the substance of the reports in order to recognize their impact.

BY FAR the most important of the volumes under consideration here is Maury Lisann's *Broadcasting to the Soviet Union*. This book is an admirable piece of scholarship, filled with valuable information, and ought to be required reading for any serious student of the East-West competition of ideas. Lisann devotes considerable space to the four major means which the Soviet Union uses to try to deal with the problem of Western broadcasting: (1) jamming, which usually involves simply the broadcasting of noise but which is very expensive; (2) diplomacy, aimed at persuading the "offending" country to change the content of the broadcasts; (3) attacks on the credibility of Western radio by attempts to "expose lies" in its broadcasts; and (4) improvement of the Soviet media to make them more lively and timely. But he also points out the limitations of each of these strategies. There are especially formidable built-in restrictions on how timely the Soviet media can be, since "the line" on how to handle important stories must come from the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership. The difficulty such an arrangement can create is illustrated by the fact that the death of Nikita Khrushchev, the man who had led the Soviet people for a decade, was announced to the Soviet people by Western radio *two days before* it was briefly noted in *Pravda* and subsequently on Radio Moscow. Lisann's interesting description of *Mayak*, a more lively Soviet station intended to compete for listeners with the Voice of America, makes it clear why VOA continues to enjoy great popularity.

A topic which Lisann approaches but, alas, treats all too briefly is the extent to which Kremlin thinking on sensitive issues can be discovered by monitoring the content and intensity of Soviet reactions to various Western broadcasts. Perhaps the answer is "very little," for as Lisann points out, it is not necessarily the content of the broadcasts that disturbs the Soviet leadership most:

The aspect of foreign radio broadcasts that bothered them most was simply the constant supply of hard news, in itself not necessarily anti-Soviet or politically oriented, but constantly holding the Soviet press up to an unfavorable comparison and thereby undermining public confidence in the credibility of all aspects of the regime's dealings with the people. (p. 13)

Abshire, in his lucid and concise *International Broadcasting: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy*, covers much of the same ground as Lisann, though not as thoroughly. However, whereas Lisann restricts himself to the USSR, Abshire includes an investigation of radio's considerable impact on East European listeners. Noted American worker-philosopher Eric Hoffer once quipped that authors write everything they know in short, concise books and try to conceal everything they do not know in long books.[7] Abshire's short study is highly recommended for those who want a well-written thumbnail sketch on this subject.

In *Broadcasting and Détente*, German scholar Gerhard Wettig, of the prestigious Federal Institute of Eastern and International Studies (Bonn), focuses his attention on the five American and German radio stations transmitting from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His principal findings support many of the conclusions of Lisann and Abshire. But he goes into greater detail than either of these two American authors in his discussion of the strenuous attempts, diplomatic and otherwise, made by the USSR to cut off or alter at its source the flow of information from West to East. For example, he describes with insight perhaps only available to members of his government-related research institute the threat of the USSR and the East European countries to boycott the 1972 Munich Olympic Games unless Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, both located in Munich, were closed down. Unfortunately, Wettig is occasionally guilty of overstating his case and of being too polemical in his examination of Soviet behavior.

Burton Paulu's *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe* also contains some useful information on Western broadcasting to Communist countries, but as is the case with the Katz and Robinson volumes as well, such information is incidental to the author's main purpose. Paulu seeks to provide a comprehensive discussion of the theory and practice of domestic broadcasting in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and his book includes an immense amount of information on subjects such as program objectives, technical facilities, stations and networks, audience research, and international broadcasting by the Communist states themselves. The book fulfills its purpose and provides Western observers additional perspective on how the Communist states have shaped their own media in response to the radio challenge from abroad.

[7] Hoffer made his remark during a 1978 interview on American television with the Public Broadcasting System.

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Zev Katz's *The Communications System in the USSR* is a competent, concise overview of all aspects of the Soviet communications system, of which radio is only a part. Katz touches only briefly on the subject of foreign broadcasting to the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the core of Gertrude Joch Robinson's *Tito's Maverick Media* is a study of the Yugoslav media rather than an examination of Western information flows into Yugoslavia. Professor Robinson contends that the Yugoslav "government's control over information collection and distribution is minimal and informal, rather than centrally structured, as in the Soviet Union" (p. 11). She is right in concluding that there is a world of difference between control of the media in Yugoslavia and in the USSR, but she seems throughout to be describing the pre-1972 Yugoslav situation. Between 1972 and 1974, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia cracked down on the media and removed a number of liberal-minded editors from their posts. There is now a definite "line" on certain sensitive matters, and when push comes to shove, the party steps in to impose the official view. The Ministry of Information formally issues media policy guidance, and adherence to it is expected. Still Robinson's premise that the Yugoslav media are substantially freer than those in the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe is correct. The effect of Western broadcasting under these conditions is a subject which still awaits systematic investigation.

IN SUM, then, it seems that Western broadcasting to the East is having a greater impact in the USSR and Eastern Europe than ever before. There are certainly more receiver radio sets capable of picking up Western signals. And there are more broadcast hours in more languages and from stronger transmitters than there were in the first decade of Western attempts to use radio to break the government monopoly on information in Communist-ruled states. Concerted Soviet and East European efforts to suppress or counter the impact of Western broadcasting are probably the best indicators of its effectiveness.

What will the future bring? Developing technology will in all probability make it possible to transmit television programs via satellite directly into private homes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since, according to proverb, a picture is worth a thousand words, it is not surprising that Soviet spokesmen have already expressed extreme uneasiness over this imminent technological advance. Their discomfort is indicative of the extent to which they continue, as Lenin instructed, to fear the free flow of "ideas."

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By Vladimir Socor

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HARRY G. SHAFFER. *Periodicals on the Socialist Countries and on Marxism: A New Annotated Index of English-language Publications*. New York, NY, and London, Praeger, 1977.

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PAUL L. HORECKY and DAVID H. KRAUS, Eds. *East Central and Southeast Europe: A Handbook of Library and Archival Resources in North America*. Santa Barbara, CA, and Oxford, ABC Clio Press, 1976.

STEVEN A. GRANT. *Scholar's Guide to Washington, D.C., for Russian/Soviet Studies*. Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977.

THE EXPANSION and diversification of Soviet and East European area research during the 1970's were reflected in a corresponding proliferation of sourcebooks in the field. Some of these are apt to spur further primary and secondary research, thus creating a mutually reinforcing cycle. Certainly, the sourcebooks under scrutiny here, differing widely in their disciplinary affiliation, content, and objectives, underline the growing diversity of research in the field, though they also attest to increased specialization and compartmentalization. The volumes belong, simultaneously or separately, to the social and political sciences, economics, and the humanities. Some of them are intended to take stock of, or draw upon, the specialized research accumulated in recent years; others, to open up vistas to unexplored or insufficiently exploited areas. Some are in the nature of general surveys and compendia systematizing basic information, while others seek to establish bibliographic inventories of secondary sources. Still others investigate resources available for primary research. We will discuss these three categories in order.

THE IMPOSING 736-page volume *Who's Who in the Socialist Countries* possesses the greatest scope and comprehensiveness of all reference works of this genre which have appeared to date. This is true both in terms of geographic area covered and in terms of investigative depth. It is the first Who's Who of all the Communist-ruled states of Eastern Europe plus the USSR; moreover, since the cutoff date for new information was mid-1977, all Asian states currently ruled by Communist parties are included in the volume's purview. The biographical selections cover a wide

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political and professional spectrum, ranging from party, government, military, police, economic, and diplomatic officials, on the one hand, to prominent individuals active in the spheres of arts and letters, the humanities, and the sciences, church leaders, and key members of intellectual dissent and human rights movements, on the other. The inclusion of many notable figures in the last area is an innovation and represents a significant addition to the value of this reference tool. For purposes of research on Soviet current affairs, this volume supersedes those previously issued by the Munich-based Institute for the Study of the USSR, as well as Borys Lewytzkyj's own *Sowjetische Kurzbiographien*.[1]

In a work of such magnitude and complexity, a number of omissions are perhaps unavoidable. Herewith are a few that in the reviewer's judgment are more consequential. A not inconsiderable number of individuals from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who occupy salient positions in important spheres of activity and whose work has frequently brought them to international attention are not listed. Absent, for example, are some prominent diplomatic and foreign trade officials (e.g., Dzhermen Gvishiani, Lev Mendelevich, Viktor Sukhodrev), a number of leading official scholars and analysts of contemporary international affairs (e.g., K. N. Brutents, Ya. S. Khavinson, M. A. Mil'shtein, A. I. Sobolev, Milika Sundic, N. N. Yakovlev), and important military and police commanders (e.g., José Méndez, Mihai Pacepa, K. K. Pashuk). Nor are there listings for certain still-living former ranking party and/or government officials purged in recent years or identified with various reform or opposition groups (e.g., Jerzy Albrecht, Begir Balluku, Vlado Dapcevic, Károly Király, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Huber Matos, Ion Serb). Finally, some prominent dissident intellectuals and leading figures in human rights, religious, or nationality rights groups are inexplicably left out (e.g., Rudolf Bahro, Dmitri Dudko, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Paul Goma, Jacek Kuron, Mihajlo Mihajlov, Frane Miklavcic, Valentin Moroz, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Gennadiy Shimanov).

There are also important omissions and errors in some of the biographies which are included (e.g., those on Cornel Bogdan, Robert Havemann, Vladimir Maksimov, Pavel Reimann, Miko Tripalo), and several entries are long outdated (e.g., on such leading figures of the 1968 Czechoslovak reform movement as Cestmir Cisar, Frantisek Kriegel, Bohumil Simon, and Josef Spacek). A number of methodological inconsistencies and derogations are noticeable as well. The subjects' ethnic and religious backgrounds are absent as often as they are provided, and occasionally the information which is provided is inexact, even though such data, particularly in Eastern Europe, are often highly significant for elucidating personal careers and the configuration of political issues. One example should illustrate the point. The national affiliation of leading military commanders has emerged as a political issue in Yugoslavia, yet this information is missing from most of the relevant biographies in Lewytzkyj and Stroynowski's encyclopedia. The book can also be confusing with respect to *noms de plume* and *noms de guerre*, and in some cases, prewar and wartime careers are neglected altogether.

Still, this volume represents a notable achievement and testifies to the skill of its editors and the breadth of their expertise. It will benefit all those concerned with Communist countries—government officials, businessmen, journalists, area specialists, and exchange scholars. Ideally, this undertaking will be continued, with an expanded editorial team reflecting the complexity of the work, by sequels updated and issued at regular intervals.

The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History (hereafter *MERSH*) is just such an ongoing project. The first 10 volumes, covering letters "A" through "Es," represent but the initial stage of a massive, long-term undertaking, projected for some 50 volumes, with supplements already contemplated, to be published at a rate of three to four volumes annually. Its aim is to create the most comprehensive reference encyclopedia for the study of Russian and Soviet history ever developed in the English language. Compared to the major corresponding Russian-language reference series, primarily the *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia) and the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), this encyclopedia, even though of lesser physical dimensions, promises to be more inclusive in the scope of topics covered and, particularly, in

[1] *Who's Who in the USSR*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, and London, Scarecrow Press, 1966, and *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1968 (with a quarterly supplement, *Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities*, 1968–1971); Borys Lewytzkyj and Kurt Muller, *Sowjetische Kurzbiographien*, Hannover, Verlag für Literatur and Zeitgeschehen, 1964. For a running update, compiled by the Borys Lewytzkyj research bureau in Munich, consult the biannual *Current Soviet Leaders: A Cumulative Guide to Officials and Notables in the USSR*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, which since 1975 has listed changes in personnel and institutions, with biographical information concerning new personnel.

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its source base, as well as more balanced and more free of normative constraints in its treatment of many topics. Designed to serve a wide and varied readership, *MERSH* is intended to provide information on all major events, personalities, ideas, and institutions important to the history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, without becoming involved in details of interest only to the research specialist or devoting entries to narrowly specialized topics.

The authorship of *MERSH* is twofold. One category of contributors consists of several score scholars from the English-speaking world—mostly American, although the editor hopes eventually to elicit a more diversified Western participation. For the most part, these are younger and rising figures in the field. Much information, however, is also taken from Russian-language — especially Soviet—standard reference series, information or entries from which are reproduced in English in condensed form in the corresponding *MERSH* entries. The Russian source most extensively used in this way is the *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya,* selections from which are credited to their individual Soviet authors and are frequently supplemented with Western bibliographic citations provided by the compilers of *MERSH*. The relative proportion of Western and Soviet authorship is difficult to determine, but the two components seem about evenly balanced.

The truism which holds uneven quality to be a well-nigh inevitable concomitant of aggregate authorship finds itself confirmed in *MERSH*. Nevertheless, most of the individual contributions by Western specialists are solid pieces of scholarship and succeed in being informative and concise at the same time. Among the many distinguished contributions to the first eight volumes, some which will attract particular attention and interest, are those on anarchism, antisemitism and several related aspects of the Jewish question, the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, Reinhold and Yan Berzin, Bolshevism, M. M. Borodin, the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, church-state relations, the collectivization of agriculture, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and Anglo-Russian relations and the diplomacy of the Eastern Question. A few entries are less illuminating, however—for example, those on the Baku Commune, the Basmachi, Bukhara, Georgi Dimitrov, and Sergei Eisenstein.

By contrast, the overall quality of contributions of Soviet provenance does not justify their enlistment to the extent determined, apparently, by editorial policy. Many entries are affected by the spirit of *partiynost',* are one-sided in their bibliographic sources, suffer from arbitrary omissions, and gloss over critical issues. Thus, entries on the nationalities of the Soviet Union (e.g., Abkhazians, Azerbaijanis, Balkars, Belorussians, and Buryats) contain primarily data of ethnographic nature, while the ritualistic, if summary, recitation of ideological formulas occupies space which could be devoted to much-needed information on modern nationalism, territorial issues, and 20th-century political history. Soviet selections on the October Revolution and the subsequent Civil War basically adhere to interpretations imposed by later political developments in the USSR. Most entries in *MERSH* on military operations during the Civil War and particularly during World War II are by Soviet authors, and these too are characterized by lacunae and various types of *parti pris*. Many other entries culled from Soviet sources, especially on topics concerning Soviet political institutions and Russian foreign relations, are marked by similar deficiencies. Compensatory references to Western bibliography are usually adequate to provide a more objective picture for those who consult additional sources, although in some cases such references are sparse or entirely missing (e.g., on the Aland Conventions, the Barbarossa Plan, the Constitutions of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Crimean Operation of 1944). The encyclopedia's objective of convenience and expeditiousness of reference is defeated by the inadequacy of the text in such cases. One additional collateral effect of the insufficiently critical incorporation of material originally written in Russian is errors in the spelling of proper names retransliterated out of Cyrillic back into the Latin alphabet, as in the entries on Abo, Austerlitz, Balaton Operation, "Bauzen," and the East Pomeranian and East Prussian Operations of 1914 and 1945.

As editor Joseph Wieczynski rightly cautions, a work of this magnitude can hardly avoid unintentional omissions. This reviewer would signal the absence of entries on Grigoriy Aleksinskiy, A. A. Andreyev, Armenia and the Armenians, Capitalist encirclement, Carpatho-Ukraine, the Chelyuskin cruise, Coexistence, *Cordon sanitaire,* Cult of personality, Dal'niy, Dmytro Doroshenko, and Il'ya Ehrenburg; other reviewers might offer a different list. In addition, a few entries, such as those on Agitprop, Aktiv, Apparat, and Dictatorship of the Proletariat, are far too parsimonious to do justice to their subjects.

Most of the imperfections in these initial volumes can undoubtedly be rectified in supplements

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and the volumes to follow. But if this series is to fulfill its purpose and put at the disposal of its readership a uniformly reliable body of information on Russia and the Soviet Union, it is urgent that the qualitative imbalance between Eastern- and Western-generated content be redressed by enlisting from Western scholars contributions on those topics for which the existing Soviet literature fails to meet the standards of critical scholarship. Then *MERSH* would achieve the success and reputation for which an excellent editorial initiative, a basically sound methodology, and very fine cooperative scholarly effort so well qualify it.

ANOTHER innovative undertaking, this one in the field of comparative communism, is *Documents in Communist Affairs—1977*. This is a collection of official pronouncements on doctrinal and political matters by ruling and nonruling Communist parties, international communiqués and agreements between various Communist parties or regimes, and statements by human rights and dissident groups within Communist polities, all issued during 1977. That year witnessed many critical developments in Communist and international politics, among them the discussion and enactment of the new constitution of the USSR, renewed momentum for intellectual dissent and human rights movements in the countries of Eastern Europe, the resolution of the succession crisis in post-Mao China and the historic reorientation of policies in the People's Republic, politico-military realignment in the Horn of Africa, intensified debate on Eurocommunism, and renewed efforts to establish a Marxist-Catholic dialogue. The documents in this volume, selected from original sources, illustrate the theoretical views and the policies of Communist parties and other participating actors on these and similar issues. Divergent viewpoints are presented in juxtaposition.

Unfortunately, several key issues of inter-Communist and international relations, particularly in Europe, are not represented in the collection. I have in mind institutional developments in Communist interstate relations and views on integration, and the problem of European security and force reductions in Soviet, East European, and West European Communist perspectives.

Apart from this limitation, the selection of documents is judicious both in terms of issues and of balance, and imparts to the volume the enduring value of an anthology. This volume is intended as the first in a series of annual surveys. Up to now, there has been no publication of this type, and the present one has the potential of becoming a standard source for both basic and advanced research on contemporary communism and international relations.

Such a documentary collection would prove particularly useful as a companion to the Hoover Institution's *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter *YICA*). The high level of achievement of *YICA*'s 1979 edition—which covers the year 1978—is on a par with that of its predecessors, whose organization and methodology it essentially follows. A total of 99 Communist parties plus the principal international front organizations are profiled individually by acknowledged area experts. Party profiles cover leadership and organization, mass and auxiliary organizations, communications media, membership and electoral strength, domestic political activities, doctrinal orientation, relations with other parties, international position, and relations with competing radical left groups. Valuable innovations of this edition that may be expected to become permanent features of the series are the coverage of Communist interstate institutions in Eastern Europe and the inclusion of biographies of selected Communist personalities who have risen to positions of world prominence during the year.

With its unique scope and its wealth of data, which would require a separate review to treat adequately, *YICA* represents a truly indispensable reference source to all students of Communist comparative and international politics, Soviet foreign policy, and international relations, as well as to those involved in the formation, execution, or analysis of public policy. *YICA* provides more than a survey of recent developments, although it does this admirably. It also provides the foundation, and often the impetus, for further inquiry and analysis.

BY THEIR NATURE, bibliographic guides reflect work completed more than they do work in progress or waiting to be done, and the guides considered here are no exception. The five works, published between 1974 and 1978, are of widely varying topical, chronological, and geographic ambit.

The series of bibliographic surveys on the countries of East Central Europe issued since 1963 under the aegis of the Library of Congress[2] continues with Michael B. Petrovich's study on *Yugoslavia*. Professor Petrovich undertakes a

[2] Previous surveys in this series, whose organizational scheme and methodology the present volume basically follows, were devoted to *Romania* (edited by Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, 1963), *Bulgaria* (edited by Marin V. Pundeff, 1965), and *Czechoslovakia* (edited by Rudolf Sturm, 1968).

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critical survey of the core of the enormous corpus of literature on that country. His selection of over 2,500 items is weighted primarily in the direction of history, reflecting not only the relative preponderance of historical writing in Yugoslav scholarship but also the author's own professional interest and a judicious choice of historiography for in-depth coverage as a humanistic discipline inherently relevant to many other scholarly fields. Petrovich displays a marked preference for publications in the languages of Yugoslavia as opposed to those in Western languages.

It is clear that Petrovich, who is an eminent American authority on Yugoslavia, labored under serious limitations of space imposed by the format of the Library of Congress series and by Yugoslavia's complex national, linguistic, cultural, historical, and political configuration. This necessitated an emphasis on general and standard works and a rigorously selective approach rather than an all-inclusive one. Coverage is restricted almost entirely to books, and even here quite a few users, particularly research specialists, will note the absence of many items pertaining to their individual areas of concern. For example, those interested in the history of the country's agrarian economy and land reform will miss references to works on the *zadruga*, or the prewar writings of Rudolf Bicanic or Otto von Franges; and researchers of right radical movements and the history of World War II will find only a few citations on the Ustasa movement and the Croatian wartime state. Professor Petrovich's coverage of American literature is much wider than his coverage of work done in Western Europe, but even some important American contributions in history and the social and political sciences have failed to make his list—e.g., major works by Stanko Guldescu, Paul Shoup, and M. George Zaninovich. Microfilmed American doctoral dissertations on Yugoslavia were apparently not considered.

Despite these limitations, the survey does attain its intended scope and objectives and remains a detailed, authoritative, and convenient reference tool. Its chief qualities are an outstanding historiographic section and a judiciously balanced distribution of the materials selected among Yugoslavia's national cultures. This volume should be used in conjunction with the section on Yugoslavia (to which Petrovich is a contributor) in Paul L. Horecky's bibliography on Southeastern Europe, published in 1970, which covers partly the same ground but includes journal articles and whose cutoff date—1968—is the same as that of the present volume.[3]

Since 1968, the literature on Yugoslavia has continued to grow, with the area of World War II history particularly enriched by new additions. Moreover, major developments, reflected to some extent in the literature, have taken place in Yugoslavia in the spheres of foreign relations, the military, politics, ideology, economics, and culture. This would make a new, updated edition of Professor Petrovich's guide quite useful, especially in view of Yugoslavia's widely acknowledged potential for once again becoming a prime focus of international politics and a major source of systemic reverberations.

Aside from Petrovich's volume, the only bibliographic guide under investigation here which is devoted primarily to European rather than North American (and other English-language) literature is the *European Bibliography of Soviet, East European and Slavonic Studies*. The inaugural volume, covering works published in 1975, marks the debut of a collective, international undertaking intended as an annual series. The series is designed as the successor of two former annual national bibliographies, *Travaux et publications parus en français sur la Russie et l'URSS* and *Soviet, East European and Slavonic Studies in Britain*,[4] and in addition incorporates contributions to the field from the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. The nearly 4,000 titles of books and articles are drawn more or less evenly from French, British, and German-language sources. Coverage is remarkably wide-reaching and comprehensive and provides a unique panorama of Western Europe's scholarship in the Soviet and East European field. A particularly notable additional asset of the volume is its recognition of the scholarly contribution of prestigious Russian and East European intellectual magazines and journals published in Western Europe — e.g., *Posev, Grani, Kontinent, Cahiers de l'Est, Kultura, Svedectvi, Limite,* and *Ethos.*

The *European Bibliography* represents an indispensable vehicle for the cross-national dissemination of scholarship, and one hopes

[3] Paul L. Horecky, Ed., *Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1969. For a recent and more up-to-date survey of literature on Yugoslavia which is highly selective and focuses on the contemporary period, see John J. Horton, Ed., *Yugoslavia*, Santa Barbara, CA, and Oxford, England, ABC Clio Press, 1977.

[4] The first was previously published annually by *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* (Paris, 1963–74); the second, as a yearly supplement to *ABSEES—Soviet and East European Abstracts Series* (Glasgow, 1971–74). No equivalent bibliographies exist for Germany or Austria.

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that it will continue to appear. Its value could be further enhanced if its purview were expanded to incorporate contributions originating from other West European countries making significant contributions to the field, especially the Netherlands (with its English-language publishing houses and journals) and Italy. Such expansion might also help secure adequate financial resources to ensure continuation of the series.

In contrast to the multilingual approach of the *European Bibliography*, Stephen M. Horak's *Russia, the USSR, and Eastern Europe* offers a selective listing—roughly 1,600 titles—of recent books in English only. Horak's declared intent is to update the coverage of English-language publications provided in the 1960's by Paul L. Horecky's outstanding bibliographies.[5] Most of the works Horak has chosen are by Western scholars, but some entries are translations of the works of Soviet and East European authors. Each listing is accompanied by one concisely excerpted review of the book in question, with the reviews gleaned from North American and British professional journals, or in instances where no published reviews could be found, by annotations supplied by Horak himself. This feature is the distinguishing characteristic of the volume and apparently its main raison d'être. Unfortunately, it is also the source of its weakness. The criteria for selecting the reviews and especially for isolating the excerpts reproduced are not spelled out—beyond a justifiable general preference for reviews published in *Slavic Review* as a guarantee of quality. And there are no citations from reviews in political science journals, even though many of the books listed are in that discipline. Moreover, the review fragments reproduced are more often descriptive than analytical, and the brevity of excerpts and the choice of their content frequently prevent the user from forming an adequate image of the book's argument and findings or of the reviewer's judgment of the book's merits.

THE FINAL two bibliographic guides to be examined here are quite different in nature from those discussed thus far. They attempt to do more than summarize work already completed, by indicating sources which can be expected to continue to provide new information. In *Periodicals on the Socialist Countries and on Marxism*, Harry Shaffer has given us an expanded version of a volume first published in 1971 by Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change. Shaffer attempts a systematic inventory of the plethora of English-language periodicals in the social sciences and the humanities that appear both in Communist-ruled states and in the West and that are concerned primarily with contemporary Communist affairs. Pertinent bibliographic data, general content profile, and full acquisition information are provided for each title. From the standpoint of subject matter, the single largest group of periodicals seems to be devoted to economic affairs, and most of these are issued under official governmental auspices in both East and West—perhaps a reflection of policy priorities on both sides. Communist official publications clearly appear to outnumber their Western counterparts, and Marxist publications, both East and West, outnumber ideologically independent ones.

The compiler of this index may have been unduly generous in incorporating into his list a host of tourist, film, sports, and other similar magazines issued by Communist governments. But if the effort is to be all-encompassing, why exclude on unconvincing grounds almost all periodicals published in the West by Trotskyist and other radical left groups? These frequently offer original perspectives and insights on contemporary socialist theory and practice, and the decision to omit them is likely to be questioned by many specialists. There are also several apparently inadvertent omissions, notably the *International Review of Social History* (Amsterdam) and *Conflict Studies* (London). In view of such lacunae and the general sort of information it contains, this volume is likely to be of greater value to institutional and public libraries and perhaps to business organizations than to individuals engaged in advanced research.

The *Bibliography of the Soviet Social Sciences*, in contrast, is of necessity aimed at the specialist. The role of academic expertise in the formation of Soviet foreign policy has received growing recognition and attention over recent years, as has the gradual maturation in analytical sophistication of Soviet scholarship. Consequently, there has been a felt need among many students of Soviet foreign policy and international relations for an inventory of recent Soviet writing on international affairs. This bibliography attempts to provide an inventory for 1965–75 of the analytical output concerning contemporary world affairs by the research

[5] In addition to *Southeastern Europe*, cited in fn. 3, Horecky edited *Russia and the Soviet Union: A Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1965; *East Central Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1969; and *Basic Russian Publications: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on Russia and the Soviet Union*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

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institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR specializing in the social and political sciences, international relations, and individual regions of the world. The titles of nonperiodical publications sponsored by the various institutes — books and pamphlets, as well as conference papers and degree theses — have been extracted from the Academy's own *Yezhegodnik izdaniy*. Titles of journal articles are systematically arranged according to subject and area specialization for each journal covered.

The comprehensiveness of this potentially invaluable source is seriously diminished in relation to its intended scope both chronologically and in terms of territory surveyed. Coverage of most publishing outlets, for both journals and nonperiodical publications, falls short (in some cases far short) of the bibliography's announced time span. For example, publications of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement are given for the years 1967–72 only; and articles in *SShA*, the journal of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, only for 1970–74. Moreover, some leading journals published by the Academy's institutes are omitted altogether, even when other publications of the institutes in question are listed. Among those absent are journals which invite the sustained attention of the student of Soviet foreign policy, e.g., *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir, Latinskaya Amerika, Narody Azii i Afriki,* and *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*. An additional gap results from the exclusion of the sizable Soviet printed output on specific topics of contemporary international politics, such as the revolutionary setback suffered in Chile (despite the fact that this has been an object of protracted and in-depth discussion, both analytical and prescriptive, in Soviet journals). The criteria for selection of materials and the reasons for the chronological and substantive gaps remain unexplained.

Nevertheless, the idea of providing the specialized researcher with a guide to the vast corpus of Soviet publications in the social and political sciences, international relations, and area studies is an excellent and timely one, and the effort in this direction should undoubtedly be continued by efforts to update this work at periodic intervals. But a far greater degree of comprehensiveness would be required to ensure its value as an inclusive and reliable reference source for area experts and decision-makers.

AFTER AN examination of the survey and bibliographic literature which we have at hand, there can remain little doubt that archival and library resource guides are the most forward-looking of the sourcebooks in the field in terms of opening up new vistas for research by signaling materials available and suggesting unexplored areas. Sponsored by the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, under contract with the Office of Education of the then US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *East Central and Southeast Europe* offers a survey of the leading library and archival collections in the East European field in the United States and Canada.[6] A total of 43 academic and public depositories are profiled individually, the aim being to provide area and subject guides to the resources of each rather than exhaustive listings of holdings. Descriptions of each collection are supplied on a country-by-country basis, with further subdivisions according to scholarly discipline. All pertinent information on access, organization, published catalogs and internal finding aids, conditions of usage and borrowing, and various library services is systematically supplied.

Given the scope of their undertaking and the space available, editors Paul Horecky and David Kraus must have found sacrifices in comprehensiveness inescapable. Perhaps the principal limitation of the volume is the exclusion from the *Handbook*'s sphere of concern of collections and holdings on the Baltic region and the Ukraine. Quite apart from their intrinsic interest, such collections contain much material of value to specialists on Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. Also missing are some important archival collections, such as the rich Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History at Columbia University in New York City, and the University of Pittsburgh's Archive on Political Elites in Eastern Europe.

In fact, the *Handbook*'s overall emphasis falls markedly on library resources at the expense of archival ones. The primary beneficiaries and most likely users of this handbook will be the nonresident scholar planning research trips to major library collections and the graduate student seeking to correlate academic affiliation with individual specialization and area interests.

The imbalance of the Horecky-Kraus effort in favor of library resources is to some extent redressed by Steven A. Grant's

[6] In fact, all but two of the collections are situated in the US. For a comprehensive survey of major Canadian collections, see Bohdan Budurowycz, *Slavic and East European Resources in Canadian Academic and Research Libraries*, Ottawa, National Library of Canada, 1976.

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Scholar's Guide to Washington, D.C., for Russian/Soviet Studies. This product of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennan Institute in Washington performs a signal service to the scholarly community. It presents for the first time in systematic fashion a general inventory of the vast resources of the Washington area in the field of Russian and Soviet studies, providing descriptions and evaluations of holdings, general reference aids, and introductions into the modi operandi of each of the depositories and organizations surveyed. A probably exhaustive total of 277 institutions and organizations is included, ranging from public and private libraries; archives; art collections; music, film, and photographic repositories; and data banks to US and foreign government agencies; academic and professional associations; cultural and scholarly exchange organizations; academic research centers; publications and media; specialized bookstores; and ethnic and émigré cultural societies and church groups.

In recent years Washington has become the locus of the largest aggregation of material for Russian and Soviet studies in the country and perhaps all of the Western world, and this guide is a must for the nonresident American or foreign scholar planning to benefit from the resources of the American capital. Washington's various depositories and organizations hold—and continue to generate—resources of comparable magnitude for East European studies, and the Kennan Institute has undertaken to produce a similar systematic inventory of these materials. In particular, the collections of the National Archives—above all those recently opened and still being opened to researchers under the 30-year archival rule—are of unique importance to the student of the Soviet Union and contemporary Eastern Europe, international communism, comparative revolution, the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe and US policy toward the region, American-Soviet relations, and the beginnings of the cold war. They should greatly enrich our knowledge of all these topics.

Of all the sourcebooks discussed, this guide is perhaps the most stimulating in that it points to a domain where much of the future of primary research in the field, whether historical or policy-oriented, undoubtedly lies. It is a particularly valuable "tertiary source" in a field in which large amounts of primary material still go unexploited despite a proliferation of secondary literature—as the contents of the sourcebooks available in the field suggest.

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The Cuban Enigma

By Antoni M. Kapcia

MARIO LLERENA. *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1978

JORGE L. DOMÍNGUEZ. *Cuba: Order and Revolution.* Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1978.

HEINRICH BRUNNER. *Cuban Sugar Policy from 1963 to 1979.* Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.

OSCAR LEWIS et al. *Four Women—Living the Revolution: An Oral History of Contemporary Cuba.* Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1977.

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, Ed. *Cuban Communism,* 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1977.

LESTER A. SOBEL, Ed. *Castro's Cuba in the 1970's.* New York, NY, Facts on File, 1978.

CUBA IN 1979 celebrated the 20th anniversary of its Revolution with characteristic eccentricity. Just as "détente" with the United States had apparently been postponed indefinitely by differences over Africa, President Fidel Castro reopened the issue by his unexpected overtures to the exiles (the old *gusanos*) and the release of hundreds of political prisoners.[1] If nothing else, these actions proved that the Revolution and Fidel Castro were as unpredictable and as enigmatic in 1979 as in 1959. Nothing, it seemed, had changed.

Yet much has in fact changed in Cuba and the world. The Cuban Revolution has now endured for 20 years and, in this reviewer's eyes, is an established fact of life. Cuba has also evolved an "alternative" revolutionary model to that of the USSR, and it seems to be slowly, if tentatively, reducing some of the elements of dependence on the Soviet Union that marked the Revolution's early years. To understand the nature of the new situation, we need a historical approach to the Revolution.

THE FIRST POINT of interest—by no means an unfamiliar issue—is what happened in 1959 and why, how Batista fell and Castro emerged as leader. Here we must have answers of greater analytic depth than many sources provide. Mario Llerena and Jorge Domínguez both address these questions, with the former focusing on Castro himself and the latter concentrating on the longer-term background. Llerena's discussion, in this writer's opinion, is the less satisfactory of the two, for it is informed by notions that Castro was a "megalomaniac" and that "communization" of the revolutionary forces took place *prior to 1959* (a judgment based on a confusion between communism and the vague, though radical, socialism of Che Guevara and Raúl Castro). Although ostensibly an "insider's" account of the Revolution, Llerena's book is less than that. The fact is that from 1956 on there was only *one* group of "insiders"—the guerrillas around Castro. Other participants such as Llerena, though active, were ultimately only peripherally involved. Despite its deficiencies, however, Llerena's volume does highlight the way in which, almost by default, the anti-Batista leadership passed to Castro. By 1958, the existing political groups in the country had become irrevelant to the real issue: Fulgencio Batista or Castro? In the vacuum, Castro emerged unchallenged.

But the origins of the fall of the Batista regime are to be found in larger contexts. In this regard, Domínguez concentrates on the loss of political legitimacy. He takes issue with earlier analyses of Batista's overthrow that stress economic dependence—the weakness

[1] On Aug. 31, 1978, Havana announced the release of several hundred political prisoners, and the following Nov. 11, it indicated that it intended to increase the total to 3,000, at a rate of 400 a month. In addition, it would free 600 illegal emigrants and 425 "war criminals." By way of explanation of this change in policy, the Castro government stated that Cuba was not only Marxist-Leninist but also nationalist and patriotic. *Keasing's Contemporary Archives* (London), Jan. 19, 1979, p. 29408.

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of the Cuban bourgeoisie, the Cuban economy, and Cuban nationality prior to 1959[2]—and argues that on the eve of 1959 the United States had reduced its role in Cuba and national entrepreneurship was on the rise.

Certainly, as Domínguez contends, the 57-year-old republic had suffered a permanent crisis of legitimacy, with a destabilizing US "presence," dual power bases (Havana and Washington, the military and Congress), and an irrelevant and corrupt "democracy." Hence, in 1959 a movement claiming "moral legitimacy" had a timely appeal. Nonetheless, this *political* explanation should not blind us to a fundamental aspect of the prerevolutionary economy: namely, that Cuba's economic system was not geared to the country's real needs. As Brunner demonstrates, the dilemma lay in the fact that neither an inefficient closed-market system tied to the United States nor an unstable free-market one stimulated stable development. This situation was compounded by the American sugar quota system, which, while not the "evil" of Cuban nationalist mythology, trapped the island. Success in expanding sugar exports deepened dependence on the United States, while only decline in sugar production aided diversification. Thus, Cuban prosperity in the 1950's was fragile and was dissipated in recession in 1958—which in turn swelled the ranks of the disaffected and disadvantaged (and, consequently, the ranks of Castro's movement).

Moreover, explanations of the Castro triumph should be sought not in Cuban history alone but in the broader Latin American milieu. Here I have in mind not so much *caudillo* or populist traditions as the eclectic ideology of the "third way," which, through the Peronista and Aprista movements in Argentina and Peru profoundly influenced a generation of Latin American youth, including the Cuban *Ortodoxos* (to which Castro belonged). In short, Castro's early "humanism" had a continental socialistic, anti-imperialist pedigree.

AS FOR the swift radicalization of the Revolution after 1959, explanations are many. These include the political and ideological vacuum, US hostility, the guerrilla experience, Castro's uncompromising personality, the availability of the (Communist) *Partido Socialista Popular* PSP as an instrument to carry out reforms, and the presence of the USSR in the wings waiting for an opening to exploit. Here it should be noted that there is little evidence of Castro's commitment to socialist ideas at the time. Rather, he seemed to believe in some sort of reformed capitalism, based on the ideas of the Cuban patriot, José Martí, and on a polyclass alliance. Most of all, however, what "pushed" the process leftward, as Domínguez observes, was the Revolution's own dynamic—the leadership's awareness of the need and pressures for fundamental and rapid change, its perception that to make the (costly) break with the United States would necessitate pursuit of a policy of autarky or reliance on other markets and sources of aid (it actually tended to follow a zigzag course between the two), and its belief that the purely "social" revolution must take precedence over economic restructuring. Although this order of priorities held obvious dangers, it ultimately guaranteed the Revolution's survival, for it succeeded in winning for the Revolution a base of popular support that remained steadfast through 20 years of austerity.

It is the social transformations, then, that should be examined first. These transformations, especially in health, education, and welfare, are now an accepted fact, and they have recently received the stamp of approval of the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America and visiting American notables. Both Oscar Lewis and Domínguez add their endorsements. (The latter, it should be noted, then goes on to examine the central issue of the degree to which these transformations have succeeded in producing Guevara's "new man.")

However, Cuba's impressive commitment to, for example, education does not resolve questions of quality, precepts, and purposes.[3] Greater literacy has undoubtedly raised consciousness and participation, but it has also assured political control because of the limitations of the program. Likewise, the government's strong dedication to racial and sexual equality may say little of actual implementation or responses. The value of the Lewis volume is its focus on contradictions and confusions with regard to the latter issue at both the national and individual levels. A radical legal position contrasts with conservative social attitudes (though Cuban women have been considerably "liberated" by the demands of labor and defense). Furthermore, "equality" is mainly a matter of the incorporation of *all* the population into the work force. Even the Family Code

[2] Two exponents of this view are James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1970; and Robin Blackburn, "Prologue to the Cuban Revolution," *New Left Review* (London), October 1963.

[3] See, for instance, Arthur Gillette, "Cuba's Educational Revolution," *Fabian Research Series* (London), No. 302, June 1972.

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of 1974[4] is primarily an instrument for ensuring revolutionary order.

THE PRIMACY of social concerns is especially important. As Brunner points out (pp. 34–35), it rendered industrialization, diversification, and rationing as much social as economic decisions. This also applies to the agrarian reforms of May 1959 and October 1963. The early prominence of the National Institute of Agrarian Reforms (INRA), which was under Castro's guidance and run by the Rebel Army, made the reforms social and political tools. INRA constituted *the* rural administration mobilizing the hitherto ignored rural work force.[5]

In light of this priority, moreover, the tardiness of economic progress was hardly surprising. Only after the post-1970 "rectification"[6] did growth take place and trade increase. (Previously, growth had been subordinated to distribution.)

At the same time, the economic situation has obviously not been as simple as these bald facts might suggest. The Revolution began (and continues) with a paradox. Sugar constituted both a cause of dependence and a source of wealth. Thus, it was vital in the short term but harmful beyond that. The Cubans' failure to solve the dilemma created by this paradox resulted in economic confusions and "zigzags" and in the economic debacle of 1960–63. (Blame for the latter must be apportioned equally to the Cubans—who took unrealistic political decisions and displayed ideological confusion—and to the Russians.)[7]

Brunner masterfully demonstrates the soundness of Havana's "return-to-sugar" strategy in 1963–70, linking the Cuban "model" (what one might call "export-led distribution") to Alfred O. Hirschman's "unbalanced growth."[8] Furthermore, he implies that post-1970 economic policy was different less in strategy than in implementation. Certainly, the problem with the 1970 harvest campaign (*zafra*) lay in its scale, not in the concept behind it. To be sure, the production target set was an inflexible political goal and had little economic rationale, given the world market's limits. In addition, the venture was costly, for it constituted a drain on other sectors (1.2 million workers were mobilized to cut the cane), reduced productivity,[9] and damaged morale and credibility. Nevertheless, the effort was fundamentally sound. One basic difficulty plaguing Cuba was the persistent instability of the price of sugar. As Brunner argues, Cuba's reliance in that period on the fluctuating world market led to cuts in advantageously priced sales to the USSR if the world price fell, for Cuba then had to sell more on the world market in order to maintain its foreign exchange earnings. (This situation, incidentally, gives the lie to Cuba's supposed dependence on the USSR during the 1960's.) By ensuring a large harvest, Havana sought to make certain it had enough sugar available to keep up its foreign exchange earnings and still sell large quantities to the Soviet Union at favorable prices.

Cuba probably had little choice with regard to its economic strategy. It had only sugar to sell, and in light of the instability of the price of sugar on the world market, the USSR represented its only reliable customer. Likewise, Guevara's "moral economy" was largely a matter of necessity, because there was no money for differentials and incentives and there were no goods to buy. For these reasons, the economic strategy was "correct." Indeed, the righting of the economy by 1972 seems to confirm the strategy's soundness.

AT ROOT, the problem that came to the fore in 1970 was political, and the political damage resulting from the failure of the harvest campaign was more serious than the economic damage. Since 1961, active dissent had been minimal, with opposition silenced by exile (Domínguez observes that the US acceptance of the exodus helped unify the Revolution[10]), imprisonment,[11] or defeat.[12] But there was a

[4] The Mar. 8, 1974, code guaranteed full sexual equality and established women's rights to participate in political, cultural, and economic life.

[5] William M. LeoGrande has observed that INRA served as the basis for many of the Revolution's organizations. See his "The Politics of Revolutionary Development: Civil-Military Relations in Cuba, 1959–1976," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), December 1978.

[6] This term is Sergio Roca's. See his "Cuban Economic Policy in the 1970s: The Trodden Paths," in the volume edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, p. 289.

[7] Brunner's analysis of this period reinforces that of K. S. Karol in *Guerrillas in Power*, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1970.

[8] See Hirschman's *Strategy of Economic Development*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1958.

[9] The Cubans subsequently admitted that there was 20 percent absenteeism from work in August–September 1970, and they therefore designated 1971 the Year of Productivity (Domínguez, p. 275). According to the Labor Ministry, moreover, the harvest had cost Cuba three times its worth on the world market. See the volume edited by Lester A. Sobel, p. 65.

[10] In 1965, the US government began an "airlift" of Cubans who wanted to leave the country, and by 1970, the number of persons who had availed themselves of this opportunity had reached 560,628 (Sobel p. 70).

[11] In 1967, Castro admitted that there were 20,000 political prisoners in Cuba, but in June 1977 he placed the figure at more than 15,000 at some time in the past (Sobel, p. 156). By 1978, the actual total still admitted to be under confinement had fallen to 3,238 (*Keasing's Contemporary Archives*, Jan. 19, 1979, p. 29408).

Fn. 12 follows on p. 83.

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greater degree of passive dissent because of frustration at the unstructured, improvisational mode of governance, which, even though it had answered the Revolution's early needs, had proved incompatible with a more complex institutional setting.[13] The profusion of organizations had undermined active participation. Thus, the signal problem of 1970 was the elite's failure to adapt to new demands. Its fear of institutional rigidity overlooked the fact that morale could not be maintained indefinitely on promises and a siege mentality. New demands on a "war weary" work force battered by 15 years of austerity could, and did, create deep resentment, with dangerous implications for the Revolution's credibility.

In this respect, however, the "watershed," the period of greatest need not only for morale but also for a more coherent system, was 1968, not 1970. The year 1968 witnessed the paradoxical Revolutionary Offensive, the nationalizing of all remaining private industry and trade (55,636 businesses). An attempt to raise morale and the 'high point" of the Guevarist phase of the Revolution, this offensive disrupted the economy, increased absenteeism, reduced participation, and (despite the antibureaucratic campaign) swelled the bureaucracy. The excesses of 1970 were the logical sequel.

What Castro failed to absorb in 1968 but finally learned from the 1970 experience—"that the art of governance is considerably more complex than is the art of insurrection"[14]—did then produce fundamental political changes. Indeed, the *zafra* separated two political strategies. The first subordinated everything to *survival* in circumstances of a real or imagined siege, while the second subordinated everything to *stability*. Replacement of INRA by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1976 eloquently symbolized the shift from one to the other.

Developments since 1970 have been fully documented,[15] but the underlying trends still need to be analyzed. One of the more obvious of these is the relative success of Cuba's economic endeavors. This has been the result of a number of factors: Soviet aid;[16] the favorable price of sugar on the world market; stabilization and reorganization of the economy; devolution of economic decision-making; and, perhaps above all, the effects of the 1963-70 efforts. Of the readjustments, the introduction of the standard of profitability of enterprises (*cálculo económico*) in 1978 as part of the New System for the Direction of the Economy may yet prove to be the most significant.[17] Yet the economy's underlying weakness, dependence on sugar, remains. In 1974, sugar accounted for 90 percent of Cuba's export receipts.[18]

Institutionalization of the Revolution has also been quite apparent. Major landmarks in this process have included the First Congress of the Communist Party on December 17-22, 1975, the enactment of the Constitution in 1976, and the elections to the Popular Assembly in 1976.[19] But what have been the effects of this trend? It seems now that the fundamental nature of power in Cuba has not really altered. Elections have been more of a concession, an expression of confidence, than a legitimation. Indeed, the *poder popular* system lacks autonomy except at the local level, and even here its role is confused with that of the long-existing Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Similarly, as Domínguez notes, the activism of the trade unions (CTC) has declined from its peak in 1970. Lastly, "democratization" of the various organizations has not altered their functions as "transmission belts" for decisions passed down from on high, but has simply increased consultation as a safety valve and sounding device.

Whether the post-1970 period has witnessed "sovietization" of the Cuban political and economic system is much less certain, although debate on this subject has been as vehement (and unhelpful) as arguments over the character of the Revolution that took place during the Revolution's early years. Cuba's economic reliance on the Soviet Union—for cheap oil, stable sugar prices, credits, and favorable loans[20]—is, of course, undeniable,

[12] Dominguez claims (p. 346) that between 1960 and 1965, the number of insurgent bands in the country averaged 179. However, he says that these comprised no more than 1,000 individuals altogether.

[13] Edward Gonzalez's observations on this matter are valuable. See his *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*, New York, NY, Houghton Mifflin, 1974.

[14] Irving Louis Horowitz, "Introduction to the Second Edition (1972)," in Horowitz, p. 12.

[15] The Sobel volume contains a wealth of meticulous detail. See also the Domínguez volume; Gonzalez, *Cuba under Castro . . .*; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization*, 2nd ed., Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1978.

[16] According to Brunner (p. 125), this amounted to US$1 million a day. Another source puts Cuba's indebtedness to the USSR in January 1971 at $2,200 million (Sobel, p. 37)

[17] Other aspects of the NSDE concerned interest rates and consumer demand. See *Latin American Economic Report* (London), Sept. 22, 1978, p. 294.

[18] See Sobel, p. 189.

[19] After elections were conducted on an experimental basis in Matanzas in 1974, nationwide popular power *(poder popular)* elections were carried out on Oct. 11, 1976, for 169 municipal assemblies, 14 provincial assemblies, and 1 national assembly. Altogether, 5 million voters participated in these elections.

[20] In 1972, the USSR agreed to restructure Cuba's debts accumulated prior to the end of 1972, consenting to extend the time frame for those past due and to accept repayment on an interest-free basis. Sobel, p. 193.

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and has been acknowledged by the Cubans themselves. But the degree of that dependence and its impact are less clear. Certainly, in this writer's view, it falls far short of the strong dependence on the US economy prior to 1959,[21] and Havana is now more deeply involved in the setting of sugar prices. Moreover, diversification of output, though limited in scope, has undoubtedly helped cushion blows (such as the precipitate fall in the price of sugar in 1974–76 from 65.3 cents a pound to 7.5 cents a pound) that before 1959 would have been disastrous for the Cuban economy.

The extent of political dependence, however, is more difficult to gauge. Here Cuba's foreign policy should be considered, because of its apparent Soviet orientation. Since 1959, Cuba's main foreign policy concern has been the United States, but now, after a decade of severe hostility and then fitful moves toward an improvement of relations since 1970 (the course of which the Sobel volume traces admirably), a full rapprochement seems only a matter of time. Hence, the need for Soviet support has diminished somewhat. With regard specifically to Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union, Africa becomes especially relevant. Many factors led to Cuba's involvement in Angola in 1975, but the most likely stimulus for it would seem to have been Havana's Third World policy. In this reviewer's opinion, the two other leading explanations—that the USSR used economic blackmail to induce Cuba to act as a proxy for it and that political infighting within the Cuban leadership contributed to the intervention[22]—offer much but miss more. Indeed, the former seems particularly untenable in light of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's rejection of the idea that the Cubans had been forced into the intervention (Sobel, p. 119). It is probably most accurate to see the whole episode as part of Cuba's long-standing "internationalist" policy and relationship with several Arab and African movements, including the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*.[23] The timing of the crisis was opportune for Cuba. The situation gave Havana the chance to reaffirm its "revolutionary" credentials to an audience made skeptical by Cuba's apparently pro-Soviet stance (especially after Castro's defense of the USSR at the Fourth Conference of Nonaligned States in Algiers in September 1973), to revive its (former Latin American) policy of *conciencia revolucionaria*[24] in the African context, and to continue its long-standing policy of acquiring "leverage" with the Soviet Union, through a dramatic gesture of solidarity that the USSR had to support. Thus, the Angolan affair was more a case of coincidence of perceived Soviet and Cuban interests than of Cuban responses to Soviet pressure.

THE POLITICAL credits that Cuba earned abroad from its Angolan venture had a parallel at home, for the public tended to view the undertaking as a new challenge and a source of national pride. Recognizing this fact, the leadership proceeded to use the Angolan operation as yet another means of morale building and mobilization, identifying it with such earlier efforts as the literacy campaign of 1961 and propagating the myth of the "return of the slaves."[25]

This issue of mobilization raises a familar but still relevant question: what sort of revolution is the Cuban Revolution (within the framework of its clear socialist orientation)? Interpretations emphasizing Castro's "personal" role, though still evident,[26] have now become less common. Yet even though this role is less important today than it was in the 1960–68 period, it is still central to the Revolution. True, it is clearly no longer accurate to speak of *Fidelismo,* for the organizations (the party included) are dominated less by Fidelista loyalists than by an elite made up of the Rebel Army elite of 1959. It was this elite that, after the "Escalante affair" of 1962,[27] strove to prevent the growth of a power base for a competing elite and to preserve the "guerrilla mentality" (through an "elitism" based on the Guevaran

[21] According to Sobel (p. 188), US-Cuban trade in 1958 amounted to 71 percent of Cuba's exports and 64 percent of its imports. At its peak in 1962, Havana's trade with the whole of the Communist world accounted for 82.9 percent of Cuba's total trade turnover, but by 1974 the figure had dropped to 58.8 percent, with the USSR accounting for 40.7 percent.

[22] See Edward Gonzalez, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1977, pp. 1–15.

[23] From this same perspective, Horowitz would seem to be in error in asserting that Cuba's support for the Arab side in the Middle East followed Soviet policy. See "Authenticity and Autonomy in Cuban Communism," in Horowitz, p. 122.

[24] Roca (in Horowitz, p. 192) views the post-1970 period as one of *conciencia económica* at home and *conciencia revolucionaria* abroad.

[25] See *Latin American Political Report,* Apr. 14, 1978, p. 110. The whole question of the linkage between Cuba's African involvement and domestic mobilization is treated by the author in "Cuba's African Involvement: A New Perspective," *Survey* (London), Spring 1979.

[26] See, for example, J. N. Goodsell, Ed., *Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba: 1959–1973,* New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.

[27] In 1962, old-line Communist Anibal Escalante was accused of "sectarianism" for attempting to "stack" the new Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), a precursor of the Cuban Communist Party, with members of the old PSP.

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concept of a *foco,* or revolutionary center, and the shared Sierra experience). Castro's early dismantling of his rebel movement and his anti-PSP moves were both part of this attempt to ensure the direction of the Revolution by the old elite, with himself at the helm. The current composition of the party leadership together with the power that Castro wields by virtue of his roles as head of the Cuban Communist Party, President of the country, President of the Council of State, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and head of a variety of other bodies[28] shows that this aspect of the situation has not changed. Since 1970, in short, Castro has again proved his ability (as in 1953 and 1956) to turn defeat into victory. Institutionalization has actually strengthened his hand. Hence, decisions can still be his alone, and he is still able to determine the direction of policy, although in overall terms he continues in some senses to *react* to events rather than to *direct* them. The substantial government changes in January 1980, and the manner in which they came about, seem to reinforce these judgments.

A popular recent characterization of the Revolution is that it has been "militarized." Horowitz described such a trend in 1967 (see Horowitz, p. 26), but his analysis was based more on subjective criteria—for example, the "military" nature of the original revolution—than on solid evidence. Moreover, his view of the original revolution, in this writer's eyes, represented a misreading that paralleled Guevara's. It ignored the fact that Batista's demoralized army had not so much suffered defeat as collapsed, along with the regime itself.

Yet the Rebel Army and its successor, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), have certainly been central to the Revolution. This was especially true early on, when the Rebel Army, the *real* power in the country, constituted the only viable instrument for meeting the urgent needs of defense, productivity, and organization. It was the Army (not the PSP) that emerged intact, loyal, organized, and popular from the battle with the Batista regime; the Army that performed the party's role, that ran INRA, and so on. Since then, it has remained a key source of manpower and means of mobilization, education, and politicization. In 1968, for instance, 46 percent of the FAR regulars were involved in the *zafra*; in 1970, the figure rose to 64 percent (Domínguez, pp. 357-58).

This is not "militarization," however. The use of the rhetoric of "struggle" has clear precedents in, say, Great Britain during World War II, and the military in Cuba is not a separate caste or elite, imposing its definitions on the whole of society. Rather, the military draws in practically the entire population in one way or another and *reflects* rather than *directs,* being "civilianized" by a long, close identification with the population (Domínguez, pp. 341ff, refers to the "civic soldier"). Certainly, such was the case at least until the Angolan venture, which constituted the first really conventional military action of the FAR. But by 1975, it should also be pointed out, the FAR's representation on the Central Committee of the party had declined from what it had been in 1965.[29]

In this reviewer's opinion, the military's role in Cuba can best be viewed as a facet of the country's "mobilization politics." These, as a result of the Revolution's unstructured, unorthodox character, its reactive, eclectic ideology, and its stress on "theory through action" (as opposed to the traditional Marxist-Leninist emphasis on "action through theory"), have produced an "alternative" revolutionary model.

The most distinctive means of mobilization has undoubtedly been the "personal" relationship between Castro and the populace, fortified by rallies, media coverage, and impromptu tours. But this means has not been the basic one employed. That role has fallen to the many revolutionary organizations which, together, assure the involvement of almost the entire population. These include the ubiquitous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution,[30] the Federation of Cuban Women,[31] the CTC, the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), and the Young Communists (UJC) and the Union of Cuban Pioneers.[32] All are characteristically bifunctional in nature—that is, they serve as instruments for both mobilizing and controlling (consultation/participation and execution of decisions).

Another means of mobilization from the outset has been a revolutionary mythology—myths concerning links with Martí and the revolutionary tradition, Castro's attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago on July 26, 1953, the guerrilla experience in the Sierra, the rise of new generations, and the concept of struggle (Angola in-

[28] Domínguez argues that this concentration of power is more in keeping with a Latin American than with a socialist tradition.

[29] LeoGrande (p. 282) gives figures of 57 percent in 1965 and 30 percent in 1975.

[30] Incorporating 4.8 million persons, or 80 percent of the eligible population, in 1976 (Domínguez, p. 262).

[31] Whose membership was 2.18 million persons, or more than 80 percent of the eligible population, in 1977 (Domínguez, p. 268).

[32] The Pioneers embraced 98.7 percent of all schoolchildren in 1975 (Domínguez, p. 279).

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cluded). Likewise, the Revolution's almost uninterrupted series of "campaigns"—some mundane (the Havana greenbelt), others dramatic (the literacy campaign); some factional (antisectarianism), others national (the 1970 *zafra*)—has been essential to mobilization. During the early years, they occurred frequently because of the initial impetus and enthusiasm behind the Revolution. Later, they became more sporadic and reflected the need to recreate this original enthusiasm, as the contrast with the pre-1959 society became less relevant to a new generation and less effective with the old one. In this sense, Angola was a godsend.

WHAT, THEN, can be said in summary about the Revolution today? Its pattern is clear. The Revolution has assumed the character of nationalist "mobilization politics" (as Domínguez maintains), with adapted elements of socialist models and an agrarian, export-led distribution economy.

In regard to the future, prediction is difficult. The same actors that have determined the Revolution's course over the last two decades could once again cause a change in its direction. For instance, the United States might decide to revive its currently dormant policy of détente with Cuba. The USSR, for its part, might miscalculate and suffer a defeat in Africa. Castro himself might take some unforeseen decision or simply die. In this regard, however, one suspects that his death would not be as critical to the Revolution now as it would have been in the early years.[33]

If the essentials of the current situation continue to prevail, though, it seems likely that Havana will try to play the United States and the USSR off against each other. The political importance of Cuba to both will in all probability facilitate such a development. For the United States, Cuba constitutes a key factor in a viable Latin American and Caribbean policy in the wake of the transfer of the Panama Canal to Panama. For the USSR, Cuba serves as proof of the Soviet "revolutionary" commitment.

As early as 1975, Cuba already had taken its first tentative steps toward independence from the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Angolan involvement, the strengthening of the position of Castro and of the Cuban elite more generally by institutionalization, the moves toward détente with the United States (including the adoption of a friendlier stance toward the exiles), and Cuba's achievement of an end to sanctions by the Organization of American States and participation in the Latin American economic system—all mark 1975 not as the final stage of Cuba's emergence as a Soviet satellite, but as a tentative beginning of a new independence. With détente with the United States holding out the brightest hope for obtaining advanced technology and consumer goods, Cuba might conceivably decide to proceed further along this path, even if doing so might dissipate a major unifying force, the country's "siege" mentality.

[33] Edward Gonzalez addresses the question of succession in the Horowitz volume, pp. 537–69.

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Conflict Within the Iraqi Left

By John K. Cooley

HANNA BATATU. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

TAREQ Y. ISMAEL. *The Arab Left.* Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1976.

RONY GABBAY. *Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq.* London, Croom Helm, 1978.

MAJID KHADDURI. *Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968.* Washington, DC, The Middle East Institute, 1978.

IRAQ IS EMERGING as a major Arab power. Not only has it invested its oil revenues in both development and arms (the latter bought mainly from the Soviet Union and France), but since the March 26, 1979, peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn al-Takriti, while increasing trade and technology transfers from the Western world and keeping a healthy distance from the USSR, has tried to make Iraq's ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) party into a vanguard of militant Arabism. With its vast oil wealth, second only to Saudi Arabia's, moreover, Iraq has the potential to become a major power in the Third World as well.

However, Iraq suffers from internal sectarian and social tensions that keep Iraqi society and politics near the boiling point. The turmoil in Iran since the Shah's departure in January 1979 has exacerbated these tensions.

The four books under review here, though they went to press before the Iranian revolution, all help to explain why Iraq is today such an explosive cauldron. Since Iraq's old pro-Western Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in 1958, various groups, all claiming to speak with a leftist voice, have competed to lead Iraq out of the isolation which her special identity has helped to impose. Of these, the most important have been the Baath and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).

Both the Baath and the ICP originated in the days when France ruled Syria, Britain was predominant in Iraq, and social inequalities were rampant. The ICP was founded in 1934 as a rural peasant movement. However, it was able to put down lasting roots only in Iraq's cities, among the workers and unemployed. The Baath, a transplant from Syria, was a party of middle-class intellectuals and, in Iraq, for the most part of Sunni Muslim army officers. Deadly rivalry between the Iraqi and Syrian Baathists has had its repercussions to this day, and Michel Aflaq, one of the party's two Syrian cofounders, now lives in exile in Baghdad, an aging figure from the party's remote, romantic past.

In 1958, the ICP, remembering the martyrdom of several of its founding members such as Yusuf Sulayman Yusuf (known as "Fahd") at the hands of the Hashemite monarchy and eager to establish its anti-imperialist credentials, cooperated with Abdel Karim Qasim, the dictatorial army officer who overthrew the royal government. Soon, however, the ICP and an array of other opponents, from right-wing landowners and businessmen frightened by Qasim's populism to supporters of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's brand of pan-Arab nationalism, were locked in political battle with Qasim. During the course of the struggle, the Communist-inspired "Peace Partisans" clashed with nationalist army factions in the northern, Kurdish oil town of Mosul.

This same episode marked the beginning of efforts by the clandestine Baath party to undermine Qasim. Led then by Ali Saleh al-Saadi, a brawling adventurer, the Baath organized a clandestine network inside the Iraqi armed forces (which helps to explain the Baath's present-day sensitivity about any non-Baathist infiltration in the armed forces, especially if it is Communist). The secret Baathist

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military committee was headed by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a retired officer (he was later reinstated in the army and accorded the rank of general, and he subsequently became president of the Republic until Saddam Husayn took over supreme power in July 1979). By February 1963, the Baathists were able to carry out a successful coup d'état, with the help of the air force, whose Baathist pilots bombed and strafed Qasim's forces into submission. A month later, the Baath seized power in Syria too.

While the Baath was immersed in internal conflict and a bitter quarrel with Nasser in Egypt, however, a rightist nationalist faction under Abdel Salam Arif, another general, seized power. The Nasserists twice tried to wrest power away from Abdel Salim Arif and later from his brother, Abdel Rahman Arif. During this period, there were also many efforts to curtail Iraq's increasing trade and political ties with the Soviet Union, patron of the ICP. These failed when a wave of popular resentment swept through the Arab world against the United States, because of its backing for Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

ON JULY 17, 1968, a Baathist junta toppled President Abdel Rahman Arif and elected Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr president. By the end of the summer, a group of men, including Saddam Husayn and Bakr, all from the town of Takrit, in north central Iraq, had control of the party, state, and military machinery. From then until July of 1973, the Baath party managed to stay in control of all three.

It was during this period that Iraqi-Soviet relations reached their zenith and that the ICP came as near as it has ever come to sharing power with the Baath. President Bakr visited the USSR in September 1972 to celebrate the signing of the 15-year Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and alliance. Considerably before that juncture, a struggle within the ICP between a pro-Moscow faction, headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Azziz Muhammed, and a pro-Peking group, led by Azziz al-Hajj, had been resolved in the Moscow group's favor, and the ICP's second national conference, in 1970, had affirmed the preeminence of Soviet influence. In 1973, the ICP, after some Soviet prodding of both it and the Baath, agreed to form a progressive National Front with the Baath and the main Kurdish ethnic party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Though the ICP complained bitterly about the continuing lack of land reform and civil liberties in the country, it followed as best it could the shifting winds of Iraqi-Soviet relations during this period.

These winds began to blow more coldly with the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. True, the USSR gave Iraq diplomatic support during that war, and in May 1974, Moscow came out on the side of the Baghdad government against Barzani, who had, with help from Israel, Iran, and the US Central Intelligence Agency, renewed the Kurdish insurrection a month earlier. But the USSR supported Egypt and Syria in their efforts to reach a negotiated solution with Israel after the 1973 war and seemed to be urging the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to take the same path. Iraq, in contrast, opposed any compromise involving recognition of Israel and sought to set up a "rejection front," although it viewed this as more political than military in character. These different approaches were reflected in the noncommittal nature of the communiqué issued when Saddam Hussayn, then Vice President of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council, visited Moscow in April 1975.[1]

The USSR also declined to support Iraq in its perennial dispute with Iran over their common water boundary, the Shatt al-Arab, and disagreed with Baghdad on how best to end the Kurdish conflict (the Soviets, aware that many ICP leaders were Kurds, at times sought to restrain the violence of Baathist military expeditions against the Kurds). Moscow's efforts in 1973 to mediate between Iran and Iraq brought no results, but when Algerian President Houari Boumediene tried his hand and helped bring about an agreement on March 6, 1975, that ended Iranian backing for the Kurdish rebellion, the Soviets reproached the Iraqis for acting without consultation with Moscow, as they felt the Iraqis should have done under the 1972 treaty of alliance. The chill was felt all the way to Baghdad when Saddam Hussayn cut short his above-mentioned visit to Moscow without being received by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Equally unproductive were Soviet attempts, carried out at Saddam Husayn's request, to mediate in the dispute between Iraq and Syria over the waters of the Euphrates River.

Despite these differences and difficulties, Iraqi-Soviet military relations grew closer in 1976–77. Military leaders of the two countries exchanged visits, and in November 1976, Soviet naval units made their first serious show of force in the Persian Gulf, hitherto a Western lake as well as the outgoing sealane for 70 percent of the Western world's oil supplies, by visiting the

[1] *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), Apr. 20 and 21, 1975.

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Iraqi port of Um Qasr. On January 31, 1977, Saddam Husayn journeyed to Moscow at the head of a 100-member delegation that included major military figures. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's subsequent trip to Jerusalem in November, termed "traitorous" by Baghdad, led to an increased flow of Soviet arms to Iraq, with MIG-23 fighters, TU-22 bombers, IL-76 long-range transport planes, and missiles among the items supplied.

THE REAL breakdown in Soviet-Iraqi relations, and consequently in the coalition between the Baath and the ICP, began in 1978. Its first sign was the Iraqi request to the Soviet embassy in Baghdad to move. The embassy, situated in a building near the presidential palace from which it could eavesdrop on discussions in the palace with electronic listening devices, refused. Then the Iraqis cut electricity and water to the building until the Soviets complied with the request. Next, the Iraqi weekly newspaper *Ar Rased* on May 5, 1978, published an unprecedented editorial criticizing the USSR's attitude on the Middle East crisis. It rejected the Soviet theory that any settlement must be based on the recognition of Israel within its 1948 borders.

Sometime the same month, 21 Iraqi soldiers were executed for having tried to organize Communist cells inside the army. In acknowledging the executions, Naim Haddad, a member of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, claimed that all the men had been condemned in 1975, 1976, or 1977.[2] According to some sources, however, the actual number of persons put to death exceeded many times over the 21 admitted by Iraqi officials.[3] Moreover, Amnesty International, the London-based, nonpartisan organization which seeks to save political prisoners in all countries, reported on July 31, 1979, that the ICP had been experiencing repression. Those soldiers executed in May 1978, Amnesty said, had been subject to the provisions of a law imposing the pain of death for non-Baathist political activities within the armed forces, but in July 1978 the death penalty had been extended to all those who had left the army since the Baath took power in July 1968 and who were active in other political groups. Moreover, in the wake of the executions of May 1978, "the Iraqi authorities conducted a sweeping campaign of intimidation against sympathizing members of the ICP, whose activities outside the armed forces have however been authorized since 1973 [when the Progressive National Front was formed]. There have reportedly been more than 20,000 arrests. There have been neither trials nor sentences; those arrested have reportedly been tortured, to the point of death in certain cases."[4] Thus, the 1978 crisis in Iraqi-Soviet relations also provoked a major crisis within the Arab Left in Iraq.

While, by some accounts, Soviet secret police (KGB) agents helped Iraqi Communists to flee abroad, especially to the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen (where some of them were pursued by agents of the Baathist government, and at least one, a teacher, was murdered under mysterious circumstances), the friction between the Baathist regime and the Soviets surfaced in some rather esoteric ways. On May 24, 1978, the official Iraqi newspaper *Al Jumhuriya* for the first time attacked a Soviet ally, Poland, for "complacency" toward Israel. *Al Jumhuriya* accused the Polish government of attaching unusual importance to the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Warsaw ghetto (March 17). A Jewish delegation, including Israeli representatives, had visited Poland and been received by the chief of state. Just before publication of the *Al Jumhuriya* article, the Iraqi government forbade its nationals to travel to Poland because of "ill-treatment" that it said they were receiving from Polish authorities.[5]

A further irritant was continued Iraqi aid to the Eritrean nationalists fighting the Marxist military regime in Ethiopia. This conflict had produced curious alignments. Soviet, Cuban, and Israeli aid went to the Ethiopians (for differing reasons, of course), while most Arab states backed the Eritreans. (The Israeli concern was, quite simply, that a Somali victory in the Ogaden and a local nationalist success in Eritrea would mean that the Red Sea would become an Arab lake, endangering Israel's southern sea approaches).

On May 25, 1978, the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Siyassa* reported, without being contradicted by Baghdad, that Saddam Husayn had threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Moscow if the Soviets persisted in providing massive aid to Ethiopia—which had already included a Soviet airlift for which Baghdad had denied the USSR refueling or staging rights in Iraq. Three days later, the Iraqi Information Minister confirmed the difference with the Soviets over Eritrea, and added that Iraq's position on a Middle East settlement was in contradiction with that of

[2]Radio Baghdad, monitored by the author in Athens, May 21, 1978.

[3]Private interviews with Iraqi refugees in Damascus and Beirut.

[4]Amnesty International release, reprinted in *The Guardian* (London) and *The Times* (London), Aug. 1, 1979.

[5]Radio Baghdad, Mar. 13, 1978.

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the USSR because of the latter's recognition of Israel's right to exist.[6]

The Soviets preferred turning the other cheek to making a harsh response. On June 3, 1978, special ambassador M. L. I. Mendelevich arrived in Baghdad to discuss bilateral problems. Three days afterward, however, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khadham asserted that Iraq was "*on the verge of abrogating its* friendship and cooperation treaty with the USSR and expelling the Soviet experts working on Iraqi territory" (mainly oil technicians and some military instructors training the Iraqi armed forces on new Soviet equipment).[7] Perhaps partly because the charge had been made by the rival Syrian regime, a member of the Iraqi Baathist Revolutionary Command Council, Naim Haddad, denied the assertion as a "vulgar insinuation." Iraq, he said, was not in the habit of making treaties in order to break them. Indeed, Iraq considered the USSR a "strategic ally."[8]

A month later, Saddam Husayn brought the Iraqi-Soviet dispute into full public view by telling *Newsweek,* in an interview published on July 9, that "the Soviet Union will not be satisfied until the entire world becomes Communist." The execution of 21 Iraqi Communists, he added, should be taken as a warning against any interference in Iraq's domestic affairs. This interview, however, was not published in Iraqi newspapers.

Again, the Soviet Union made no public response. Instead, Moscow tried to pour oil on the troubled waters. On July 14, in an article about the 20th anniversary of the Iraqi revolution, *Pravda* stressed the "fruitfulness" of Iraqi-Soviet cooperation. Shortly before, an ICP delegation had been received in Moscow but given only medium-grade treatment. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation to Baghdad in mid-July for the 10th anniversary celebration of the Baathist takeover in Iraq was instructed to "wish the Iraqi CP success in its national activities,"[9] a modest slogan for such a solemn occasion.

Saddam Husayn continued to press the Iraqi offensive on July 21 with the warning that "no country, whether friend or enemy, can decide Iraqi policy,"[10] but a slow improvement in relations seemed to set in thereafter. In September 1978, Iraqi Vice-President Taha Muhi-al-Din Ma'ruf visited Moscow and discussed the Camp David negotiations with Soviet Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin. On October 17, 1978, Saddam Husayn took a conciliatory stance:

The Soviets are our best friends. The USSR always sides with the Arabs. We act accordingly. But we should not fall in love with the Soviet Union if it renounces us. Well, this has never happened, even though our views differ, for example on Eritrea's conflict with Ethiopia.[11]

During the weeks that followed, Saddam Husayn and his top aides as well as other Iraqi leaders, including the navy commander, traveled to Moscow. Saddam Husayn saw both Brezhnev and Kosygin and signed two new Soviet-Iraqi agreements on economic and technical cooperation. In a joint communiqué issued December 12, 1978, the two governments condemned the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David process and called for "unity of all forces in the Arab world opposed to the policy of capitulation," and the Soviets expressed willingness to "strengthen Iraq's defensive capability."[12] At one point during the visit, Kosygin stated that Iraqi-Soviet cooperation "is not affected by momentary ups and downs."[13]

Since then, however, neither Soviet-Iraqi relations nor those between the Baath and the ICP have bettered noticeably. Indeed, hundreds of Iraqi Communists have fled to South Yemen, Western Europe, and (when they could not reach the West) Syria, and there has been no offer of any amnesty to the ICP. Furthermore, Baghdad's links with Moscow have cooled to the freezing point in early 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

FROM THE WINTER of 1978 on, events in Iraq began to be dominated by the revolution against the Shah in Iran. Saddam Husayn had cultivated reasonably good relations with the Shah, and the militant Shi'a Muslims' victory in Iran was a double embarrassment to the Iraqi Baath. First, the secular Baath, whose leadership consisted mainly of army officers, was now faced by a powerful theocracy across its border with the capacity to stir up serious trouble, if not worse, among the 60 percent or so of Iraqis who were Shi'a Muslims (the two Shi'a holy cities, Qarbala and Najjaf, are in Iraq). Second, the Arab minority in Iran's Khuzistan, the province where the main oilfields and Iranian Gulf tanker ports are located, looked to the Baath in Iraq for support in their drive for autonomy, which by the

[6] Ibid., May 28, 1978.
[7] Briefing by Khadham to newsmen in Damascus, June 6, 1978.
[8] Radio Baghdad, June 10, 1978.
[9] Radio Peace and Progress (Moscow), July 15, 1978.
[10] Radio Baghdad, July 21, 1978.
[11] Ibid., Oct. 17, 1978.
[12] Radio Moscow in Arabic, Dec. 12, 1978.
[13] Ibid., Dec. 11, 1978.

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summer of 1979 had developed into something approaching a full-scale revolt.

The Baath party (rather than the army or other official government organs) seems to have channeled arms and perhaps some personnel into Iranian Khuzistan during the tense summer of 1979, when Arab oilfield workers (the same 67,000 or so whose general strike had been decisive in bringing down the Shah in January 1979[14]) committed acts of sabotage in the oilfields and port installations. What is not clear is whether there was close liaison between the Iraqi Communists and the Iranian Tudeh, the old, traditional pro-Soviet party, which claimed several thousand supporters in Khuzistan. At any rate, pitched battles developed between Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's Islamic guards and the Arab guerrillas in Ahvaz, Abadan, and Khoramshahr, Khuzistan's main cities (both of the last two directly face Iraqi territory on the Shatt al-Arab estuary leading into the Persian Gulf). Sheikh Taher Khagani, spiritual head of the Khuzistan Arab People's Organization, warned that disorders in the oilfields, which had resumed production after the long interruption that helped to bring on the world energy crisis, "would provide a pretext for certain quarters [meaning Iraq] to intervene in Iran's domestic affairs under cover of protecting the Arab minority."[15]

At the same time, Shi'a religious riots in Iraq led Saddam Husayn to send troops to most of the Shi'a towns, including Qarbala and Najjaf. Baghdad also declared southern Iraq's own oilfields and port areas a military zone, and Iraqi fighter planes raided Kurdish villages on the Iranian side of the northern border. By the end of 1979, the situation along the land border between Iran and Iraq, and the battle for influence in the Persian Gulf between the ayatollah clerics of Tehran and the secular Iraqi Baathists, had the potential for a major explosion.

The Iraqi and Syrian Baathists, along with other secular Arab leftist movements and the Marxists and Communists both in Iran and Iraq, consider Khomeyni's rule a religious dictatorship and even, to quote one Sunni Arab diplomat, a "cancer in the body of Islam." The attitude is not surprising, for the Islamic world is dominated by Sunni Muslims, numbering about 700 million people. The Shi'a community, inside and outside Iran, totals only about 80 million. This Sunni dominance, however, is shaky in all the Arab Gulf states, and particularly in Iraq. Iraq is nearly 70 percent Shi'a, and most of the Arab Gulf states have either substantial Shi'a minorities or slight Shi'a majorities. Their nervous Sunni rulers, especially in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, view these Shi'a as potential fifth columns which might some day, in alliance with radical Palestinian residents, sabotage the countries' existing oil installations.

ONE OF THE MANY virtues of the impressive encyclopedia-length book of Professor Hanna Batatu is that its exhaustive narratives of Iraqi people and movements, especially the Communists and the Baath, provide ample background to understand what is now going on within Iraq. In the clandestine, downbeaten, yet tough Iraqi Communists of the pre-1958 monarchy, we recognize some of the same traits now seen in the leftist Arab guerrillas of Khuzistan or the imprisoned Communists who await the pleasure of Saddam Husayn's courts and hope for better days. Anyone who ever attended Batatu's lectures on Iraq, and especially on Iraqi Communists, at the American University of Beirut knows how vast his knowledge is. Whether dealing with the minutiae of what gave Iraq's old feudal, landowning classes their power (one pre-1958 landlord is described as drawing his from ownership of "25,905 dunums of land and the Pepsi-Cola distributorship for Iraq") or the detailed history of the Iraqi Communist Party, Batatu's scope is immense.

In his incisive biographical sketch of strongman Saddam Husayn, Batatu swiftly and surely draws the profile. Like his former lesser Baathist partner in power, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (President from 1968 until just before Saddam Husayn's July 1979 purge), Saddam Husayn was born in the al-Begat section of the Albu Nasir tribe near Takrit. (The term "Takriti mafia," first used by veteran correspondent David Hirst of *The Guardian* to describe Iraq's present rulers, comes from the dominance of Takritis in the party. Saddam Husayn, sensitive about this appellation, dropped Takriti as his third name and forbade its use.) Saddam Husayn, Batatu discovers, is the foster son, nephew, and son-in-law of Khairallah al-Talfah, governor of Baghdad, and is a first cousin of Bakr. Batatu says that Saddam Husayn "surpasses al-Bakr in boldness, strength of will, and nimbleness of mind," and "is of a tougher fibre" than his fellow Takritis. After one of the gun battles that took place during the rise of Baathist power, he took a bullet out of his own leg with a knife. His ruthlessness toward the ICP matches that of Qasim. Batatu

[14] Personal interview with Ardeshir Zahedi, former Iranian ambassador to the United States, Oct. 20, 1978.

[15] Arab Press Service, Beirut, Sept. 18, 1979, and various news agencies, Sept. 18-21, 1979.

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aptly points out that since defeating their last opponents, "the Takritis rule through the Baath party, rather than the Baath party through the Takritis."

Like the other authors, Batatu acknowledges the turmoil of Iraq's politics, which he attributes in large part to the role of foreign interference—especially that of the fallen Shah of Iran. He shows how the Shah's intrigues, until the 1975 deal with Saddam Husayn, encouraged the revolt of northern Iraq's 3 million Kurds and prevented their reconciliation with their Sunni Muslim Arab rulers in Baghdad, and he cites the "not-so-secret entente" between the Shah and Israel, prior to 1975, to keep Iraq "as weak and as tied down as possible for as long as possible" by fanning Kurdish and also Shi'a dissidence. At the same time, along with Tareq Ismael and, to a lesser extent, Rony Gabbay and Majid Khadduri, Batatu sets down a fair account of the Baath's undoubted achievements in education, culture, and agrarian and social reform.

Batatu's thorough history of the Communists in Iraq is well supplemented in small ways by Gabbay's recapitulation of how the ICP, founded in 1934 as a rural, peasant movement, paradoxically succeeded only in the cities. Batatu's case histories of individual Communists illustrate the general points made by Gabbay and by Tareq Ismael. Batatu, however, shows much more knowledge and sympathy for his subject.

In his scholarly treatise, emphasizing diplomatic and political events rather than the social and economic circumstances that Batatu stresses, Khadduri gives the reader the same impression that some auditors have gained from his lectures: he knows more than he tells. He is at his best in general observations about the mind and character of Arabs, specifically Iraqi Arabs. For example, he observes:

The Arabs, it is suggested, often speak of freedom and equality as two inseparable words meaning the same thing, but if they were to choose one of the two, it seems that the choice of the great majority would be in favor of equality rather than freedom.

The main contribution of Tareq Ismael's brief volume is its account of the "radicalization" of Arab nationalism, both inside and beyond Iraq's frontiers. He sorts out in concise fashion the real, as well as the purely doctrinal, differences among the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the Baath; the Syrian Social National Party (PPS), a movement born in Syria and Lebanon and often described as "neo-Fascist" despite its leftist pretentions; and the ubiquitous Arab Nationalists' Movement (ANM), a clandestine, pan-Arab group which first followed Nasser's star and then, disillusioned after Egypt's defeat by Israel in 1967, conceived the radical Palestinian guerrilla group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, now headed by George Habbash. In general and specific terms, Ismael also draws upon the confused currents of the Leftist-Palestinian side in the Lebanese civil war of 1975–77 to describe the rise of what he calls the "New Arab Left," committed neither to orthodox communism nor to Maoism (nor, for that matter, to any other "non-Arab" doctrine).

All four of these books went to press too late to record the failure of a serious attempt by the two Baath parties, in Iraq and Syria, to bury their old feuds and unite against President Sadat's peace moves of 1977–79. In 1978, Saddam Husayn sponsored two Arab summit conferences which produced a series of inter-Arab reconciliations. Most important, Iraq subscribed for the first time to a general Arab consensus on the conditions for peace with Israel, giving its first tacit consent to the formula embodied in UN General Assembly Resolution 242 as a basis for peace negotiations. In October 1978, President Hafiz al-Assad flew to Baghdad to meet Bakr and announce a Syrian-Iraqi "charter of joint action," designed to end their decade of strife.[16] By mid-1979, some of the charter's provisions had been fulfilled—mainly, the formation of committees to oversee political, economic, and military cooperation (though the watchful Israelis saw no sign of genuine military cooperation, e.g., joint staff work or stationing of Iraqi troops in Syria). In addition, the 650-kilometer oil pipeline between northern Iraq's oilfields and the Syrian port of Baniyas was reopened after being closed for two years; and plans were formulated on paper for a full union of the two countries, with one name, one flag, and one president (alternately Syrian and Iraqi).

This reconciliation was dealt a possibly fatal blow by Saddam Husayn's discovery, in July 1979, of what he believed was a Syrian-sponsored plot against him. More than 30 Iraqi Baathists, some high in the leadership, were executed. An Arab emissary from outside, who tried to mediate between the rival Baathist factions, told this writer that Saddam was convinced that the conspirators, with the blessing of Damascus, had planned to jump the gun and proclaim the *instant* union of Syria and Iraq, with Assad as president and a member of the "pro-Syrian" Baathist faction in Iraq, Abdel

[16]Radio Damascus, Oct. 21, 1978.

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Khalik Samarrai, as vice-president. Most signs that Iraq was prepared to join a new "eastern front" against Israel faded, and Saddam Husayn appeared to be turning his attention more and more to the Gulf instead.

THE PICTURE of the Iraqi Baath that emerges from its years of internecine struggle and its battles with Communist and other challengers is that of a group of secular civilian ideologues using military means to work toward the goal of an ideal Arab socialist commonwealth. Its slogans are the three basic principles of unity, socialism, and Arabism that the Syrian Christian schoolteacher Michel Aflaq, the Baath founder, laid down. The Iraqi Baath's map of the world envisages that all Arabs will ultimately live under Baathist leadership. To fulfill this vision, the Baathists believe, a tough, efficient government in Iraq must first assume leadership of Arab foreign policy. The next step is to fill any political or ideological vacuum in the Arab world—e.g., that created by a coup against a king or some other breakdown of authority in an Arab country.

From the time it returned to power in 1968, the Iraqi Baath has always tried to strike a delicate balance between civilian and military wings. Five years of work and intrigue by Saddam Husayn tipped the balance in favor of the civilian wing, by gradually eliminating from powerful positions key Baathist field generals. Saddam Husayn groomed Gen. 'Adnan Khayrallah Talfah, his cousin and brother-in-law, to become Defense Minister when Bakr vacated the post to become President. Talfah has now emerged as Saddam Husayn's heir apparent.

Nevertheless, violence and expediency, rather than the idealism of Iraq's early leftist struggles, have become the main determinants of the fate of Iraq's patient, (and some would say) long-suffering people. The Baathists of Baghdad believe that ruthless violence, when necessary, breeds popular obedience at home and—combined with oil wealth—respect abroad. In truth, since Sumerian and Babylonian times, Iraq's history has been one of successive oppressors and oppressed, with most governments made and broken by bloodshed. Just as the ruling monarch and his pro-Western Prime Minister, Nuri Said, were massacred in the 1958 revolution, their successors were killed by other opponents. And from 1968 until the present day, Saddam Husayn, in his actions against any who might threaten him, has demonstrated again that might, in Iraq, makes right.

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Notes & Views

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THE USSR, CHINA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Edward E. Azar ("Soviet and Chinese Roles in the Middle East," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1979) has performed a service by focusing attention on the complex Sino-Soviet relationship in the Middle East. I concur in his assessment (with some reservations with respect to Soviet arms supply) that "neither the USSR nor China has managed to demonstrate to the peoples of the Middle East that it is critically relevant to the region's needs." Though the Soviet Union has at times managed to establish at least a partial patron/client relationship with several Middle Eastern states (Egypt for over two decades from the mid-1950's; South Yemen today and, to a lesser extent, Syria and Iraq), Beijing's presence in the region is less evident than Moscow's—especially following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

I disagree, however, with Professor Azar's basic thesis that the roles of both China and the Soviet Union have visibly diminished in the Middle East during the 1970's. It depends on where and at what one is looking. Despite setbacks, the Soviet Union continues to exercise considerable influence in some parts of the Middle East (Syria and South Yemen are obvious examples, in addition to Afghanistan). As for China, presence is not the criterion. Beijing's actual influence is rather more extensive and contains greater potential than Professor Azar describes. Professor Yitzak Shichor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem wrote recently (*The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949–1977*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 192):

If we try to evaluate Chinese achievements in the Middle East in traditional terms of power politics, then China's Middle East policy must be admitted a complete failure. Yet, if we bear in mind that Peking has never sought direct involvement and presence in the Middle East, nor economic or other gains, the conclusion would be somewhat different.

China's role in the Middle East cannot be measured only in terms of diplomatic or trade presence there, or ability to provide aid. The PRC's major leverage in the region has always been its potential as an alternate backer which area states and groups can use to pressure the Soviet Union. That function continues, enhanced as China evolves into a major power with a more activist foreign policy. Indeed, since it entered the UN in 1971 and assumed a seat on the Security Council, China has been considered a great power by many Middle Easterners. Today, although China has little economic or military leverage in the Middle East outside Pakistan, it does have a good deal of prestige and potential political influence in Egypt and to a lesser extent in the Yemen Arab Republic and Iraq and among various Palestinian groups.

With the normalization of Sino-US relations, China has acted at times as a supporter and even interpreter of US policy in the Middle East. Despite US efforts during 1979 to maintain a policy stance not aligned with China against the Soviet Union, Beijing on more than one occasion portrayed itself to Middle Easterners as an "independent ally" of the US. Beijing desires, as Washington does, stability in the region and an overall peace settlement so as to thwart Soviet "fishing in troubled waters." Beijing's media comment favorably on US provision of arms to Middle Eastern states and have backed US restraint in the hostage situation in Iran.

Both Beijing and Moscow recognize the Middle East as the world's most volatile region. As an increasingly articulate, credible, and activist China continues its encouragement of Third World nations to oppose Soviet "hegemonism," we are seeing the Middle East become a more important arena of Sino-Soviet competition. Contrary to Professor Azar's statement that there is a "low level of Soviet and Chinese concern with finding sources of raw materials . . . ," Moscow—due to its emerging energy shortage—is finding the Middle East of growing importance. The world's energy situation also provides grist for the Chinese accusation of a Soviet southward expansion to gain access to oil production areas and control of energy shipment routes so as to gain a stranglehold on the economies of the Western world and Japan. Beijing, in keeping with the reactive characteristic of modern Chinese foreign policy, strengthens its efforts to achieve leverage in any area into which it sees the Soviets apparently pushing.

In the March-April 1979 issue of *Problems of Communism*, David Lynn Price's article, "Moscow and the Persian Gulf," examined Soviet policy in the Middle East and concluded that the Soviet Union is still forced to follow events there rather than direct them. Whether or not we can agree with this view in light of recent events in Afghanistan, the question in regard to China is: How successful do the Chinese think the Soviet Union has been in what Beijing regards as a grand design to gain control of the

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Middle East? The answer is "very successful," and this perception has led in recent weeks to a more aggressive (because frustrated) Chinese response, which not only openly criticizes the US for what Beijing perceives as failure to stand up to Israeli pressuring, but is surely one reason for the recent Chinese public support for Pakistani nuclear development and, most recently, to renewed affirmation of ties by China with the Palestinians. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong, Dec. 7, 1979, p. 36), in a somewhat hyperbolic statement, described this trend as "a new dynamic phase" in China's Middle East diplomacy.

Finally, I have a question about the accuracy of Professor Azar's data base. This, I admit, arises in part from disaffinity for mechanical devices for interpreting history. However, I am also disturbed by the evident gaps in the compiled information. For example, Professor Azar lists no cooperative economic interaction between China and Israel for the 1948–62 period, thus omitting the 1954 Israeli trade delegation to China. I am more greatly astonished by the low marks given Sino-Egyptian political cooperation in the post-1973 period. Beijing and Cairo have never had better rapport, their relationship having grown steadily closer since China stepped in with offers of aid and renewed friendship when Cairo abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in early 1976. China's political support for Cairo on the issue of the treaty with Israel has been steadfast and has extended from defenses by the New China News Agency for Egypt's support of Palestinian rights to arm twisting on behalf of Cairo in connection with the recent nonaligned summit in Havana.

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EDITORS' NOTE: Ms. Harris wished us to state that the opinions expressed in her letter are her own and do not necessarily reflect official US government positions.

MR. AZAR REPLIES: I appreciate having the opportunity to respond to Ms. Harris's letter to you regarding my article in *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1979). I want to emphasize two (among many) reasons for my response. First, Ms. Harris failed to understand my argument, and hence, my derived conclusion. Second, her letter exhibits lack of knowledge regarding the interface between "analytical approaches" and "research tools and techniques" in the area of social research. Allow me to explain.

First, my article stated that I expect the generalized influence and presence of the USSR and the PRC (as well as the US) in the Middle East to be dependent on a number of variables, two of which are (1) the past and present level of conflictive and cooperative behavior in the region and (2) the ability of these world powers to effectively help in solving the complex local problems that preoccupy the leaders and peoples of the Middle East. These local social problems are the Arab-Israeli protracted social conflict (with its ethnic and sociocultural components in addition to its political and military ones) and the issue of structural development of the region (with its built-in social constraints such as population explosion and issues of economic underdevelopment). To my thinking, these problems cannot be solved from outside but must be solved from within the region, and they require general cultural and political transformation. Thus, the USSR and the PRC (and even the US at times) appear to be unable to help solve these problems, at least in the foreseeable future. Since my data show that, relative to the US, the USSR and the PRC are not doing so well in political, economic, and even military relations with the region, especially since 1973, and given my own knowledge and experience in judging trends in international relations, I argued that "it would appear probable that the influence of the USSR and China in the Middle East will not grow significantly in the foreseeable future. Indeed, their roles in the region may even diminish further." Neither Ms. Harris's letter to you nor any of the articles, studies, or books that I have read on the USSR and the PRC in the Middle East have convinced me of the opposite conclusion. If we were to rank acceptance of external actors in the region, one would have to conclude that, of the three, surely Americans have the greatest chance of being accepted as exogenous parties.

Soviet and Chinese failures and damaging experiences elsewhere, in Africa, support this. My past contacts with many Arab leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens have convinced me of the validity of my conclusion. Events in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and even Afghanistan add weight to my thesis. Soviet aggression against Afghanistan is to me a sign of failure and frustration—not a sign of success—on the part of the USSR in dealing with its neighbors. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese have shown any ability to help solve the pressing problems of the Middle East. I agree with Ms. Harris that China is very young in the business of politics in the Middle East. That is why I think that, in the next 10 to 15 years, China's role in the Middle East will be very marginal. The PRC has nothing to offer the Arabs and Israelis toward the resolution of either the Palestinian-Israeli social conflict or the overall protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. China has too many developmental problems of its own to be able to contribute much to the regional and national development of the Middle East. But, if you want to talk about the nuisance value of the USSR and the PRC in the Middle East, that is a different matter altogether.

Secondly, the greatest disservice which Ms. Harris renders to the research community that reads *Problems of Communism* is her naive criticism of an area that she appears to know very little about, namely, empirical and quantitative research. She admits that she is unhappy with my conclusions because of her "disaffinity for mechanical devices for interpreting history." I have never stated that this is how I arrived at my conclusions, and so she accuses me incorrectly. In fact, there are no such devices in existence. Researchers who

CORRECTIONS

In the last paragraph of page 58 of the article, "Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations" (*Problems of Communism*, September-December 1979), the figure for the area of land disputed by the Soviet Union and China in the Pamirs should be 20,000 square kilometers, not 10,000. In the photo of Zhenbao Island on page 59 of the same article, the arrow *does* indicate the direction of flow of the Ussuri River.

In the "Correspondence" section of the September-December 1979 issue, the editors inadvertently demoted Soviet naval chief S. G. Gorshkov. His official rank is "Admiral of the Fleet of the USSR," not "Admiral of the Fleet."

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view the introduction of quantitative analysis into some aspects of the study of international relations as "mechanical" bring harm to both qualitative and quantitative work.

When Ms. Harris writes that she is not sure whether my data are accurate, I cannot help but urge her to go back into her own State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), files and dig up the study which was conducted for INR by Professors Michael O'Leary and William Coplin in 1975. In this study—since published by them in a book entitled *Quantitative Techniques in Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting* (New York, NY, Praeger, 1975)—the authors compared my publicly collected data with the State Department's "confidential" data regarding the study of violence in the Middle East. They found that my data collection compared favorably with that obtained at State. Since the early 1970's, there have been hundreds of articles and books written using my data, and much time and effort have been invested in creating what is the largest public data bank in the world. We have tried to be careful and systematic and have studied the problem of data validity and reliability very many times. I would also wish that Ms. Harris showed more acquaintance with what her own governmental unit has been doing in the area of computerized and non-computerized data libraries.

In conclusion, my article in *Problems of Communism* was based on the use of data, analytical criteria, and personal observation and experience in the analysis of international relations. In the article, I described briefly the data base, the method of collection, and the procedure for analysis. Of course, different people prefer to have their data sets stored and managed differently. I have chosen to store it on computer disc in order to be able to have access to it faster and more easily. Other people prefer to clip cables, newspapers, and documents for storage in filing cabinets or books of one sort or another—a procedure used by some people at INR and elsewhere. These differences are not terribly important, but what is important is what we do with the data and how we give it meaning. It is not uncommon for two scholars to arrive at different conclusions even when looking at the same data base, but it is important not to discount findings contrary to one's own conclusions on the basis of hasty and poorly thought-out criticisms of another's methodology.

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